Understanding the Paradox of Changes among dalits of Punjab

special article
Economic & Political Weekly EPW octoBER 11, 2008 49
cParamjit S Judge, Gurpreet Bal
A study of dalits in two districts of Punjab reveals that
ghettoisation remains common (including in urban
areas). While the traditional caste occupational structure
has changed, this is less so among dalits in rural areas.
Caste endogamy remains the norm.
The study shows that casteism is powerfully
embedded in the collective consciousness. The caste
system is oppressive due to discrimination, exclusion,
exploitation and untouchability, but at the same time it
situates the dalits in the system as a collective identity.
Their desire is to end all kinds of discrimination,
oppression and exclusion, but not the caste system in
its entirety. This is an instance of a deep-rooted
internalisation of a world view.
This paper is based on interviews of 1,600 dalit
respondents randomly selected in Amritsar and
Jalandhar districts of Punjab.
Since independence, the forces that have been unleashed to
ameliorate the conditions of the dalits in India include conscious
efforts on the part of the government through constitutional
provisions, reservation policies and special development
programmes. Besides, there have been numerous instances
of the efforts by the dalits through political mobilisation towards
improving their conditions. All these efforts towards changing
the socio-economic conditions of the dalits for the better are destined
to have a bearing on the caste system as such. This paper is
an attempt, based on empirical investigation, to understand the
paradox involved in the changes that are taking place among the
Punjabi dalits. The main objective of this paper is to examine
whether at the empirical level all these forces have made an
impact with regard to the conditions of the dalits in Punjab.
Equally important is to see whether the caste system has been
eroded at different levels of the lives of the dalits. Ghurye (1969)
identifies the following features of the caste system: segmental
division of society, hierarchy, restriction on feeding and social
intercourse, civil and religious disabilities and privileges of the
different sections, lack of unrestricted choice of occupation and
restrictions on marriage. In certain respects, the present study is
linked to the identification and examination of certain dimensions
of the caste system that are expected to change.
In the specific context of Punjab, with dalits constituting 28.85
per cent of the population of the state, attempts have been made
to identify certain key dimensions of change in the socio-economic
conditions of the dalits [Jodhka 2002 and Judge 2004]. Based on
the empirical research some dimensions have been examined
by
these two studies, namely, social ecology, religious places and
economic conditions.1 Equal attention is needed for the investigation
into the issues that are linked with the way the dalits
construct their orientation towards change with regard to caste
endogamy and caste identity. It may be added that the caste system
and casteism are equally important in impeding and facilitating
certain basic changes in the system. The caste system is
marked by political and economic asymmetry and cultural plurality,
whereas casteism is the system of ideas and principles that
justify the system. As a system of justificatory ideas, casteism is
embedded in the mind and the world view of the people and
may persist longer than the changes in the caste system through
education, occupation and social ecology. Keeping in view the
central features of caste, the following aspects have been examined
here to map the changing (and not so changing) contours of
Punjabi dalits: social ecology, hereditary occupations, religious
places, caste endogamy and caste identity.
The present paper is a part of the report submitted to the University
Grants Commission that funded the project ‘Education, Empowerment,
Emigration and Entrepreneurship: A Sociological Study of Mobility
among the Dalits in Punjab’. The authors wish to acknowledge the
assistance provided by Bhupinder Thakur, Gurpreet Singh and Manoj
Birdi as research staff. Critical comments of M Rajivlochan are gratefully
acknowledged.
We are grateful to the referee of this journal for giving useful
comments as a result of which we have been able to improve the
paper tremendously.
Paramjit S Judge (paramjitjudge@yahoo.co.uk) and Gurpreet Bal
(gbal.judge@gmail.com) are at the Department of Sociology,
Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar.
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octoBER 11, 2008 EPW Economic & P 50 olitical Weekly
Before proceeding to a discussion of the above-mentioned aspects
of the changing and perpetuating conditions of the dalits,
it is important to briefly state the methodology of the study. The
study is based on the interview of 1,600 dalit respondents
randomly selected in two districts of Punjab, namely, Amritsar
and Jalandhar. An equal number of the sample (400) was drawn
from each of the four units that were identified as social types,
namely, Amritsar city, Amritsar villages, Jalandhar city and
Jalandhar villages.2
1 S ocial Ecology
The social organisation of physical space is one of the most important
dimensions of understanding change in a society. The
notion of the ghetto basically emerged in the Jewish context in
which it was understood that the Jewish population was confined
to overcrowded localities. There are historical reasons for the
emergence of the phenomenon and in the post-Holocaust period,
the situation has somewhat undergone a
change with regard to the Jews. The ghettos,
however, have not disappeared. It has
been found that ethnic communities and
blacks live in ghettos. Two reasons are ascribed
to the process, namely, a low income
level and sociocultural/racial distinction
from the dominant population of
the community. The latter is so strong
that it tends to become the only reason
for ghettoisation. An informal network
develops in which the dominant community
creates a system of checks to
ensure the denial of entry to the “others”
as residents in the locality. In other
words, the social organisation of space
occurs in such a manner that the
economic dimension in the determination
of physical space gets marginalised.3
It is important to mention that few attempts have been made to
understand the social organisation of the urban physical space
with regard to the dalits. One of the ways of understanding the
social organisation of space is to know the caste background of
the neighbours. It is important to begin our discussion on the
neighbourhood patterns. Table 1 shows the caste background of
the two neighbours of the respondents. It may be pointed out that
the respondents were asked to reveal the caste background of the
neighbours residing on both sides of their houses.
It is evident from the data that the respondents have been predominantly
living in a neighbourhood where the people of their
own caste reside. The fact that draws immediate attention is that
even the cities are not free from caste-based neighbourhoods.4
The social ecology of the urban areas acquires importance
because
of the general understanding that cities are the modern
centres where caste distinctions do not operate in the market situation.
Possession of capital and goods for exchange becomes the
most crucial basis of interaction. So far as the market is concerned,
similar principles may operate, though the western
experiences of immigrants reveal that even the market situation
could create exclusionary practices on the basis of birth-ascribed
features. Influenced by the city life in the western countries and
repulsed by the Indian village life, B R Ambedkar did not only
create a critique of the village republic the way it was constructed
by the British administrators [Moon 1989], but also asked the
dalits to leave the villages and go to the cities [Virdi 2004]. However,
as Judge and Bal (2005) have argued, the migration
of the
Punjabi dalits neither followed any such perception that their
conditions would undergo change nor was there any increase in
migration rate. Even now the proportion of the dalits in urban
Punjab is less than that of villages. As a matter of fact the expanding
cities have enveloped the villages that made many of them
city-dwellers. The city was to them a place where the market situation
could be clearly separated from the residential space. In the
case of residential spaces the concentration of dalits in certain
localities is obvious. It is evident from the data in Table 2 that in
the case of 18 wards in Amritsar and 21 wards in Jalandhar the
percentages of the scheduled castes
(SCs) are above their population percentage
in the state ranging from 29 to
85 per cent.
There is another fact that comes to
the fore in the case of all the localities
in both the cities. In Amritsar, balmikis
in Gowal Mandi, mazabis in Guru Ki
Wadali and meghs in Haripura localities
are in an overwhelming majority.
