Dalit v/s Bahujan and the Need for Multi -Class Unity

 

Dalit v/s Bahujan and the Need for Multi -Class Unity

- S.R. Darapuri, National President, All India Peoples Front

 

For quite some time now, the term "Bahujan" has been used in politics instead of "Dalit." According to the proponents of the Bahujan concept, Bahujan includes Dalits and backward classes. According to Kanshi Ram, it also includes Muslims, and their number constitutes 85%. According to his theory, the Bahujans should unite and seize power from the 15% upper castes. While this formula sounds very good and seems to hold great potential, the question is, what is the formula for uniting the Bahujans? Is it the commonality of being Untouchable and Shudra, or something else? The Untouchables and Shudras are divided into countless castes, and they suffer from varying degrees of caste pride. They are just as afflicted by Brahmanism (superiority complex) as they accuse the upper castes of being. There are many intense internal contradictions within them. The Backward Castes consider themselves superior to the Dalits and behave accordingly. Currently, most atrocities against Dalits are committed not by the upper castes but by the prosperous (kulak) Backward Castes. Most Dalits are labourers, and the economic interests of these newly wealthy castes clash with those of the labourers. This is why these castes perpetrate atrocities against Dalits regarding wages and forced labour. In such a situation, on what basis can unity be established between Dalits and Backward Castes? On one hand, there is social distance, and on the other hand, a conflict of economic interests. Therefore, merely being Dalit and backward, or Untouchable and Shudra, cannot be the basis for unity. Even if some unity is formed based on political self-interest, it cannot be permanent, as has been observed in practice.

Now, if we analyse the class structure of Dalits and Backward Castes, it is found that even within the Dalit community, a class division between the prosperous and the poor has emerged. The distinction between the forward, backward, and extremely backward classes within the Backward Castes is very clear. For some time now, only the affluent sections of the Dalit and Backward classes have benefited from economic development and gained a share in political power. In contrast, most Dalits and Backward Classes remain severely marginalized. This division has given rise to the concept of the "most backward" among Dalits and other backward classes. This also makes it clear that the concept of "Bahujan" (the majority) is merely an abstract idea. Similarly, among Muslims, there is a division between Ashraf, Ajlaf, and Arzal, which is manifesting itself as the Pasmanda (most backward) Muslims  movement.

Now the question arises: what can be the real basis for unity within these groups? The above analysis makes it clear that within Dalits, backward classes, and Muslims, there are two distinct classes – the forward and the backward – whose economic and political interests are different, and there are sharp contradictions and conflicts between them. Until now, the dominant section of these groups has been leading the entire caste/class and community in the name of caste and religion, and it is this section that has reaped all the economic and political benefits of development. This has intensified caste/class divisions and conflicts within these groups. Various political parties have been exploiting this caste/class division, but no party has identified their real issues or done anything for their upliftment.

 Recently, the BJP has united them in the name of Hindutva and garnered their votes. If we look closely, this class is socially, economically, and politically backward. The real upliftment of these classes can only be achieved by addressing the issues related to their backwardness and formulating policies to resolve them. Therefore, their true unity can only be built around these issues, not based on caste and religion. From the perspective of economic and political interests, these groups are natural allies because their problems are similar, and their struggle for liberation is also the same.

Under the umbrella of "Bahujan," the issues and interests of the most backward sections get suppressed. Therefore, to establish strong unity among these extremely backward sections, instead of the artificial concept of Bahujan based on caste/religion, issues related to their social, economic, and political backwardness should be raised. Politics based on caste and religion only strengthens Hindutva. With this objective, the All India People's Front (AIPF) has included the following issues under social justice in its agenda: (1) separating the quota for backward Muslims from the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), amending Article 341 to include Dalit Muslims and Christians in the Scheduled Castes, and implementing the recommendations of the Sachar Committee and Ranganath Mishra Committee; (2) providing separate reservation quotas for extremely backward Hindu and Muslim castes from within the 27% OBC quota; (3) restoring the reservation system in promotions as soon as possible; (4) filling vacant government posts under the SC/ST quota through a special campaign; (5) providing reservations to Dalits, Adivasis, OBCs, and Extremely Backward Classes in the private sector as well; (6) granting tribal status to tribal communities like the Kol community of Uttar Pradesh; (7) strictly implementing the Forest Rights Act and making employment a fundamental right, etc.

 With the aim of giving representation to these sections, the party has reserved 75% of the positions in its constitution for Dalits, Backward Classes, Minorities, and Women. The AIPF is striving to promote issue-based multi-class political unity instead of caste-based Bahujan politics, as Dr. Ambedkar also did by establishing the Republican Party of India (RPI). With this objective, the AIPF is currently running an Employment and Social Rights Campaign which is getting good response.

