Impact of Kanshi Ram's alliance with BJP on Dalit politics and the struggle against Brahmanism

 

Impact of Kanshi Ram's alliance with BJP on Dalit politics and the struggle against Brahmanism

Courtesy: Grok 

Presentation by SR Darapuri, National President, All India Peoples Front

 

Kanshi Ram’s Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) formed alliances with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Uttar Pradesh three times between 1995 and 2002. Below, I address whether these alliances were precalculated or momentary, their impact on Dalit politics and the struggle against Brahmanism, and whether they helped the BJP/Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) gain acceptance among Dalits.

 Were the Alliances Precalculated or Momentary?

The BSP’s alliances with the BJP were largely **momentary and pragmatic**, driven by immediate political necessities rather than a long-term ideological alignment. Kanshi Ram, a strategic thinker, prioritized political power as a tool for Dalit empowerment, encapsulated in his slogan, “political power is the master key.” His approach was rooted in the belief that weak coalition governments, reliant on BSP support, would allow Dalits to wield influence and challenge the dominance of upper-caste-led parties. The alliances were tactical responses to specific political contexts:

1. 1995 Alliance: After the collapse of the BSP-Samajwadi Party (SP) coalition due to the infamous 1995 Lucknow guest house incident, where SP cadres allegedly attacked Mayawati, the BSP sought BJP support to form a government. This was a momentary decision to stabilize Mayawati’s position as Chief Minister and counter SP hostility.

2. 1997 Alliance: Following the hung assembly in the 1996 Uttar Pradesh elections, the BSP again allied with the BJP in a rotational chief ministership arrangement. This was a calculated move to secure power, but it was short-lived due to internal disagreements.

3. 2002 Alliance: Post-2002 elections, the BSP and BJP formed another coalition government. This was a pragmatic step to regain power after the BSP’s electoral setbacks, but it collapsed within a year due to mutual distrust.

While Kanshi Ram’s strategy involved leveraging alliances to gain power, the BJP’s ideological alignment with the RSS, which promotes Hindutva and is often seen as reinforcing Brahmanical structures, made these partnerships controversial. Critics argue that Kanshi Ram’s willingness to ally with the BJP was opportunistic, as he had previously labeled the BJP as the “most corrupt” party. However, Kanshi Ram justified such moves as necessary to weaken “majority governments” that he believed were despotic toward the Bahujan Samaj. The alliances were not deeply precalculated as part of a long-term strategy but were instead reactive, aimed at securing immediate political gains in a fragmented electoral landscape.

 Impact on Dalit Politics and the Struggle Against Brahmanism

The BSP-BJP alliances had a complex and largely detrimental impact on Dalit politics and the struggle against Brahmanism:

1. Short-Term Gains in Political Power:

   - The alliances enabled Mayawati to become Chief Minister multiple times, a historic achievement for a Dalit woman in Uttar Pradesh, the epicenter of caste-based politics. This instilled a sense of pride and political consciousness among Dalits, reinforcing Kanshi Ram’s vision of capturing the “temple of power” for emancipation

   - Programs like the Ambedkar Village Scheme, which allocated funds for the development of Dalit-majority villages, provided tangible socio-economic benefits, enhancing the BSP’s appeal among Dalits.

2. Erosion of Ideological Clarity:

   - The alliances diluted the BSP’s anti-Brahmanism stance, as the BJP and RSS are widely perceived as upholding Brahmanical hegemony through their Hindutva ideology. Kanshi Ram’s original vision, inspired by Ambedkar and Phule, was to unite Dalits, OBCs, and minorities against caste oppression. Aligning with the BJP confused the BSP’s cadre and alienated sections of its core Dalit base, who saw it as a betrayal of the anti-caste struggle.

   - Critics argued that the BSP’s opportunistic alliances compromised its radical roots, shifting its focus from social justice to power politics. This was evident in the BSP’s later “Sarvajan” strategy (2007), which courted upper castes, further diluting its Bahujan identity.