In Jalandhar ad-dharmis/chamars in
Boota Mandi and Mithapur, balmikis
in Ali Mohalla and meghs in Bhargo
Camp are living in their own caste
localities. In such a situation in which
social ecology corresponds with the
caste background, the classical notion
of the city is seriously challenged. The
political
economy perspective would
lead us to the understanding that such a situation could have
emerged due to the overlapping of class and caste positions. It
may be partially true. But it was seen that even in the case of economic
mobility, as is illustrated by the ad-dharmis of Boota
Mandi, social ecology is marginally altered. The prosperous addharmi
respondents had then started living in the adjoining
Guru Tegh Bahadur Nagar in palatial houses, but the locality was
still mainly inhabited by the ad-dharmis. Sharma (2003) in his
study of a small town in Rajasthan has shown how the social
organisation
of space is closely associated with the caste. There is
a likelihood of a small town showing the ecological segregation
of castes. The interesting
aspect is that all the big cities of Punjab
like Amritsar, Ludhiana and Jalandhar have the same kind of
pattern. Such a pattern organises the social space in such a way
that the perpetuation
of caste identities seems highly probable.
At the same time, such aggregation of people of one caste at one
place facilitates the mobilisation process.
The villages hardly show any changed scenario with regard to
the settlement pattern. As is evident from Table 1, the dalits
continue to have segregated houses. In the villages of Amritsar
Table 1: Caste Background of Two Neighbours
Caste Status Urban Rural Total
Same caste 736 (92.00) 766 (95.75) 1,502 (93.88)
Both higher 7 (0.87) 15 (1.88) 22 (1.37)
One same, one higher 48 (6.00) 18 (2.25) 66 (4.12)
One high, one lower 9 (1.13) 1 (0.12) 10 (0.63)
Total 800 (100) 800 (100) 1,600 (100)
Figures in brackets are columnwise percentages.
Table 2: Number of Wards according to the Percentage of the
Scheduled Castes in Amritsar and Jalandhar
% of the Amritsar Jalandhar
Scheduled Castes Number % Number %
of Wards of Wards of Wards of Wards
0-5 16 25.81 6 10.91
5-10 11 17.74 4 7.27
10-20 13 20.97 18 32.73
20-29 4 6.45 6 10.91
29-50 16 25.81 13 23.64
50-85 2 3.22 8 14.55
Total 62 100 55 100
Source: Census of India, 2001.
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW octoBER 11, 2008 51
district the dalit locality is called ‘thathi’, whereas in the Jalandhar
district it is called ‘chamarhli’ [Judge 2004]. It is already
argued by many scholars that the location of the dalit colony is
towards the southern-western direction of the village.
2 Hereditary Occupations
Occupational mobility is an indicator of both economic and social
mobility. Sociologists take occupation, education and income as
the determining variables of the class position of the individuals
and families. Occupations do not change in a makeshift manner,
as there is a definite relationship between economic change
and the emergence of new occupations that require certain
skills. Capitalism/industrialisation is credited with creating
occupational diversification that broke the traditional hereditary
character. In India, caste and occupation had close
proximity
to the extent that even the caste names could reveal the
nature of hereditary occupation. For example, chamar, mochi,
bhangi, lohar, nai are some of the caste names that are the names
of the occupations as well. In the existential world of village India,
the caste name invariably invoked the occupation. For example, jat
meant peasant, saini meant vegetable grower, julaha meant
weaver, and so on. Obviously, the arrival of capitalism
with new occupations
that required education was destined to break the correspondence
between caste and occupation.
There has been a lot of diversification
of occupations among the dalits,
which is clear from the fact that the
dalit respondents are involved in as
many as 46 occupations in both the urban
and rural areas. However, everything
has not changed. As is evident
from the data in Table 3, 28.75 per cent
in the cities and 49.5 per cent of the
dalits respondents in villages are still
involved in the low status occupations.
In the case of male respondents, sweeping
and agricultural
labour, and in the
case of female respondents and male respondents’ wives, to be a
maidservant or domestic help is the predominant occupation. It
was also noticed that many of them tried to conceal their occupation.
Table 3 also shows that among the respondents 17.12 per
cent in urban areas and 9.66 per cent in rural areas do not have
any occupation. A probe into the matter reveals that they had
actually concealed the fact that they were either sweepers
or maidservants.
Understanding the change and persistence in the occupations
of the dalits depends upon how we look into the matter with regard
to the occupational characteristics of the respondents. One
way of understanding is that there has been a definite change in
occupations as there is some percentage (about 6 per cent) of respondents
occupying prestigious occupations as they are industrialists,
big traders, large landowners, etc, whereas the other
would be that some of the respondents are still located on the
lowest occupational rungs. It is also plausible that there is a class
formation among the dalits. Another way of looking at
the empirical reality is that change is taking place in a gradual
manner. It may be pointed out that dalit castes have also been at
the bottom of the class structure. They were involved in polluting
occupations. There is a difference between caste and class mobility.
One is related with status enhancement, whereas the other is
economic. In the case of dalits the two were combined and it
could be anticipated that if the dalits stopped doing defiling
work their status could change. Such a change has occurred in
a limited fashion though the nexus between caste and occupation
has been fractured.
3 R eligious Places
All the respondents, irrespective of their rural or urban
backgrounds, were assertive with regard to one query, namely,
whether they were allowed to enter the temple/gurdwara belonging
to upper dominant castes. What was that assertion? There is
no restriction on their entering any temple/gurdwara. Rather
many balmiki respondents in both Amritsar and Jalandhar cities
laughed at the query and declared that “nobody could dare stop
us from entering a temple”. However, the dalits of Punjab are
struggling against the upper dominant castes, particularly the jat
Sikhs, on issues concerning the religious places. The issue of religious
places has historically evolved in two phases. First, it was
related with the right to worship in the temple. Ambedkar led
dalits to make a forced entry in the temples
in the initial stages of his struggle for
equality of worship [Zelliot 1970]. The
second stage began when the dalits
either had their own religious places or
they started “reclaiming” their religious
places. So far as the issue of entry into
religious places is concerned, it has
almost been settled. Jodhka (2002) and
Judge (2004) have noted the practice of
not allowing dalits to enter the temple in
Patiala district. But, such instances in
Punjab are rare.
The issue of religious place is an important
dimension of intercaste interaction and caste system.
One dimension of religious place is what Jodhka (2002) has
brought out in his study, wherein he noted that in 51 villages the
dalits had their own gurdwaras though the number of such villages
could be much more. It has been pointed out that there are 10,000
dalit gurdwaras in Punjab [Webster 2007]. The implication of
this finding could be very interesting. One of the interpretations
of this empirical fact is that the dalits are not allowed to enter the
gurdwara and in protest they have constructed their gurdwaras
[Jodhka 2002 and Bal 2007]. The practice of untouchability at
religious places among the Sikhs is almost absent in the Doaba
region of Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur, Kapurthala and Nawan Shahar
districts of Punjab.5 There is a widely held belief that there
is caste hierarchy among the Sikhs though the caste system
lacks rigidity that is prevalent in other parts of the country. The
existence of the practice of untouchability is invariably denied.
There is another way of understanding the issue of the separate
gurdwaras. Let us look into the historical and anthropological
dimensions of the religious places and their caste-linked
Table 3: Categorywise Occupational Levels of the Respondents
Occupational Prestige Category* Urban Rural Total
I 25 (3.12) 16 (2.00) 41 (2.56)
II 46 (5.75) 9 (1.12) 55 (3.44)
III 8 (1.00) 1(0.12) 9 (0.56)
IV 58 (7.25) 20 (2.20) 78 (4.73)
V 171 (21.38) 147 (18.38) 318 (19.69)
VI 124 (15.50) 133 (16.62) 257 (16.06)
VII 231 (28.88) 396 (49.50) 627 (39.18)
VIII/NA 137 (17.12) 78 (9.66) 215 (13.43)
Total 800 (100) 800 (100) 1,600 (100)
*These occupational categories have been constructed on the basis of
D’souza (1985). These categories have been arranged in descending
order in terms of prestige of the occupation.
