Showing posts with label Social Justice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Social Justice. Show all posts

Thursday, 17 September 2026

Periyar and the Emancipation of the Oppressed Classes

 

Periyar and the Emancipation of the Oppressed Classes

SR Darapuri I.P.S.(Retd)

(On the occasion of the 147th birth anniversary of Ramasamy Periyar)

Introduction

E. V. Ramasamy, popularly known as Periyar (1879–1973), occupies a distinctive and consequential place in the history of India's struggles against caste oppression, social inequality and Brahminical domination. Through the Self-Respect Movement and the wider Dravidian social movement, Periyar sought not merely to reform particular customs but to transform the social relations and ideological structures that reproduced inequality. His politics was grounded in a radical proposition: no society can claim to be democratic when human beings are divided into hierarchically ranked communities and when birth determines social dignity, access to knowledge, occupation and power.

Periyar's contribution to the emancipation of oppressed classes therefore needs to be understood as a project of social transformation rather than merely political reform. He attacked caste hierarchy at its cultural, religious and institutional foundations. He promoted rationalism, self-respect, equal access to education, communal representation, women's emancipation and the rejection of hereditary privilege. His objective was to create a society in which social status would no longer be determined by birth.

Periyar's ideas also invite comparison with Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. Although the two thinkers differed considerably in their approaches to religion, political organisation and constitutional transformation, they shared a fundamental understanding: caste was not simply a collection of prejudices but a deeply embedded system of social power. Both rejected the idea that political democracy could survive indefinitely alongside entrenched social inequality.

Caste as a System of Graded Inequality

Periyar's understanding of caste went beyond the question of untouchability. He saw caste as an elaborate system of graded social hierarchy in which communities were assigned unequal status by birth. This hierarchy affected virtually every dimension of life—education, occupation, marriage, residence, religious authority, access to public institutions and political representation.

For Periyar, caste survived because it was supported not only by social customs but also by ideas that presented inequality as legitimate or sacred. Consequently, merely appealing to individual goodwill could not eliminate caste. The institutions and beliefs that reproduced hierarchy had to be challenged.

This explains the radical character of Periyar's social philosophy. He did not ask privileged groups simply to become more charitable towards oppressed communities. He demanded a restructuring of social relationships themselves. The objective was not a more benevolent caste system but the destruction of caste hierarchy.

In this respect, Periyar's thought converged with Ambedkar's critique of caste. Ambedkar argued that caste was a system of "graded inequality" in which every group could regard another as inferior while accepting its own position relative to groups above it. Periyar similarly understood caste as a mechanism for maintaining unequal social power across generations.

The Politics of Self-Respect

The Self-Respect Movement, launched by Periyar in 1925, became the principal vehicle of his emancipatory politics. Its central idea was deceptively simple but socially radical: a human being must possess self-respect before genuine freedom is possible.

Self-respect, in Periyar's philosophy, was not merely an individual's sense of personal dignity. It was a collective rejection of the social belief that some people were inherently superior and others inherently inferior. A person born into an oppressed caste had to be liberated not only from external discrimination but also from the internalised belief that their inherited status made them inferior.

The Self-Respect Movement therefore challenged caste names, ritual hierarchy, hereditary status and practices that symbolically reproduced inequality. It sought to create a new social consciousness in which people would judge themselves and others as human beings rather than according to caste rank.

This was an important departure from approaches that treated social reform as a matter of changing individual behaviour while leaving the underlying hierarchy intact. For Periyar, emancipation required a transformation of consciousness as well as institutions.

Periyar and the Struggle against Untouchability

Periyar's involvement in the Vaikom Satyagraha in Travancore during the 1920s demonstrated his commitment to challenging caste exclusion in public life. The movement sought access to public roads surrounding the Vaikom temple for communities subjected to caste restrictions. Periyar's participation strengthened his role in the wider struggle against untouchability and social exclusion.

The significance of such struggles extended beyond access to a particular road or temple. They raised a fundamental question of democratic citizenship: Can public space legitimately be controlled according to hereditary social status?

Periyar's answer was unequivocal. Public institutions and public spaces had to be accessible on the basis of equal citizenship rather than caste.

This principle remains important because caste discrimination often operates through control over everyday spaces—schools, temples, water sources, residential areas, workplaces and local institutions. Legal equality becomes meaningful only when equal access is realised in everyday social life.

Rationalism and the Critique of Religious Authority

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Periyar's politics was his uncompromising commitment to rationalism. He questioned the authority of religious traditions whenever they were invoked to justify social inequality.