3. Fragmentation of Dalit Unity:

   - The alliances created disillusionment among Dalit activists and voters, who felt that the BSP was prioritizing power over ideology. This led to the emergence of new Dalit leaders like Chandrashekhar Azad, whose Azad Samaj Party (ASP) aimed to reclaim Kanshi Ram’s radical vision.

   - The BSP’s reliance on Jatav voters (Mayawati’s sub-caste) and failure to consolidate non-Jatav Dalits further weakened its base, as non-Jatav Dalits began gravitating toward the BJP, which offered patronage and representation.

4. Weakening the Anti-Brahmanism Struggle:

   - By aligning with the BJP, the BSP inadvertently legitimized a party whose ideology is antithetical to Ambedkarite principles. This undermined the broader struggle against Brahmanism, as it signaled a willingness to compromise with forces that reinforce caste hierarchies.

   - The alliances also shifted the BSP’s focus from grassroots mobilization to electoral politics, reducing its role as a movement for social transformation. This was a departure from Kanshi Ram’s earlier emphasis on organizations like BAMCEF and DS4, which prioritized community empowerment.

 Did the Alliances Help BJP/RSS Gain Acceptance Among Dalits?

The BSP-BJP alliances significantly aided the BJP and RSS in gaining acceptance among Dalits, particularly non-Jatav sub-castes, through a combination of political patronage and ideological outreach:

1. Political Patronage and Representation:

   - The BJP capitalized on the alliances to project itself as a viable alternative for Dalits, especially non-Jatavs like Pasis, Valmikis, and Khatiks, who felt marginalized within the BSP’s Jatav-centric politics. By offering ministerial berths and local leadership roles, the BJP attracted Dalit leaders and voters.

   - The BJP’s narrative of “saving” Mayawati during the 1995 guest house incident was used to appeal to Dalit voters, portraying the party as a protector of Dalit interests against SP aggression.

2. RSS’s Cultural Outreach:

   - The RSS intensified its “samarasta” (social harmony) campaign, which sought to integrate Dalits into the Hindu fold while downplaying caste distinctions. This included organizing events like Ambedkar Jayanti celebrations and promoting micro-caste identities to fragment Dalit unity.

   - The BJP’s emphasis on Hindu nationalism, exemplified by the Ram Temple movement, resonated with some Dalits who were drawn to a unified Hindu identity, especially in the absence of a strong BSP alternative

3. Electoral Gains:

   - The alliances allowed the BJP to erode the BSP’s non-Jatav Dalit base. Post-2007, the BJP’s success in Uttar Pradesh elections (2014, 2017, 2019) was partly due to its ability to attract non-Jatav Dalits and OBCs, who were disillusioned with the BSP’s alliances and Mayawati’s leadership.

   - The BSP’s electoral decline—winning zero seats in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and only one seat in the 2022 UP assembly elections—reflected a shift of Dalit votes to the BJP, facilitated by the earlier alliances.

4.   Ideological Penetration:

   - The BJP/RSS used the alliances to normalize their presence in Dalit communities, framing Hindutva as inclusive. This was particularly effective among younger Dalits who had not experienced the BSP’s peak mobilization in the 1990s

   - However, the BJP’s gains were not uniform. Jatav voters, the BSP’s core base, largely remained loyal to Mayawati, but their loyalty waned over time due to the BSP’s ideological compromises and electoral losses.

Conclusion

The BSP’s alliances with the BJP were primarily momentary and pragmatic, driven by Kanshi Ram’s strategy of capturing political power to empower Dalits. While they achieved short-term gains, such as Mayawati’s chief ministerships and socio-economic schemes for Dalits, they compromised the BSP’s anti-Brahmanism stance and alienated sections of its base. The alliances significantly aided the BJP/RSS in gaining acceptance among non-Jatav Dalits through patronage, cultural outreach, and the BSP’s weakened ideological position. This contributed to the BJP’s electoral dominance in Uttar Pradesh and the broader decline of the BSP, pushing Dalit politics to a crossroads where new leaders and parties are attempting to revive Kanshi Ram’s vision.