Figures in brackets are columnwise percentages.
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existence in Punjab, which, metaphorically, could be stated as “a
religious place of one’s own”. Historically, the social structure of
a Punjab village typically followed the all-India pattern in which
the entire social organisation revolved around agriculture. In the
present Punjab, prominent castes of landowners are jats, sainis,
lobanas, kambohs, mahatons, khatris and brahmins. The numerically
preponderant and politically dominant caste among them
in Punjab is that of the jats. Since more information is available
on the jats, it is appropriate to select them for an illustration of
the entire issue. The jat landowner traditionally had a large
number of service castes that were related to him under the
“Jajmani” system. As the entire village community depended on
agrarian production for its existence and livelihood, the landowner
occupied the central position so far as the economic life of
the village was concerned [Judge 2002]. All other castes were
limited in number except for the agricultural workers who invariably
belonged to the dalit castes. This fact of the existence of the
service castes and their proportion in the population of village
has been noticed by Dirks (2002: 76) in India in general, “No village
contained more than a few of these families…”. The construction
of a religious place in such a situation could only be
done under the patronage of the landowning caste.
Most of the villages in the Doaba region in particular are without
any temple despite the presence of the Hindus, whereas all
the jat Sikh villages have gurdwaras. Over a period of time, the
number of gurdwaras in the villages has begun to rise. There is a
general impression that there is a caste basis for the gurdwaras.
Each caste tends to have its own gurdwara. Such an observation
is partially true. To understand the reality underneath, one may
raise a question as to why the jats have more gurdwaras if the
logic of caste basis is taken into consideration. As a matter of fact
there is a gurdwara for each locality called ‘patti’ in Punjab. The
dalits having their separate gurdwara is a recent phenomenon.
The green revolution process brought changes in the Punjab
economy and society. The arrival of migrant labour pushed the
dalits out of the agrarian relations, as they were displaced as
agricultural
labourers due to which they had to go to the cities to
look for work in the non-agricultural sector. The conditions of the
dalits relatively improved and they diverted their attention to the
affairs of god. The balmikis constructed their temples, addharmis
their Ravidas temples and ramdasias and mazabis their
gurdwaras. It should be pointed out that so long as a caste community
is poverty-stricken and its members are finding it difficult
to make both ends meet, it may not be able to construct its
temple or gurdwara in the village. In the case of the Sikhs it is
quite probable that during the period of the Singh Sabha movement
the construction of gurdwaras according
to the locality and
caste was discouraged due to its claim of equality among all the
Sikhs. The conversion of jats to Sikhism in the Doaba region at
the turn of the 20th century due to the proselytisation
activities
of the Singh Sabha movement leads us to raise a pertinent question,
that is, what did happen to their religious places of worship?
Since the jats as the landowning
class had a Hindu past, it was
expected that they might have constructed some temples. We
know that so far as ancestor worship is concerned those places
are still intact. However, the question of temples relating the
jats to their Hindu past has not been settled. There are two possibilities.
One, there were no temples of any sort in the villages
of Punjab. Second, the jats after their conversion to Sikhism
appropriated
the sacred place as well.
So far as the Doaba region of Punjab is concerned, the above
argument holds well, but the Majha region in which Amritsar
district falls presents a different case. During data collection the
mazabi respondents of Amritsar district reported caste-based
exclusion of religious practices. Many of them said that the upper
caste Sikhs did not allow them to carry the sacred book to their
residence for purpose of performing various rituals/ceremonies
on the pretext that their houses were dirty. Similar information
was given by the mazabis of Guru Ki Wadali – an erstwhile village
that has become a locality of Amritsar city. No such thing
was reported in Jalandhar district. The respondents while asked
about the religious places said that their villages
had common
gurdwara(s). It clearly shows that a certain degree of religious
exclusion is practised in some parts of Punjab.
It may be reiterated that a separate gurdwara does not imply
that its existence is a consequence of exclusion. There are three
kinds of gurdwaras of the Sikhs. First, there are historical gurdwaras.
These gurdwaras are linked with the Sikh gurus or certain
events in the Sikh history. The Golden Temple in Amritsar
is one of the examples of historical gurdwaras. The second type
of a gurdwara is what have now become very well-known religious
places, namely the ‘deras’.6 The deras are a part of both
the Hindu and the Sikh religious traditions of Punjab; and if we
take the Sufi tradition into consideration, then it is possible to
put even the places of the Sufi ‘fakirs’ as a part of the same tradition.
In the early medieval period, there were deras of ‘Nath
yogis’. Sufi saints had their own deras. After the emergence of
Sikhism, the institution of deras could be found among them.
The ‘nirmalas’ and the ‘udasis’ had their own deras. These
deras have also come into conflict with the mainstream
religious establishments. Recently, deras have also become
places of contestation among different castes. The third kind of
gurdwaras is called the social gurdwaras. It is here that the
issue of untouchability or exclusion has emerged. In the 10
villages studied in Amritsar and Jalandhar districts, there was
no historical gurdwara.
A question was asked about the number of religious places and
their responses are given in Table 4. It is interesting to note that
Table 4: Number of Religious Places in Each Village
Village Jat/Kamboh Common Mazabi Hindu Dera Sufi Church Balmiki Ravidas
Gurdwara Gurdwara Gurdwara Temple Pir’s Tomb Temple Mandir
Gehri 1 1 2 1 1
Galowali 1 1 1 1
Bhoma 1 3 1 2 1
Kotli Dhole Shah 1 1 1 1
Nawan Pind 1 1 1 1 1
Udhowal 2 8 1
Adharman 1 1 2 1
Meham 2 1 2 1 1
Bath 1 1 16
Mehtpur 2 8 1 1
Total 7 7 6 6 3 39 3 7 2
(First five villages are from Amritsar district, whereas the rest five are from the Jalandhar district.)
special article
Economic & Political Weekly EPW octoBER 11, 2008 53
there was a clear-cut distinction between the Amritsar and
Jalandhar villages. In the case of Amritsar villages, the predominant
trend was to identify the gurdwara with the caste, whereas
the villages in Jalandhar district had the predominance of common
gurdwaras. Notably, the mazabis and balmikis abound in
terms of religious places though the largest number of religious
places in villages was that of Muslim Sufi saints. The Muslims of
the eastern Punjab migrated to the western part of Punjab after
Partition. However, it may be noted that while mosques in villages
have disappeared, the tombs of Sufi saints are well-maintained. It
implies that the composite religious tradition of Punjab has not
been completely eliminated by the efforts at constructing a single
religious tradition.
Finally, the existence of a distinct religious space is a different
dimension from that of a separate gurdwara if the issue implicates
the religious practices of the dalits. Comparing to the ideal
typical constructions of the deprivation of dalits, the existence of
a place of worship is a major transformation
in the conditions of the dalits.