1. Factors Responsible for the Downfall of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)

 

1.    Factors Responsible for the Downfall of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)

SR Darapuri, National President, All India Peoples Front

The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), founded by Kanshi Ram in 1984 as a vehicle for Dalit and marginalized community empowerment, achieved its peak in 2007 by winning an absolute majority in Uttar Pradesh (UP) with a broad "Sarvajan" coalition. However, since 2012, the party has faced a steep decline, evidenced by its vote share dropping from around 30% in 2007 to 9.39% in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections (0 seats won), and only 1 seat in the 2022 UP Assembly polls. This erosion stems from a combination of internal, strategic, and external factors. Below, I outline the key reasons, drawing from analyses across political commentary and academic insights.

 1. Leadership Failures and Centralization Under Mayawati

   Mayawati's prolonged dominance has led to a highly centralized, dynastic structure that stifles innovation and accountability. The party shifted from Kanshi Ram's grassroots movement to a "supremo-centered" entity, with decisions like appointing her nephew Akash Anand as successor alienating cadres. Corruption allegations, including links to land mafias and personal wealth accumulation, tarnished her image, while her limited campaigning (often attributed to fears of central agency probes) reduced visibility. Post-election, she blamed external factors like EVMs and Muslim distrust rather than internal reforms, eroding credibility.

 2. Erosion of the Core Dalit Voter Base

   The BSP's traditional Jatav Dalit support (about 10% of UP's population) has fragmented, with even loyal voters splitting between BSP, BJP, and SP-Congress alliances. More critically, non-Jatav Dalits (the majority of UP's 21% SC population) shifted en masse to the BJP since 2014, attracted by its "subaltern Hindutva" and welfare schemes like Ujjwala and PM Awas Yojana. Post-2022 surveys showed less than half of Dalits voting BSP, with a quarter of Jatavs and half of non-Jatavs moving to BJP. This reflects the party's failure to address aspirations of an upwardly mobile Dalit middle class.

3. Loss of Broader Coalitions and Minority/OBC Support

   The 2007 "Sarvajan" strategy briefly united Dalits, Brahmins, Muslims, and OBCs, but backlash from Dalit cadres forced a retreat to core voters, alienating allies. Brahmins defected to BJP, Muslims to SP, and OBC groups like Kurmis, Koeris, and Rajbhars followed suit due to BSP's inability to sustain inclusive messaging. In 2024, minorities and OBCs overwhelmingly backed the SP-Congress INDIA bloc, leaving BSP as a "spoiler" that indirectly aided BJP by splitting anti-BJP votes.

4. Organizational Decay and Leadership Exodus

   The party has suffered a mass exodus of stalwarts, including MPs like Kunwar Danish Ali and Ritesh Pandey, and MLAs defecting to BJP or SP for "greener pastures." Ground-level cadre has withered, with no visible banners or rallies in core Dalit areas during elections, signaling disinterest. This stems from transactional politics—welcoming defectors for funds/tickets without ideological vetting—turning the BSP into an "election machine" rather than a sustained movement.

 5. Ideological Rigidity and Failure to Adapt to Political Shifts

   BSP's subdued criticism of BJP, silence on issues like constitutional erosion, and abstention from opposition campaigns (e.g., "Save the Constitution") allowed rivals to capture Dalit anxieties. It neglected socio-economic reforms like redistribution during its 2007-2012 rule, focusing on symbolism (e.g., Ambedkar statues) over governance. In a bipolar UP polity dominated by BJP-SP, BSP's refusal to form effective alliances (fearing subordination of Dalit interests) isolated it further.

6. Broader External Pressures: BJP's Dominance and Polarization

   The BJP's organizational strength, welfare populism, and Hindu nationalist appeal have fragmented Dalit-Bahujan unity, drawing non-Jatav SCs and OBCs into its fold. Events like the Ram Temple inauguration amplified this, while BSP's anodyne strategy failed to counter it. Additionally, the rise of new Dalit voices (e.g., Bhim Army's Chandrashekhar Azad) has diluted BSP's monopoly on Dalit mobilization.

 While these factors explain the BSP's sharp downturn, some analysts argue it's not "permanent." The party's ~10% consistent vote share reflects a resilient core, and historical recoveries (e.g., post-1990s dip) suggest potential revival if Mayawati fosters second-line leadership and adapts to caste census demands. However, without introspection, irrelevance looms in UP's evolving landscape.

Courtesy: grok.com

Secularism and BJP governments spending public money on celebration of Hindu festival

 

Secularism and BJP governments spending public money on celebration of Hindu festival

SR Darapuri I.P.S.(Retd)

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led governments in India, particularly at the state level (e.g., Uttar Pradesh under Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath), have allocated significant public funds to organize and promote major Hindu festivals. These include events like the Kumbh Mela and Ayodhya's Deepotsav. Such expenditures are often justified by the government as efforts to boost cultural heritage, tourism, and economic activity rather than purely religious promotion. However, critics, including opposition leaders and constitutional experts, argue that this practice contravenes India's secular framework by using taxpayer money to favor one religion, potentially violating principles of state neutrality.