Who are the people who gave legitimacy to the Sangh from time to time?

 

Who are the people who gave legitimacy to the Sangh from time to time?

An assessment of the leaders who brought the Sangh, which had become untouchable in Indian politics after independence due to Gandhi's assassination, into the mainstream.

By: Jitendra Kumar

(English translation from Hindi: SR Darapuri I.P.S.(Retd)

07 Nov, 2019

 

In the 90s, when Sachin Tendulkar was rising to the top, he was being compared to Australia's Don Bradman, the greatest batsman of all time. As was bound to happen, Sachin went to meet Don Bradman during the Indian team's tour of Australia. When Sachin came out after meeting Bradman, Bradman's wife asked him what kind of cricket he played that it is still discussed so much! To this, Bradman replied to his wife - "If you want to know how I played, you should watch Sachin playing cricket, I used to play almost like that."

I don't know how much truth is there in this, but it was published by almost all the newspapers of India at that time. This is a reference because if we want to see or imagine the Congress of that time, we can say that it is like today's BJP. The only difference is that Congress was present in South India and BJP was absent from South even in its most successful period. But it can also be said on the contrary that Congress never had the strength with which BJP is present in North and Central India today.

Since BJP has become so big, in the last few years the debate has intensified that Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) is the only person who played the most important role in getting legitimacy to RSS in the mainstream of the country and in taking it out of the image of 'Gandhi's killer'. If we try to understand this fact, we will find that this is true but only to a certain extent. It is true that after Gandhiji's assassination, the Sangh remained almost untouchable in the country until Indira Gandhi did not go too far by imposing emergency.

But it is not fair to point fingers at just one person for giving legitimacy to RSS. Many leaders are responsible for this, who have flourished and withered from time to time since independence till today. After independence, the way RSS created an atmosphere of hatred against Gandhi in the entire country, its culmination was Gandhi's assassination. In the investigation of the assassination, many wires were found to be connected to RSS. But it is also true that no big leader of RSS was punished for this. But it is also equally true that many of its leaders were questioned and seeing their suspicious activities, the then Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel had imposed a ban on RSS.

In this entire debate, we should not forget that RSS had reach and legitimacy in the merchant (Vaishya) society from the very beginning. That is, RSS preachers may have had problems in making a place for themselves socially, in expressing their views, but they never faced a crisis of financial resources. After Congress, RSS had the most financial resources among the social movements and organizations of that time. It is not possible to mention with figures how much financial resources RSS had in which form (and it is not possible even today) because no audit of its resources and source etc. has ever been done, nor does it come under any government law or rule.

Therefore, when we talk about RSS, we should always focus on who helped it socially and how much? When Congress was at its peak, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia was the first to prepare the ground for non-Congressism against the Congress party, where Jansangh and socialists were working together internally. This was the reason that in the 1967 elections, when Congress party collapsed in seven states and the United Legislature Party government was formed, Jansangh was also a part of it. Jansangh means the previous version of the present BJP. This was a political venture of RSS.

Therefore, when it comes to legitimizing RSS in the country, it would not be appropriate to ignore the role of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia. After Lohia, the second important leader is JP, who, after Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency in 1975, with the active cooperation of the Sangh, created a political platform in which Jansangh was the most important. When socialist leaders like George Fernandes questioned the communal past of the RSS, JP made the famous statement: 'If the RSS is communal, then consider Jayaprakash Narayan communal too.'