Periyar's critique was particularly directed at what he regarded as the ideological foundations of Brahminical hierarchy. He argued that religious doctrines and social customs could not be accepted merely because they had been inherited from the past. They had to be judged by reason and by their consequences for human equality.

His radical rejection of religious authority distinguished him from many other social reformers. Rather than seeking to reinterpret religious traditions in an egalitarian manner, Periyar often questioned the legitimacy of the religious framework itself when he believed it sustained caste hierarchy.

His approach consequently differed from Ambedkar's. Ambedkar subjected Hindu social philosophy to severe criticism but ultimately sought an alternative ethical and religious foundation in Buddhism. Periyar moved much more decisively toward rationalism and atheism.

Despite this difference, both thinkers shared an important principle: no religious or cultural authority should be permitted to override human dignity and equality.

Education as an Instrument of Liberation

Periyar regarded education as essential to emancipation because ignorance allowed inherited authority to remain unchallenged. But his conception of education went beyond literacy or vocational training. Education had to cultivate the ability to question, reason and reject irrational social conventions.

This was particularly important for oppressed communities because exclusion from education had historically reinforced their exclusion from administration, professions and political power. Opening educational institutions to disadvantaged communities was therefore not simply a welfare measure; it was a means of redistributing social power.

Periyar's emphasis on education has a strong affinity with Ambedkar's insistence that oppressed communities must educate themselves, organise collectively and struggle for their rights. Both understood knowledge as a form of power.

Representation and Social Justice

Periyar recognised that social inequality could not be overcome if public institutions remained monopolised by historically privileged groups. He therefore supported communal representation and policies designed to increase the participation of disadvantaged communities in education and government employment.

His argument anticipated an important principle of affirmative action: formal equality does not necessarily produce substantive equality when social groups begin from unequal historical positions.

If one community has enjoyed generations of privileged access to education and public employment while another has been systematically excluded, simply opening the same formal competition to both does not erase the accumulated effects of historical discrimination.

Representation, therefore, became an instrument for democratising state institutions.

This dimension of Periyar's thought is particularly relevant to the continuing debate about reservation and social justice in India. Reservation is not merely a question of distributing government jobs or educational seats. At its deeper level, it concerns who has access to institutions of knowledge, administration and decision-making.

Periyar and Women's Emancipation

Periyar's conception of social emancipation was incomplete without women's emancipation. He understood that caste society depended partly on controlling marriage, sexuality and family relations. Since caste reproduction depends upon maintaining boundaries between communities, control over women's marriage and sexuality becomes a mechanism for preserving caste.

Periyar consequently attacked child marriage, dowry, enforced widowhood, restrictions on women's education and patriarchal control over marriage. He advocated women's right to education, property, economic independence and freedom of choice.

The Self-Respect Marriage became one of the practical expressions of this philosophy. It rejected the idea that marriage required the exclusive authority of a Brahmin priest and emphasised the equality and consent of the partners.

This made Periyar's feminism an integral part of his anti-caste politics. For him, a society could not be liberated from caste while continuing to maintain patriarchal domination within the family.

Periyar and the Democratisation of Social Power

The deeper significance of Periyar's politics lies in his attempt to democratise social power. He understood that political democracy could coexist with profound social inequality if inherited hierarchies remained untouched.

A person might possess the formal right to vote while simultaneously being treated as inferior in everyday life. A constitution might guarantee equality while social institutions continued to reproduce caste privilege. A government might be elected democratically while education and administration remained disproportionately controlled by socially dominant communities.

Periyar therefore pushed the meaning of democracy beyond elections. Democracy had to become a way of organising social relationships.

This conception has considerable relevance to contemporary India. The question of democracy cannot be reduced to the conduct of elections. It also concerns equality in education, employment, representation, public institutions, social dignity and access to justice.

Periyar and the Dravidian Movement

Periyar's ideas profoundly influenced the development of the Dravidian movement in Tamil Nadu. The movement combined demands for social justice with opposition to caste hierarchy, linguistic domination and hereditary privilege.

Its later political manifestations contributed to the expansion of affirmative action, educational opportunities and representation for historically disadvantaged communities in Tamil Nadu. However, Periyar's own radical social philosophy should not simply be equated with the subsequent electoral politics of Dravidian parties. Political movements evolve, and institutional governments necessarily operate within different constraints from social-revolutionary movements.

Nevertheless, the intellectual legacy of Periyar remains central to understanding Tamil Nadu's distinctive history of social justice politics.

Periyar and Ambedkar: Converging Paths of Emancipation

The comparison between Periyar and Ambedkar is especially valuable for understanding the broader anti-caste tradition in modern India.