The issue of the gurdwara is complex
because some of the respondents reported
discrimination that comes close
to untouchability. However, the construction
of the gurdwara on the part
of the Sikh dalits could be considered
in terms of their ability to do so. Caste
was always present and strong even earlier. It was not what
Gupta (2007) thinks about the rising tide of caste consciousness,
rather the change is with regard to the rising awareness of
the dalit castes and its manifestation in the public sphere. The
political economy of the religious place indicates that there is
some improvement in the economic conditions of the dalits. The
existence of separate gurdwaras for different castes presents an
illustration of untouchability
as well as of dalit mobility however
limited it may be.7
4 E ndogamy and Intercaste Marriages
Caste endogamy is regarded as one of the major citadels on which
the caste system rests. The notions and practice of hypergamy
and hypogamy existed in the Indian tradition, but these are more
a part of mythological stories than reporting of actual cases. The
combination of caste endogamy and the institution of arranged
marriage have made caste almost a permanent system. Caste endogamy
is also a result of a principle that has transformed into a
mentality. Vovelle (1990: 12) defines the examination of mentality
“as the study of the mediations and of the dialectical
relationship
between the objective conditions of human life and the ways
in which people narrate it, and even live it”. In a way the notion
of mentality implicates the combination of objective and subjective
conditions with a difference from traditional understanding
of this dichotomy. The subjective is understood in terms of
how it is narrated/told. It seems natural to think, expect and
anticipate that the people belonging to the lower castes whose
stake is in the demolition and destruction of the system would
support intercaste marriages. Caste identity presupposes
endogamy in spite of the fact that in a patriarchal system the
identity of the male is more important than that of the
female. The respondents were asked to give their views on
the significance of caste endogamy if they thought that it was
desirable. Table 5 indicates the views of the respondents with
regard to caste endogamy.
It is obvious that the dalit respondents living in villages overwhelmingly
consider caste endogamy significant in comparison
to the urban dalits. Less than 3 per cent of rural respondents
stated that caste did not matter, whereas 29.12 per cent of the
respondents
in the urban areas viewed endogamy as insignificant.
In both the settings there was comprehensive support for
caste endogamy. Tradition is a vague word and the caste system
could be plausibly regarded as a part of Indian tradition. Since
the rural respondents are supporting caste endogamy, it is clear
that this view cuts across caste lines. On the other hand, a considerable
proportion of the urban respondents regarded caste endogamy
as not significant. Keeping in view this fact, it is proper to
see the castewise
responses of the
urban respondents. The conjecture is
that the ad-dharmis and meghs would
be more tilted towards the insignificance
of caste endogamy than those
of mazabis and balmikis.
The data presented in Table 6 show
clearly that among those who emphasised
traditions as the reason for
supporting caste endogamy, the majority belonged to the
mazabi, ad-dharmi/chamar and sansi castes. At the same time,
among the ad-dharmi respondents one-fourth of them considered
the issue unimportant. If we take a closer look at this table
and see how each caste is distributed in terms of its emphasis
on caste endogamy, then only meghs could be considered to
be more amenable to marginalise caste endogamy. In that
sense, our conjecture is partially substantiated. The second
main caste that does not attach a crucial significance to caste
endogamy is that of the balmikis. It may be concluded that the
dalit castes consider caste endogamy significant as a part of
the tradition.
Related with the issue of endogamy is the event of intercaste
marriage. The respondents were asked whether intercaste marriages
could destroy the caste system. The responses are given in
Table 7 (p 54 ). Again there are rural-urban differences in the
sense that 96 per cent of the urban respondents are of the view
that it is possible to end the caste system if intercaste marriages
Table 5: Significance of Caste Endogamy
Significance Urban Rural Total
Tradition 518 (64.75) 775 (96.88) 1,293 (80.82)
Better understanding 20 (2.50) 1 (0.12) 21 (1.31)
Family support 24 (3.00) 1 (0.12) 25 (1.56)
Does not matter 233 (29.12) 23 (2.88) 256 (16.00)
Do not know 5 (0.63) - 5 (0.31)
Total 800 (100) 800 (100) 1,600 (100)
Figures in brackets are columnwise percentages.
Table 6: Castewise Responses: Why Caste Endogamy Is Significant (Urban)
Responses Caste Tradition Better Family Does Not No Total
Understanding Support Matter Response
between
Spouses
Ad-dharmi/chamar 150 (71.77) 2 (0.95) 4 (1.91) 53 (25.36) - 209 (100)
Megh/kabir panthi 141 (57.08) 4 (1.62) 9 (3.64) 92 (37.25) 1 (0.40) 247(100)
Balmikis 109 (56.48) 7 (3.63) 5 (2.59) 71 (36.78) 1 (0.52) 193 (100)
Mazabi 108 (80.59) 7 (5.22) 5 (3.73) 13 (9.70) 1 (0.75) 134 (100)
Sansis 3 (100) - - - - 3 (100)
Dumnas 7 (50.00) - 1 (7.14) 4 (28.57) 2 (14.29) 14 (100)
Total 518(64.75) 20 (2.50) 24 (3.00) 233 (29.12) 5 (0.62) 800 (100)
Figures in brackets are rowwise percentages.
speciAl article
octoBER 11, 2008 EPW Economic & P 54 olitical Weekly
come into practice. Interestingly, most of the rural respondents
have showed uncertainty with regard to intercaste marriages.
They remain undecided about the issue. The urban respondents
are more articulate
with regard to the issue than the rural
respondents. One of the reasons is that all the urban respondents
have personal knowledge of such marriages due to which many
of them think that such marriages never succeed or caste is deeprooted.
An attempt was also made to further examine the urban
respondents. Table 8
presents castewise
data on whether intercaste
marriages
could destroy the
caste system. Predictably,
the ad-dharmis,
meghs, sansis and
dumnas constituted
the major proportion
of those respondents
who were of the view that it was possible to end the caste
system through intercaste marriages. Balmikis and mazabis were
not sure of the proposition.
In terms of education, as shown in Table 9, the responses are
predictable. It is widely understood that education creates awareness.
Obviously, educated respondents in the urban areas consider
the proposition as a possibility. It may be further pointed
out that even the educated respondents are not wholeheartedly
supporting the view.
The issue of intercaste marriage has wider ramifications. In
a society in which modern institutions provide space for
interaction among people belonging to different castes, there
is always a possibility of certain frequency of intercaste marriages.
The issue is also related to how the other caste
groups understand it.
The following may not be a common occurrence, but such cases
appear once in a while: Despite filing a writ in the Punjab and
Haryana High Court for security, a couple – Ashwani Kumar and
Baljeet Kaur – were murdered by the girl’s relatives – “punishment” for
marrying against her family’s wishes.
Ashwani, a Balmiki, and Baljeet, a jat, belonged to Rauli village falling
under Mehtpur police station (The Sunday Tribune, July 15, 2007, p 1).
The case refers to the area in Jalandhar district from
where the sample of villages was drawn for the present study. In
contrast to Amritsar district, the dalits of Jalandhar district, as
we have seen, have done well in different walks of life. However,
the upper caste dominant jats do not think so. There is
still another issue with regard to intercaste marriages. Can we
look at the possibility of intercaste marriages among the dalits?
The same rule applies here also. The caste hierarchy among
the dalits prevents any possibility of breaking caste barriers
through intercaste marriages [Judge 2002].
However, it is equally important to know the actual number
of intercaste marriages in which at least one of the couple is
from a dalit caste. Table 10 gives the data on the cases of intercaste
marriages in which dalits are involved. The data could be
interpreted in various ways of which three seem plausible. Let
us first look into the dominant pattern. A majority of cases
(56.35 per cent) reporting intercaste marriages are that of
between a dalit boy and a non-dalit girl. One of the reasons
could be that since the dalit boys are socially more mobile
than dalit girls, owing to the factor of patriarchy, the mobile
and educated dalits can marry from the upper castes. An
illustration of this could be given of the family of Steven Kaler
in Boota Mandi, Jalandhar who is a factory owner. The castes
of the wives of his three brothers are brahmin, upper caste
Jain and khatri.
Secondly, in some cases the girls belong to the backward
classes like nai and jheer, where the differences in the positions
in the caste hierarchy could not have evoked a hostile response.
Thirdly, a case of a non-dalit girl marrying a dalit boy is invariably
controversial and the family of the girl opposes it. The
conflict tends to keep the case alive in memory. On the other
hand, a dalit girl marrying a non-dalit boy makes the girl
invisible as she leaves the locality and there is not much reaction
to such cases. After some time the case is forgotten.