The third important name in the chain of getting legitimacy for the RSS in the mainstream is that of George Fernandes. George had a great stature. People knew him all over India as a labour leader. He was against the RSS-BJP from the beginning. But when his own political ground weakened and his hold on the party started to loosen, he compromised with the BJP on some 'conditions' to remain in power. This was the decade of the 90s. In the atmosphere of the temple-mosque, the image of the BJP had become completely communal. The RSS and the BJP were facing the second major crisis after independence. Due to the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the BJP's reputation was so tainted that those who wanted peace in the country had accepted that the BJP was really against Muslims. But despite this, George compromised politically with the BJP.

The fourth big name among those who joined hands with BJP ignoring its communal identity is that of socialist and social justice player Nitish Kumar. BJP which was considered communal and anti-Muslim before 1990, was also branded as anti-backward and anti-Dalit after opposing the Mandal Commission's recommendations.

It is believed that BJP Sangh played the Kamandal card to counter Mandal. BJP was not able to openly oppose Mandal Commission at that time but the absence of backward-Dalit leaders in its top leadership strengthened this image. Except Kalyan Singh, not a single backward leader was included in the BJP leadership till then. When Nitish Kumar's Samata Party joined hands with BJP in 1996, it reduced BJP's communal and upper caste identity to some extent.

One name in this series is that of Kanshi Ram. After the demolition of Babri Masjid, Kanshi Ram laid the foundation of SP-BSP alliance. As a result, Mulayam Singh became the Chief Minister with a huge victory. This is the story of 1993. This was seen as the strongest political alliance of Dalit-OBC and minority politics. But after a few months when differences emerged between SP and Mayawati, BSP chief Kanshi Ram agreed to form a government under Mayawati's leadership along with BJP.

 

This was the most successful strategic move of BJP, which is doing the politics of upper castes, because with this BJP was successful in sending a message among Dalits that it is not against them. In this way, Dalits who considered BJP as untouchable based on caste no longer had so much hatred for BJP. Under Mayawati's leadership, BSP formed alliance with BJP thrice. It went to such an extent that right after the Gujarat riots, Mayawati went to Gujarat to campaign for Narendra Modi as the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. It means that one wrong step of Kanshiram helped BJP to jump several steps ahead. BJP removed the stigma of being communal and casteist from itself.

This list will remain incomplete without mentioning two big leaders of Bihar in the matter of getting acceptance for RSS-BJP in the society. Sharad Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan. After the implementation of the Mandal Commission's recommendations in VP Singh's government, Sharad Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan, who were part of the government, wanted to share the entire credit among themselves. Both leaders used to identify BJP as a party of upper castes at that time after the implementation of the Mandal Commission. But as soon as their own position in the Janata Dal weakened, both of them joined the same 'Brahminist' BJP. Now BJP was no longer a party that usurped the rights of the backwards and Dalits for them. Sharad Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan coming under the umbrella of the BJP leadership was an acceptance on the part of the stream of social justice that the RSS or BJP is not really anti-Dalit-backward, otherwise how would the two biggest 'messiahs' of the Mandal Commission after VP Singh be with the BJP? In this way, the acceptance of BJP among Dalits and backward classes deepened.

All these leaders, for their personal ambitions, first joined the Jan Sangh, then joined hands with the BJP and contributed to strengthening the ground for the RSS. In fact, Ram Manohar Lohia was the first politician who knew this danger very well, yet he made this mistake. Lohia was the first socialist leader who was fighting not for change of power but for change of system. If Lohia had lived a few more days, he would have definitely realized his mistake.

Ram Manohar Lohia had written a book years ago on the partition of India and Pakistan- 'Guilty Men of India’s Partition'. Without naming the culprits, he had told who the culprits were. I guess that if Lohia were alive today, then perhaps the name of his book would have been- 'Guilty Men of giving legitimacy to RSS'.

With the frankness and honesty that Dr. Lohia had, he would have written without hesitation that how he alone has freed RSS from the sin of 'Gandhi murder'. But both the Mandal players- Sharad Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan are still looking for a big opportunity for themselves in the BJP camp!

Courtesy: Hindi Newslaundry