Both rejected caste as a legitimate social institution. Both challenged hereditary privilege. Both emphasised education and collective organisation. Both supported political and institutional measures to increase the representation of oppressed communities. Both regarded women's equality as an essential component of social transformation.

Their differences, however, are equally important.

Ambedkar placed exceptional emphasis on constitutional democracy, political safeguards, legal rights and the creation of institutions capable of protecting individual liberty and minority rights. His later conversion to Buddhism represented an attempt to construct an ethical community based on liberty, equality and fraternity.

Periyar placed greater emphasis on rationalism, self-respect and the destruction of religious and cultural authority that he believed sustained caste hierarchy. His politics was more explicitly directed toward a radical transformation of social consciousness and traditional institutions.

The two approaches can therefore be seen as complementary intellectual resources rather than identical programmes. Ambedkar provides a particularly developed framework for constitutional and political democracy; Periyar provides a powerful framework for challenging social hierarchy, cultural domination and internalised inferiority.

The Continuing Relevance of Periyar

Periyar's ideas remain relevant because the formal abolition of untouchability and constitutional guarantees of equality have not automatically eliminated caste-based social practices. Caste continues to influence marriage, social networks, access to resources, political representation and social status.

Similarly, gender inequality continues to intersect with caste and class. Educational expansion has not eliminated unequal access to quality education, and formal political equality does not necessarily guarantee equal influence over institutions.

Periyar's emphasis on self-respect therefore retains contemporary significance. The emancipation of oppressed communities requires not only legal protection but also the development of collective confidence, critical consciousness and institutional power.

His rationalist approach also remains relevant to the question of how democratic societies should deal with traditions that conflict with equality. Tradition cannot become an automatic justification for discrimination. The democratic test of a social practice must ultimately be whether it respects human dignity and equal citizenship.

Conclusion

Periyar's contribution to the emancipation of oppressed classes was rooted in a radical understanding of social freedom. He refused to accept that caste could be eliminated merely by reforming individual behaviour or providing limited concessions to disadvantaged groups. For him, emancipation required the transformation of the structures, beliefs and institutions that reproduced hereditary inequality.

The Self-Respect Movement sought to create a new social consciousness based on dignity and equality. His rationalism challenged the authority of traditions that legitimised hierarchy. His advocacy of communal representation sought to democratise access to education and public employment. His campaign for women's emancipation challenged the patriarchal institutions through which caste itself was reproduced. His participation in struggles against untouchability connected social dignity with equal access to public space.

Periyar's enduring contribution is therefore the insistence that social equality must precede, accompany and deepen political democracy. The oppressed cannot be emancipated simply by being included within existing structures if those structures continue to reproduce their subordination. They must acquire self-respect, knowledge, organisation and institutional power.

In this sense, Periyar belongs to the larger intellectual tradition of radical anti-caste emancipation represented in different ways by Jyotirao Phule, Savitribai Phule, Narayana Guru, Periyar and B. R. Ambedkar. Their methods and philosophies were not identical, but their struggles converged around a fundamental democratic principle: birth cannot be the basis of human worth, social status or political power.

Periyar's message consequently remains significant not simply as a chapter in the history of Tamil Nadu but as a continuing challenge to every form of inherited hierarchy. His central demand was not merely reform of the oppressed person's condition but the creation of a society in which oppression itself would cease to have a legitimate social foundation.

Saturday, 25 June 2016

Dalit Politics in India Recognition without Redistribution



Dalit Politics in India Recognition without Redistribution
-Radha Sarkar, Amar Sarkar
(Economic & Political Weekly EPW may 14, 2016 vol. lI No 20 15)