However,
it is clear that despite all preferences for cast endogamy
and reactions against intercaste marriages, change is also taking
Table 7: Whether Intercaste Marriages Can
Destroy Caste Systems
Response Urban Rural Total
Possible 384 (96.00) 16 (4.00) 400 (100)
Desirable 107 (52.45) 97 (47.55) 204 (100)
Caste is deeprooted
140 (92.72) 11 (7.28) 151 (100)
Such marriages
do not succeed 36 (92.31) 3 (7.69) 39 (100)
Undecided 133 (16.50) 673 (83.50) 806 (100)
Total 800 (50.00) 800 (50.00) 1,600 (100)
Figures in brackets are rowwise percentages.
Table 8: Castewise Responses to Whether Intercaste Marriages Can End Caste
System (Urban)
Responses Caste Possible Desirable Caste Is Such Marriages No Total
Deep-rooted Do Not Response
Succeed
Ad-dharmi/
chamar 125 (59.81) 25 (11.96) 17 (8.13) 9 (4.31) 33 (15.79) 209 (100)
Megh/
kabir panthi 138 (55.87) 38 (15.38) 35 (14.17) 2 (0.81) 34 (13.76) 247 (100)
Balmikis 71 (36.79) 28 (14.51) 52 (26.94) 9 (4.66) 33 (17.10) 193 (100)
Mazabi 40 (29.85) 16 (11.94) 32 (23.88) 15 (11.19) 31 (23.13) 134 (100)
Sansis 3 (100) - - - - 3 (100)
Dumnas 7 (50.00) - 4 (28.57) 1 (7.14) 2 (14.28) 14 (100)
Total 384 (48.00) 107 (13.38) 140 (17.50) 36(4.50) 133 (16.62) 800 (100)
Figures in brackets are rowwise percentages.
Table 9: Intermarriages as a Means to End the Caste System according to the
Education of the Respondents (Urban)
Responses Caste Possible Desirable Caste Is Such Marriages No Total
Deep-rooted Do Not Response
Succeed
Illiterate 28 (7.29) 11 (10.28) 33 (23.57) 11 (30.56) 30 (22.56) 113 (14.12)
Literate 11 (2.86) 2 (1.87) 8 (5.71) 3 (8.33) 4 (3.01) 28 (3.50)
Primary 55 (14.32) 21 (19.63) 24 (17.14) 5 (13.89) 25 (18.80) 130 (16.25)
Middle 59 (15.36) 16 (14.95) 36 (25.71) 4 (11.11) 21 (15.78) 136 (17.00)
Matriculation 99 (25.78) 35 (32.72) 28 (20.00) 7 (19.44) 37 (27.82) 206 (25.75)
+2 53 (13.81) 12 (11.21) 4 (2.86) 3 (8.33) 9 (6.77) 80 (10.00)
College/graduate 53 (13.81) 7 (6.54) 5 (3.57) - 5 (3.76) 71 (8.88)
Postgraduate 7 (1.82) 2 (1.87) - - 2 (1.50) 11 (1.38)
Diploma/
professional degree 19 (4.95) 1 (0.93) 2 (1.43) 3 (8.33) - 25 (3.12)
Total 384 (100) 107 (100) 140 (100) 36 (100) 133 (100) 800 (100)
Figures in brackets are columnwise percentages.
Table 10: Incidence of Intercaste Marriages Involving Dalits
Caste Status of the Couple Amritsar Amritsar District Jalandhar Jalandhar District Total
Boy dalit, girl dalit 13 (27.66) 3 (25.00) 8 (17.78) 3 (13.63) 27 (21.43)
Boy dalit, girl non-dalit 20 (42.55) 7 (58.33) 32 (71.11) 12 (54.55) 71 (56.35)
Boy non-dalit, girl dalit 14 (29.79) 2 (16.67) 5 (11.11) 7 (31.82) 28 (22.22)
Total 47 (37.30) 12 (9.53) 45 (35.71) 22 (17.46) 126 (100)
(100) (100) (100) (100)
Figures in brackets are columnwise percentages.
special article
Economic & Political Weekly EPW octoBER 11, 2008 55
place. However, the general response of the dalit respondents
regarding intercaste marriage is negative.
5 Dalit Identity
The project of ending the caste system seems to have lost direction
in the face of tradition and resilience of caste. The defining
features of caste clearly have showed that the attack on caste has
to take place from all fronts if it is to be destroyed. If the caste
differences do not disappear or wither away with all round efforts,
then the next logical question is what is to be done? Is it
possible to end a system that has been in existence for centuries
with the stroke of a pen or micro-level efforts? One of the
preconditions for the destruction of the caste system is the end
of all caste-based identities.
One of the numerous castes of Punjab is that of the jats. They
are also the dominant caste in the villages. They are proud of
their jat identity. Similarly, the graffiti written on four-wheelers
like trucks in particular would show the arrogant jat displaying
himself. The most popular graffiti is ‘putt jattan de’ (sons of jats).
No other caste group would find such mention. Recently, a similar
trend could be found among the chamars of Punjab, as is evident
from the following
graffiti: ‘putt chamaran de’ (sons of chamars),
then “chamar power”. However, the following graffiti behind a
truck is notable for its identity assertion: ‘Awen bharam ne
mutiaran de, marhi neet rakhade munde chamaran de’ (Young
women are mistaken in thinking that the chamar boys have evil
intentions). Such examples may be rare, but present before us a
different trend in the caste issue. There has been a rise in caste
assertion and it is not from the upper castes where it was
always present. The dalits have begun to assert their caste identity.
The contemporary political scenario is also favourable to such
assertion. Mayawati’s coming to power in Uttar Pradesh is an important
aspect of this assertion. Whatever might be her political
strategy, she essentially represents dalits. The present is marked
by the perpetuation of caste in which the politics of numbers
has led to a situation where it is in the interest of the dalits to
articulate and manifest and maintain their caste identities.
6 C onclusions
The findings of the empirical study point towards the paradox of
change among dalits. At the level of the caste system, inequalities
and exclusion continue to show their existence, the evidence of
which could be ascertained on the basis of data on social ecology,
occupation and access to religious places. Secondly, at the level of
casteism as a world view the dalits are unable to construct the
plausibility of a society without caste. The relevance and indispensability
of caste in marriage has been largely accepted by them
though there are apprehensions that without ending caste endogamy
caste may not disappear. Articulation of dalit identity for political
gains in the electoral process is again an important issue of
concern. From the perspective of the dalits, the end of the caste
system is the most radical change that could be thought of. The
traditions, however, do not allow the dalits to emerge as a homogeneous
category. Casteism is powerfully embedded in the collective
consciousness of the dalits as a result of which their orientation
towards caste system is ambivalent. For them the caste system
is oppressive due to discrimination, exclusion, exploitation
and untouchability, but, at the same time, it situates them in the
system as a collective identity. Their desire is to end all kinds of
discrimination, oppression and exclusion, but not the caste system.
It is an instance of deep-rooted internalisation
of a world
view – a process of reification in which like the Marxian market
and relations emerging from that caste becomes a natural, absolute
and ahistorical fact for members of the society. While the
need is to think of Indian society without caste, the possibility of
caste differences without inequality seems real.
Notes
1 Jodhka (2002) has examined the issue of untouchability
by further probing into the issues like access
to village streets, sharing of drinking water sources,
unclean occupation, practice of untouchability in
modern institutions, police behaviour, etc.