 Key Examples of Public Spending

- Kumbh Mela (2025, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh): The Uttar Pradesh government invested a record ₹70 billion (approximately £640 million) in infrastructure, sanitation, security, and publicity for the event, which drew an estimated 400 million devotees. This included a nationwide campaign featuring images of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. The festival was framed as a blend of religious significance and modern development, with Modi personally participating in rituals. While attendance shattered records, a crowd crush in January 2025 resulted in at least 30 deaths, highlighting logistical challenges funded by public resources.

- Ayodhya Deepotsav (October 19, 2025, Uttar Pradesh): The state government organized a grand Diwali celebration, including the lighting of 150,000 oil lamps (diyas) along the Saryu River, a world-record aarti with 2,100 performers, light-and-sound shows, and fireworks. Chief Minister Adityanath led the event, which was promoted as a symbol of Lord Ram's return and a tourism draw. Exact expenditure figures were not publicly detailed, but opposition figures questioned the use of public funds for purchasing lamps and organizing rituals, estimating costs in crores of rupees based on similar past events.

These are not isolated; earlier instances include the 2019 Kumbh Mela, where the central government under Modi spent unprecedented sums (over ₹4,000 crore) on the event ahead of elections, blending religious grandeur with political messaging.

Constitutional Perspective on Secularism and Public Funding

India's Constitution enshrines secularism as a core principle, explicitly added to the Preamble in 1976 and affirmed as a "basic structure" by the Supreme Court in the 1994 S.R. Bommai case, meaning it cannot be altered by amendments. Relevant provisions under Articles 25–28 guarantee freedom of religion while mandating state neutrality:

Article 25: Freedom to profess, practice, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, and health.  Allows personal religious expression but permits state regulation to prevent favoritism. Festivals can be practiced privately, but state sponsorship risks unequal treatment.

Article 26:  Right of religious denominations to manage their affairs. Empowers communities to self-govern, reducing justification for state intervention or funding.

Article 27: No taxes shall be levied for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion. Directly prohibits using public (taxpayer) funds to promote one faith, as it compels citizens to subsidize beliefs they may not share. Critics cite this as violated by festival spending, viewing it as indirect "promotion."

Article 28:  No religious instruction in state-funded institutions (with exceptions for endowed ones). Reinforces separation by barring state resources from religious education or worship, extending analogously to events.

Article 27 is pivotal: It bars the appropriation of tax proceeds for religious promotion, ensuring the state does not act as a patron. Legal scholars argue that funding Hindu-specific festivals like Deepotsav or Kumbh Mela breaches this by prioritizing one religion, potentially eroding equality under Article 14 (right to equality). The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on festival funding but has upheld secularism in related contexts, such as dismissing challenges to interfaith participation in state events (September 2025 judgment) and protecting minority rights in school funding cases.

Criticisms and Defenses

- Criticisms (Against Secularism): Opposition leaders like Samajwadi Party chief Akhilesh Yadav have called such spending a "waste" and insensitive to fiscal priorities, urging a shift to year-round illuminations like Christmas abroad—sparking backlash for allegedly mocking Hindu traditions. Congress's Rashid Alvi echoed this, stating public funds for "religious matters like lamps" violate the Constitution.

 Broader concerns include politicization: Events like Kumbh Mela are seen as tools for BJP's Hindutva agenda, fostering a "Hindu Rashtra" narrative that sidelines minorities and undermines secularism. In 2023, Uttar Pradesh's allocation of funds for festivals like Ram Navami was labelled an "attempt to enmesh religion with administration."

- Defenses (Cultural, Not Religious):

 BJP leaders counter that these are cultural celebrations promoting unity and tourism, not religious endorsements. For instance, Uttar Pradesh Deputy CM Keshav Prasad Maurya accused critics of "insulting Hindu faith" for vote-bank politics, emphasizing diyas as symbols of harmony. The government argues such events generate economic benefits (e.g., jobs, pilgrim economy) and align with India's pluralistic heritage, where national holidays include festivals from multiple faiths (Diwali, Eid, Christmas). No major court has struck down these expenditures, suggesting a gray area where "cultural" framing provides leeway.

 Conclusion: A Contested Practice

Yes, BJP governments are spending public money on Hindu festivals, with documented examples totaling billions of rupees in recent years. Whether this is "against the concept of secularism" depends on interpretation: Legally, it treads close to Article 27's prohibition, raising valid concerns about state favouritism in a multi-religious society. Politically, it fuels debates on Hindutva's role in governance. For a definitive resolution, affected citizens could petition courts, but current practice persists amid ongoing contention. India's secularism remains aspirational—balancing faith with equality—rather than absolute.

Courtesy: Grok