Dalit political parties in North and Central India have overwhelmingly pursued an agenda of recognition, calling for equal respect, rather than one of redistribution. While this has improved the social and economic standing of Dalits better situated in terms of class, it has failed to substantively improve the lives of the majority of Dalits. Ultimately, Dalits’ quest for equal treatment will be limited so long as it lacks a redistributive politics that addresses exploitative economic relations.
How should we understand the rise of caste-based politics among India’s Dalits since the 1990s? Should we celebrate it as the empowerment of a historically oppressed community and a major success of Indian democracy, as some scholars have (Jaffrelot 2003; Kohli 2001; Varshney 2000)? Or should we be more sceptical in examining the gains and limitations? We argue that caste-based politics cannot achieve social justice for Dalits unless it takes class into account, which it has largely failed to. The politics of recognition employed by Dalit parties has brought only limited gains for Dalits on the whole as the benefits associated with it have been reaped by Dalits better situated in terms of class. Ultimately, Dalits’ quest for equal treatment will be limited so long as it lacks a redistributive politics to address exploitative economic relations. We use the case of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (UP)—one of the largest and most electorally successful of caste based parties—and its project for Dalit equality to illustrate our arguments.
Social Justice 
Nancy Fraser (1998) distinguishes two conceptions of social justice: one that centres on redistributive claims, comprising calls for a more equitable distribution of goods and resources; and a second conception built on claims for recognition with the goal of a “difference friendly world” that accords equal respect to a plurality of social groups (Fraser 1998: 1). While redistribution has had a central place in calls for justice, Fraser highlights the equal importance of recognition in achieving justice for those groups for whom “institutionalized patterns of interpretation and valuation [have] impede[d] the parity of participation in social life” (Fraser 1998: 4). Fraser argues that to adequately add ress injustice, the politics of redistribution and recognition must be employed tog ether: either one on its own is incapable of dealing with the complex cultural and economic realities of injustice. Her argument primarily concerns women but is also well suited to explain the nature of caste oppression in India. Caste, like gender in Fraser’s account, is a two-sided category, composed of economic and cul tural dimensions. And as with gender, redressing caste-based injustice calls for attention to both redistribution and recognition (Fraser 1998: 2)
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Recognition vs Redistribution 