2 Each unit has distinct social characteristics in terms of
caste. For example, Amritsar city consists of balmikis,
mazabis and meghs, Amritsar village mainly the
mazabis, Jalandhar city balmikis, ad-dharmis and
meghs and Jalandhar villages were comprised addharmis
and balmikis. It may be informed that the
dalits are 28.78 per cent in the Amritsar district and
37.69 per cent in Jalandhar district.
3 There could be an exception to the general rule in
the sense that in the class society some rich
blacks, such as Oprah Winfrey, may be living in
the posh and white-dominated neighbourhood.
4 Judge and Bal (2005) have shown how the organisation
of the social space in Amritsar and
Jalandhar cities in the case of the dalits exhibits
strong association with caste.
5 The following empirical observation may be important
in understanding how untouchability has declined
in the Doaba region: In village Ajram in
Hoshiapur district there are three gurdwaras out of
which one belongs to the jats and the other non-dalit
castes, and two to the ad-dharmis. When the authors
attended a ‘bhog’ ceremony in the gurdwara meant
for the jats and other non-dalits, it was interesting
to find that the priest belonged to the julaha caste.
This priest was a stopgap arrangement, because the
gurdwara priest was unwell and he belonged to
the mazabi caste. The person who prepared the
‘langar’ (community food) belonged to the ad-dharmi
caste. On top of that, the women who were
cooking chapattis belonged to the bazigar caste.
6 Recently, clashes between ‘Sikhs’ and the followers
of Sacha Sauda sect have made the word ‘dera’
common.
7 The issue of religious places provides for varying
interpretation largely due to the complexity involved
in the situation. Having a separate gurdwara
thus could also be understood as “assertion for
autonomy” as stated by Jodhka (2002) though religious
communities tend to construct horizontal
solidarity unless there are internal sectarian fissions.
References
Bal, Gian Singh (2007): ‘Viaktigat Suntarata, Dera
Sacha Sauda Vivad and Dalit-Kisan Samasya’,
Nawan Zamana, July 22 (Punjabi).
Dirks, Nicholas B (2002): Castes of Mind: Colonialism and
the Making of Modern India, Permanent Black,
New Delhi.
D’souza, Victor S (1985): Economic Development, Social
Structure and Population Growth, Sage, New Delhi.
Ghurye, G S (1969): Caste and Race in India, Popular
Prakashan, Bombay.
Gupta, Dipankar (2007): ‘The Threat from Within’,
Hindustan Times, July 28.
Jodhka, Surinder S (2002): ‘Caste and Untouchability
in Rural Punjab’, Economic & Political Weekly,
May 11, pp 1813-23.
Judge, Paramjit S (2002): ‘Punjabis in England: The
Ad-Dharmi Experience’, The Economic & Political
Weekly, August 3, pp 3244-50.
– (2004): ‘Interrogating Changing Status of the
Dalits of Punjab’ in Harish K Puri (ed), Dalits in
Regional Context, Rawat, Jaipur, pp 100-31.
Judge, Paramjit S and Gurpreet Bal (2005): ‘Dalits
and Urban Social Space’, Indian Social Science
Review, 7(2), July-December, pp 98-120.
Moon, Vasant (1989): Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar:
Writings and Speeches, Vol 5, Government of
Maharashtra, Bombay.
Sharma, K L (2003): ‘The Social Organisation of Urban
Space: A Case Study of Chanderi – A Small Town
in Central India’, Contributions to Indian Sociology,
Vol 37, No 3, September-December.
Virdi, S L (2004): Bahujan Manifesto, Guru Ravi Dass
Society of Calgary, Calgary.
Vovelle, Michel (1990): Ideologies and Mentalities,
Polity Press, Cambridge.
Webster, John C B (2007): ‘The Dalit Sikhs: A History?’
in Tony Ballantyne (ed), Textures of the Sikh Past:
New Historical Perspectives, Oxford University
Press, New Delhi, pp 132-54.
Zelliot, Eleanor (1970): ‘Learning to Use Political Means:
The Mahars of Maharashtra’ in Rajini Kothari (ed),
Caste in Indian Politics, Orient Longman, New Delhi,
pp 29-69.

Mayawati's Govt Sanctions Untouchability in Govt. Schools

"Mayawati's SARVJAN GOVERNMENT officially sanctions UNTOUCHABILTY in Govt. Schools"
Reference news captioned "Phool Kumari sits on dharna at VidhanSabha" in Indian Express reproduced in Dalits in News dated 21st,December. It clearly establishes that Mayawati's Sarvjan govt. has now officially sanctioned UNTOUCHABILITY in govt. schools. The Dalit lady appointed as cook for preparing mid-day meals in a school right in the capital city of Lucknow has been dismissed on the ground that the village Pardhan had appointed her in a wrong manner. But the fact remains that her appointment was hundred percent correct as per the govt. orders. Now an OBC woman has been appointed in her place. This action of the govt. officials has triggered a chain reaction in other Govt. schools in U.P. It has appeared in media that high caste students of a school in Kannauj district have also refused to take food cooked by a Dalit lady cook. Thus U.P. Govt. headed by a Dalit Lady has officially sactioned UNTOUCHABILITY in govt. schools. The right course of action should have been to take action under SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act against the Brahmin Principl who instigated the students to bycott the food cooked by a Dalit cook but instead of that the village Pardhan who happens to be a most backward class fellow has been suspended on frivolous grounds. The vari ous DalitOrganizations including Dr. Ambedkar Mahasabha have taken up this issue and petitioned U.P.State SC/ST Commission to look into the matter. The Commission have issued summons to the officials of Lucknow district administration and Education Daptt. From this incident you can just imagine the fate of U.P.Dalits who are regularly facing atrocities and untouchability in Sarvjan Govt. headed by Mayawati.

Hidden Apartheid
Caste Discrimination against India’s “Untouchables”
India February 2007
More than 165 million people in India remain
vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation, and
violence simply because of their caste. India’s
“hidden apartheid” relegates Dalits, or socalled
untouchables, to a lifetime of
segregation and abuse. Caste-based divisions
continue to dominate in housing, marriage,
employment, and general social interaction—
divisions that are reinforced through
economic boycotts and physical violence.
Hidden Apartheid was produced as a “shadow report” in
response to India’s submission to the United Nations Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“Committee”), which
monitors implementation of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“Convention”).
The report documents India’s systematic failure to respect,
protect, and ensure Dalits’ fundamental human rights.
Severe violations persist in access to education, health, housing,
and property, and freedom of religion, free choice of
employment, and equal treatment before the law. The report also
documents routine violations of Dalits’ right to life and security of
person through state-sponsored or sanctioned acts of violence,
including torture.
More than 165
million people in
India continue to be
subject to
discrimination,
exploitation, and
violence simply
because of their
caste.
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
2
India’s Obligations under the Convention
As a State Party to the Convention, India has an obligation to
prohibit and bring to an end caste-based discrimination. Article 1
of the Convention guarantees rights of non-discrimination on the
basis of “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” In
1996, the Committee concluded that the plight of Dalits falls
under the prohibition of descent-based discrimination.
The Committee is a body of independent experts responsible for
monitoring states’ compliance with the Convention. India’s
report to the Committee was more than eight years overdue.
Although it covers more than a decade of India’s compliance with
the Convention (from 1996 to 2006), it does not contain a single
mention of abuses against Dalits—abuses that India’s own
governmental agencies have documented and verified.
Hidden Apartheid fills that gap and presents Committee
members with information that is essential to a fair assessment
of India’s record and, ultimately, to encouraging the government
to live up to its domestic and international human rights
obligations.
The 1950 Indian Constitution abolished the practice of
“untouchability” in all its forms, and a number of laws and
special measures have since been adopted to address castebased
discrimination and abuses. India has consistently cited
these laws and policies to show that it is protecting Dalits’ rights.
While these laws and policies are welcome, they have been
implemented sporadically and often not at all.
The information detailed in Hidden Apartheid demonstrates that
India has failed to enforce its laws in violation of its obligations
under Article 2 of the Convention to pursue by all appropriate
means a policy of eliminating caste discrimination, and to ensure
that all public authorities and institutions do not engage in castebased
discrimination.
As a State Party to
the International
Convention on the
Elimination of All
Forms of Racial
Discrimination,
India has an
obligation to end
caste-based abuses
and segregation.
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
3
This failure is exemplified by police treatment of Dalits. India’s
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)—a statutory
government body that India describes as the apex national
institution to protect human rights and redress grievances—has
commented that the law enforcement machinery is the greatest
violator of Dalits’ human rights.
According to the NHRC, police responsibility for the widespread
torture of Dalits in custody, rapes of Dalit women, and the looting
of Dalit property “are condoned, or at best ignored.” Dalits,
jurists, and human rights groups claim that a lack of political will
and immunity laws that shield those responsible for human
rights abuses from prosecution allow torture and other forms of
custodial abuse to continue unchecked.
Under a theory of collective punishment, the police often target
entire Dalit communities in search of select individuals. Dalit
women are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence by the
police. Dalits are also vulnerable to arrest under draconian
security laws.
Under Article 2 India must also ensure the development and
protection of particularly marginalized groups. India grants Dalits
certain privileges, including “reservations” (quotas) in education,
government jobs and political posts. Like many of the protective
measures adopted, the reservation policy has not been faithfully
implemented.
Caste-based occupational distribution is often reinforced in
government employment quotas, with Dalits assigned primarily
to the posts of sweepers. Reservations in higher education
continue to be met with a great deal of resistance, leading to
under-enforcement. Additionally, there has been widespread
public opposition to reservations for Dalits in local government
bodies, often leading to acts of violence against Dalit candidates.
According to government estimates in 2000, the unemployment
rate for Dalits and tribal groups was double that of non-
Custodial torture of
Dalits, rapes of Dalit
women, and the
looting of Dalit
property by the
police “are
condoned or at best
ignored.” –
National Human
Rights Commission
of India (2004).
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
4
Dalits/tribals. Public sector divestment is estimated to have left
200,000 Dalit employees jobless. Dalits continue to be
significantly underrepresented in most professional strata. Dalit
representation in India’s high industries and service sectors is
dismal. The National Commission for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes has stated that the private sector, which
continues to enjoy government patronage, should also be
brought under the purview of the reservation policy.
The Government of India has established several programs for
the development of Dalits. According to the NHRC, however,
many such programs fail to reach their target groups.
Additionally, India has failed to address the multiple forms of
discrimination faced by Dalit women. Even as compared to Dalit
men, Dalit women do not have equal access to employment
opportunities or justice mechanisms. They must contend with
threats to their personal security, including trafficking and sexual
violence. In some states in India, Dalit women are forced into
prostitution under the devadasi system and are ultimately
auctioned off to urban brothels. This puts them at particular risk
of contracting HIV/AIDS.
Residential segregation of Dalits is prevalent across the country,
in violation of India’s obligations under Article 3. Segregation is
also evident in schools, in access to public services, and in
access to services operated by the private sector. In his 1999
Annual Report, the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance found “untouchability” to be “very much alive” in
rural areas.
A recently published survey investigating the extent of
“untouchability” in 565 villages in 11 Indian states found that the
practice continues to profoundly affect the lives and psyches of
millions of Dalits. “Untouchability” practices were documented
in almost 80 percent of the villages surveyed.
The Dalit woman
faces triple
discrimination
because she is an
untouchable, of a
poor class and is a
woman. – National
Campaign on Dalit
Human Rights
(2006).
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
5
The open dissemination of propaganda targeting both Dalits and
religious minorities by Hindu nationalist groups—whose
members have incited and engaged in widespread violence—
calls into question India’s commitment to fulfill its Article 4
obligations to condemn the promotion of hatred and
discrimination in any form. Educational measures to combat
caste-based prejudices are also sorely lacking.
Dalits’ fundamental civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights are routinely violated by state actors and private
individuals, in violation of Article 5 of the Convention. Castemotivated
killings, rapes, and other abuses are a daily
occurrence in India, resulting in routine violations of Dalits’ right
to security of person and protection of the state. The police have
systematically failed to protect Dalit homes and Dalit individuals
from acts of looting, arson, sexual assault, torture, and other
inhumane acts such as the tonsuring, stripping and parading of
Dalit women, and forcing Dalits to drink urine and eat feces.
Much like cases of police abuse against Dalits, attacks by private
actors often take the form of collective punishment—entire
communities or villages may be punished for the perceived
transgressions of individuals who seek to alter village customs or
demand their rights.
Between 2001 and 2002 close to 58,000 cases were registered
under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989—legislation that criminalizes particularly
egregious abuses against Dalits and tribal community members.
A 2005 government report states that a crime is committed
against a Dalit every 20 minutes. Though staggering, these
figures represent only a fraction of actual incidents since many
Dalits do not register cases for fear of retaliation by the police
and upper-caste individuals.
In a study of 11
Indian states, the
practice of
“untouchability”
was documented in
almost 80 percent of
the 565 villages
surveyed. – Action
Aid India (2006).
Every 20 minutes, a
Dalit becomes a
victim of crime. –
India’s National
Crime Records
Bureau (2005).
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
6
Political rights, including the right to vote freely and the right to
stand for election, have repeatedly been denied to Dalits through
acts of booth rigging, restricted access to polls, intimidation, and
violence.
Dalits’ right to freedom of residence is severely curtailed by the
practice of “untouchability,” which often dictates where Dalits
must live. Dalits’ right to freedom of movement within India is
affected by conditions that make Dalits vulnerable to migratory
labor and forced displacement, particularly in the aftermath of
episodes of caste violence.
Strict prohibitions on marriage and other social interaction
between Dalits and non-Dalits violate the rights of Dalits to marry
and choose their spouse. Endogamy is a hallmark feature of the
caste system. Inter-caste marriages are frequently extra-judicially
punished by acts of public lynching, murder, rape, beatings, and
other sanctions against the couple and their relatives. On August
6, 2001, in Uttar Pradesh, an upper-caste boy and a lower-caste
girl were publicly hanged by members of their own families for
refusing to end an inter-caste relationship.
The right to own property is systematically denied to Dalits.
Landlessness—encompassing a lack of access to land, inability
to own land, and forced evictions—constitutes a crucial element
in the subordination of Dalits. Land reform legislation is neither
implemented nor properly enforced. When Dalits do manage to
acquire land, access to it is often denied. In 2004, the Dalits of
Kalapatti village, Tamil Nadu, were forced to flee after an attack
in which upper-caste neighbors burned and destroyed over 100
Dalit homes.
Dalits in India face a number of restrictions on their right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Dalits are
frequently denied entry into places of worship. Some Dalits have
responded to ill-treatment by upper-caste Hindus by converting
en masse to Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam. However, the loss
of constitutional privileges upon conversion (to Christianity and
On August 6, 2001,
in Uttar Pradesh, an
upper-caste boy and
a lower-caste girl
were publicly
hanged for refusing
to end an inter-caste
relationship.