They are concerned primarily with changes to the cultural order as means of securing equal treatment in social  relations, or, in Fraser’s words, they pursue “parity of participation in social life” (1998: 4). But changes to the cultural order can at best address misrecognition, or the unfairly low social status accorded to a group; they are unable to address what Fraser terms maldistribution, or the unjust distribution of resources and goods. If caste constituted the sole principle of distribution, then it would correspond perfectly with class. If all members of a caste engaged in their traditional occupations, then we could expect few differences between property ownership, education, wealth or income between the members of any one caste or sub-caste (Weiner 2001). Misrecognition of a group’s status in society would directly entail maldistribution, and a politics of recognition would serve to address injustices of distribution as well as recognition. However, the reality of caste is more complex, for caste and class do not map seamlessly onto one another. With changes in economy and policy, caste Hindus as well as Dalits have become increasingly differentiated internally. With deregulation, liberalisation of the economy and higher economic growth rates, individuals from various rungs of the caste hierarchy have gained diverse economic benefits (Weiner 2001; Kohli 2001). As some members of lower castes acquire higher levels of education and have benefitted from caste-based reservations in government employment, class divisions among them have increased. Weiner (2001) predicts an increasing trend of social mobility for educated, urban Dalits; the prospects for the more numerous rural sections of the Dalit population, with less education, are less optimistic. Thus, all the members of any one caste do not belong to the same class: caste and class are not interchangeable, and we cannot infer one directly from the other. Consequently, a politics of recognition does not, in and of itself, entail a politics of redistribution. In the remainder of this article, we demonstrate the ways in which the caste based politics of Dalit parties are unable to address the economic dimensions of oppression, in addition the cultural ones, for the overwhelming majority of Dalits.
The Case of Uttar Pradesh
Consider, for instance, the pro-Dalit BSP in UP. The BSP emerged as a competitor for state-level power in 1991, winning 9.4% of the vote that year. In 2007, it won a landslide victory with 30.6% of the vote (Jeffrey et al 2008). The BSP’s attempts to better the social, economic, and political position of Dalits in UP comprised of two interlinked strategies. The first consisted in a symbolic transformation of the landscape of UP—parks, statues, and libraries were dedicated to Dalit leaders; and hospitals, stadia, and educational institutions were renamed along similar lines (Jeffrey et al 2008). The BSP’s second strategy was to alter the implementation of existing government policies rather than effect new legislation (Chandra 2004). For example, the BSP sought to change the nature of the state government by transferring Dalits into key positions in the bureaucracy and by expanding Dalit presence in the police force. In the six months that the BSP’s Mayawati was chief minister in 1997, she transferred 1,350 civil and police officers (Jaffrelot 2003: 419), made a concerted effort to recruit Dalits to the police force, and made existing  reserved seats in government training and professional training more accessible to Dalits (Chandra 2004; Hasan 2001). In sum, the strategy of the BSP was to raise the profile of UP’s Dalits writ large by increasing their presence and power in the bureaucratic and coercive apparatuses, as well as in the symbolic landscape. Clearly, the BSP improved the political and economic standing of some Dalits. Varshney (2000) argues that, although the BSP has not substantially improved the economic position of ordinary Dalits, it has nonetheless benefitted the Dalit community, politically and symbolically, across North India. He suggests that Dalits are better positioned to challenge the legitimacy of caste discrimination and to engage in politics. Jaffrelot (2003) goes further in suggesting that many ordinary Dalits are using their recently acquired state-level representation to significantly improve their access to political resources, economic goods, and social contacts in rural UP. While the rise of low-caste  politics has indeed altered local-level politics to a certain extent (Jeffrey et al 2008), hailing the BSP as the harbinger of a “silent revolution” (Jaffrelot 2003) is as yet premature, for a politics of recognition, divorced from that of redistribution, is limited from the very outset. Without a radical shift in the distribution of economic and social opportunities, a politics of recognition does little to reconfigure entrenched power relations.
Socio-economic Inequality  
The limits of a politics of recognition are evinced by the BSP. Even as it has embraced a politics of recognition and advanced a largely symbolic agenda, the BSP has failed to intervene in disputes over land and labour and to implement policies that address inequality and  poverty in UP (Jeffrey et al 2008). The realities of socio-economic inequality, rooted in unequal land and asset ownership, also impact the ways in which Dalits are able (or unable) to take advantage of the policies of recognition offered to them. While reservations in state educational institutions and government offices have been implemented with the claim of advancing Dalits’ economic, political, and social standing, in reality they have done little for the majority of the community. For instance, rural Chamars, a Dalit group in UP, argue that reservations have little impact on their community’s chances of securing government work because the competition for reserved government posts is     fierce and corrupt (Jeffrey et al 2008). The Chamars’ less prestigious education, obtained primarily from rural state schools with poor educational standards— the only schools most Chamar families can afford—combined with a lack of money for bribes marginalised their bid for government jobs relative to urban members of their caste (Jeffrey et al 2008).
 The politics of recognition have thus allowed those Dalit individuals better positioned in the class hierarchy to take advantage of the opportunities offered for recognition. Furthermore, a politics of recognition without redistribution is limited even in its pursuit of respect in a largely rural society where dignity and respect are bound up with landownership and use. Landownership has been a source of self-respect and a claim to respectful treatment from others across the Indian countryside (Bhatia 2005). For the majority of rural Dalits, their landlessness has left them completely dependent on landlords. The skewed labour relations engendered by this pattern of land ownership has been a source of enduring humiliation among Dalits and has exposed them to continued exploitation by their employers (Bhatia 2005). Respect for Dalits can only be meaningfully secured through a direct intervention in the labour relations between them and other castes—either through land redistribution, heightened minimum wage regulation, or other redistributive measures. The aim of a politics of recognition— parity in participation in social life—can only be achieved with redistribution.   All of this is not to deny the value of a politics of recognition. Dalits have been denied dignity and respect, even their humanity has too often been denied. These harms are indeed injustices of recognition and demand remedies of recognition of equal worth. However, a Dalit politics of recognition that is unable to substantiate a redistributive agenda is doomed to be shallow, bringing tangible gains to those better off in class terms while permitting at best symbolic achievements for many. Furthermore, such a politics ignores the interrelated nature of economic and social relations: without significant redistribution, Dalits are fated to continued dependence on higher castes to make ends meet. This economic dependence in turn fosters relations of exploitation that preclude the parity of participation in social life to which a politics of recognition aspires. Indian democracy can only be (at most) a partial success without the full social and economic incorporation of the country’s most oppressed and marginalised groups. 
References
Basu, Ipshita (2012): “The Politics of Recognition and Redistribution: Development, Tribal Identity Politics and Distributive Justice in India’s Jharkhand,” Development and Change, Vol 43, No 6, pp 1291–1312. Bhatia,
 Bela (2005): “The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar,” Economic & Political Weekly,  Vol 40, No 15, pp 1536–49.
 Chandra, Kanchan (2004): Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fraser, Nancy (1998): “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, Participation,” WZB Discussion Paper No FS I 98–108.
 Hasan, Zoya (2001): “Transfer of Power? Politics of Mass Mobilisation in UP,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 36, No 46–47, pp 4401–9.
Jaffrelot, Christophe (2003): India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India, Orient Blackswan.
Jeffrey, Craig, Patricia Jeffery, and Roger Jeffery (2008): “Dalit Revolution? New Politicians in Uttar Pradesh, India,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 67, No 4, pp 1365–96.
Kohli, Atul (2001): Introduction, The Success of  India’s Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Varshney, Ashutosh (2000): “Is India Becoming More Democratic?” The Journal of Asian Studies,  Vol 59, No 1, pp 3–25.
 Weiner, Myron (2001): “The Struggle for Equality: Caste in Indian Politics,” The Success of India’s Democracy, Atul Kohli (ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The Poona Pact and Dalit Politics to Combat its Adverse Effects

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