In 2004, the Dalits
of Kalapatti village,
Tamil Nadu, were
forced to flee after
an attack in which
upper-caste
neighbors burned
and destroyed over
100 Dalit homes.
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
7
Islam) is a serious impediment to Dalits’ freedom to choose their
religion. In addition, the introduction of anti-conversion
legislation in several states has made religious conversion
extremely difficult if not impossible. Tragically, even conversion
does not guarantee escape since “untouchability” is practiced
across all faiths in India.
The denial of the right to work and free choice of employment
lies at the very heart of the caste system. Dalits are forced to
perform tasks deemed too “polluting” or degrading for non-
Dalits. According to unofficial estimates, more than 1.3 million
Dalits—mostly women—are employed as manual scavengers to
clear human waste from dry pit latrines. Dalits comprise the
majority of agricultural, bonded, and child laborers in the
country. Many survive on less than US$1 a day. Dalits are also
discriminated against in hiring and in the payment of wages by
private employers. Laws designed to eradicate exploitative labor
arrangements are largely ineffective.
Dalits are often refused access to health care in violation of their
right to the highest attainable standard of health and social
services. In a number of cases, those who are admitted to
hospitals receive discriminatory treatment. Caste-based
occupations, such as manual scavenging and forced prostitution,
frequently expose Dalits to serious and sometimes fatal health
hazards.
Manual scavengers are routinely exposed to both human and
animal waste without proper protection. This has severe
repercussions for their health; most suffer from anemia, diarrhea,
vomiting, and respiratory diseases. In many cities, Dalits clear
sewage blockages without protective gear. Over 100 die each
year from inhaling toxic gases or from drowning in excrement.
Many Dalits survive
on less than US$1 a
day.
More than 1.3
million Dalits –
mostly women –are
employed as
manual scavengers
to clear human
waste from dry pit
latrines.
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
8
The right to education free from discrimination is not secured for
Dalit children. Ninety-nine percent of Dalit students are enrolled
in government schools that lack basic infrastructure, classrooms,
teachers, and teaching aids. They are made to sit in the back of
classrooms and endure verbal and physical abuse from teachers
and students. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the
right to education, teachers have been known to declare that
Dalit pupils “cannot learn unless they are beaten.” The effect of
such abuses is borne out by the low literacy and high drop-out
rates for Dalits. Upper-caste hostility toward Dalits’ education is
linked to the perception that Dalits are either incapable of being
educated, or if educated, would pose a threat to village
hierarchies and power relations.
Dalits are denied equal access to public places, such as police
stations, government ration shops, post offices, schools, water
facilities, and village council offices. More than 20 percent of
Dalits do not have access to safe drinking water. Only 10 percent
of Dalit households have access to sanitation (as compared to 27
percent for non-Dalit households), and the vast majority of Dalits
depend on the “goodwill” of upper-caste community members
for access to water from public wells. Dalits are also excluded
from, or receive discriminatory treatment in, private businesses
such as food stalls, barber shops, and cinemas. Dalits are made
to use separate crockery and cutlery and drink from separate tea
glasses which they are then required to wash.
Attempts by Dalits to defy the caste order, to demand their rights,
or to lay claim to land that is legally theirs are consistently met
with economic boycotts or retaliatory violence. For example, on
January 5, 2006 Punjabi Dalit activist Bant Singh was beaten to
the point of losing his limbs for seeking justice for the gang rape
of his daughter. On September 26, 2006 in Kherlanji village,
Maharashtra, members of a Dalit family were brutally beaten and
killed by an upper-caste mob because they refused to let uppercaste
farmers take their land.
Teachers have been
known to declare
that Dalit pupils
“cannot learn unless
they are beaten.” –
UN Special
Rapporteur on the
right to education
(2006).
Dalits depend on
the “goodwill” of
upper-caste
community
members for access
to water from public
wells.
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
9
Both state and private actors commit the abuses documented in
Hidden Apartheid with impunity. In violation of India’s Article 6
obligations to ensure effective remedies against acts of
discrimination, police, prosecutors, and judges routinely fail to
properly pursue cases brought by Dalits. Police systematically
fail to properly register these crimes under the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and the
Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1995. Even on the relatively rare
occasions on which a case reaches court, the most likely
outcome is acquittal.
The innocuous treatment of the caste system in school textbooks
and curricula, along with insufficient media attention to Dalit
issues, all suggest that the Indian government is failing to take
effective measures to counter caste prejudice, in contravention of
Article 7 of the Convention.
Dalit Rights Movements
In response to centuries of inhuman and degrading treatment,
and in spite of tremendous obstacles, Dalit rights movements
across the country are growing, as are their demands for basic
dignity and human rights.
Dalits have also begun to raise their voices in international
forums, such as the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism,
successive World Social Forums, and in hearings before various
UN human rights bodies.
International scrutiny is growing and with it the condemnation of
abuses resulting from the caste system and the government’s
failure to protect Dalits’ rights.
They have got my
limbs, but I have
still got my voice, I
can sing. –
Dalit activist Bant
Singh (2006). Singh
was beaten to the
point of losing his
limbs for seeking
justice for the gang
rape of his daughter.
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
10
On December 27, 2006 Manmohan Singh became the first sitting
Indian prime minister to openly acknowledge the parallel
between the practice of “untouchability” and the crime of
apartheid. According to Singh, “The only parallel to the practice
of ‘untouchability’ was Apartheid in South Africa. ‘Untouchability’
is not just social discrimination. It is a blot on humanity.” Singh
added that “even after 60 years of constitutional and legal
protection and state support, there is still social discrimination
against Dalits in many parts of our country.”
We welcome Prime Minister Singh’s remarks and hope that this
statement will prompt vigorous reforms and state action that will
begin to close the gap between India’s human rights
commitments and the daily reality faced by over 165 million of its
citizens.
The only parallel to
the practice of
“untouchability”
was Apartheid in
South Africa.
“Untouchability” is
not just social
discrimination. It is
a blot on humanity.
– Indian Prime
Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh
(December 2006).
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
11
Recommendations
The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice and Human
Rights Watch call on the Indian government to take active steps
to comply with its obligations under international human rights
law and respect, protect, and ensure the rights of Dalits. In
particular, India should:
• Eradicate caste-based segregation in residential areas and
schools, and in access to public services.
• Implement laws and government policies to protect Dalits,
and Dalit women in particular, from physical and sexual
violence.
• Ensure appropriate reforms to eliminate police abuses
against Dalits and other marginalized communities.
• Ensure proper investigation and prosecution of crimes
against Dalits.
• Identify obstacles in the implementation of legislation
designed to protect Dalits and take steps to overcome
these obstacles. In particular, ensure the effective
eradication of exploitative labor arrangements and
implement rehabilitation schemes for Dalit bonded and
child laborers, manual scavengers, and for Dalit women
forced into prostitution.
• Combat hate speech and other actions inciting caste or
religion based discrimination and violence.
• Implement the recommendations of the 2004 National
Human Rights Commission report on atrocities against
Dalits.
• Ensure proper implementation of the “reservations” policy,
including providing protection for Dalit candidates in local
elections.
• Ensure proper implementation and monitoring of Dalit
development programs.
Hidden Apartheid February 2007
12
About the Report
Hidden Apartheid is based on in-depth investigations by the
Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Human Rights
Watch, Indian non-governmental organizations, and media
sources. The pervasiveness of abuses against Dalits is
corroborated by the reports of Indian governmental agencies,
including the National Human Rights Commission, and the
National Commission on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. These and other sources were compiled, investigated,
and analyzed under international law by NYU School of Law’s
International Human Rights Clinic.
Hidden Apartheid is available for download at www.chrgj.org and
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/india0207/
For more on the work of the Center for Human Rights & Global Justice see
www.chrgj.org
For more on the work of Human Rights Watch on Asia see
www.hrw.org/asia