Bengal Elections 2026: Why Political Parties are Averse to the Dalit Question

 

Bengal Elections 2026: Why Political Parties are Averse to the Dalit Question

Subhajit Naskar

Such a narrative is rooted in denial of social recognition of Tapashilis, who are categorised as Scheduled Caste (SC) and their historically transformative anti-caste politics in undivided Bengal.

Even the social justice icon Dr B R Ambedkar is not celebrated in the state beyond the few assertive independent Dalit groups while he is duly acknowledged with remarkable state honours in rest of the country. If selective amnesia had not engulfed the Bengali upper caste “bhadraloks” at large, it wouldn't be tough to remember Ambedkar's long association with Bengal. It was his All India Scheduled Castes Federation (AISCF), whose Bengal branch was headed by Jogendranath Mandal, a prominent leader from SC community in 20th century Bengal.

The association of Mandal with Ambedkar grew so unwaveringly loyal that, in 1946, Ambedkar turned to Bengal to be elected to the Constituent Assembly of India. Mandal and six other Dalit MLAs of the Bengal legislative assembly secured the seat for him. Ambedkar later went on to be the chairman of Constitution Drafting Committee. The glorious role of Bengal and its autonomous Dalit leadership in sending the main architect of Indian Constitution to the Constituent Assembly is today grossly erased institutionally. The caste question and Ambedkarite politics too, despite its powerful legacy in Bengal, is relegated to the background through coercion and social misrecognition.

Bengal has sixty constitutionally recognised scheduled caste communities, which is 23.51% of state’s total population according to the 2011 Census. Bengal comes second after Punjab among Indian States in size of Dalit population. And yet, the question of Dalit political aspirations and substantive caste representation doesn't find any resonance in the Bengal assembly elections. At the same time, the Dalit factor is one of the driving factors in every Punjab assembly election.

Interestingly, 19th and early 20th century's popular historiography of Bengal was largely shaped by majoritarian Hindu upper caste supremacism camouflaged as nationalist movement and deeply influenced by ''practicing Hindu rituals and glorification of Hindu kings''. Sumanta Banerjee in his book 'Unravelling the Bengali Identity' writes, how the Bengali upper caste hindu intellectuals of the 19th century tended to put emphasis on the Brahminical, Sanskrit oriented elements in that culture, while the same century had contemporaneously witnessed Dalits’ progressive assertions against upper caste Bengali bhadraloks’ caste supremacism.

Dalit assertions in Bengal

From early 19th century onwards, a host of Dalit social reformers started challenging the blatant casteism of Brahminical Bengali bhadraloks. In fact, the absence of Dalit sensibilities in Bengali nationalists' anti colonial struggle had been looked at with suspicion by Dalit political leadership. Harichand Thakur (1812-1878), Benimadhab Halder (1858-1923), Panchanan Barma (1866-1935), Raicharan Sardar (1876-1942), Mahendranath Karan (1886-1928), Guruchand Thakur (1846-1937), Anukul Chandra Das Naskar (1894-1947), Basanta Kumar Das (1898-1984), Rajendranath Sarkar (1903-1979) are some of anti-caste stalwarts being pushed out of the mainstream by the Bengali upper caste historiographers.

The hostility of Bengali upper caste bhadralok intellectuals towards the Dalit reformist movement against casteism is a well calculated move to sustain the former's complete social and political dominance in post-colonial Bengal. The Hindu Mahasabha, Communists and Congress in undivided Bengal were deeply antagonistic towards autonomous Dalit politics. The political parties in post-colonial Bengal have also retained the narrative of Bengali exceptionalism entrenched in castelessness that depoliticised Dalit social and political aspirations in contemporary Bengal.

It is a well concerted effort of the upper-caste political class of Bengal to sustain complete political dominance of Brahmins, Baidyas and Kayastha bhadraloks. The possibilities of Ambedkarite Dalit autonomous politics once launched by Jogendranath Mandal remains a perpetual threat to the Right, Left and Centrist political forces. Therefore, radical Dalit political consciousness observed in Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and some pockets of Southern India are consciously suppressed in the mainstream Bengali polity, society and academia.

Bengal: A caste conscious society

A Pratichi India Trust report of 2005 studied ''Cooked Mid-day Meal Programme in West Bengal - A study in Birbhum district'' found out explosive caste bias among the Caste Hindu Savarna Parents and their children’s attitudes towards marginalised caste students and Dalit mid-day meal cooks. The study has shown how Dalit and Adivasi students benefited immensely from mid-day meal scheme but the upper-caste students disliked the scheme while their parents had reservations about Dalit cooks cooking the mid day meal.

In fact. the practicing of endogamy is also high in West Bengal, with inter-caste marriages being very low in the state, a fact that doesn't sit well with its progressive claims. A mere 9.5% of the marriages happening in the state are inter-caste. The social backwardness of Bengali Dalit communities due to upper-castes’ hegemony is so stark that the state has never thought of implementing Scheduled caste special component plan like other states such as Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Karnataka.

It is only recently, that the the huge deletion of Dalit voters in Bengal through the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise the of Election Commission of India (ECI) prompted the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) top leadership of prime minister Narendra Modi and home minister Amit Shah to pacify them with the promise of citizenship and restoring their names once they come to power in the state. The Trinamool Congress (TMC) has since last few years started the corporate style 'Tapashilir Sanglap'(interaction with the Scheduled Castes) outreach campaign during election season, which is purely an electoral connect programme with Dalits.

Even though the BJP is very careful this time in addressing the Scheduled Castes of Bengal, they are trying to broadly mobilise the Hindu vote bank cutting across the castes. The communal campaign around 'ghuspaithiye' (infiltrators) is very willfully advanced by the BJP to mobilise and appropriate Dalits so that independent Dalit political agency never grows in Bengal.

The 2026 Bengal election is fought on high communal pitch so that the Dalit questions of representation and marginalities do not get any mainstream political recognition. There is a broad consensus among the Bengali upper caste bhadraloks of the Left, Right and Centre that Dalit aspirations and autonomous Dalit politics should not re-emerge.

Subhajit Naskar is a Political Scientist, who teaches at Jadavpur University.

Courtesy: The Wire 

Link of English write up: https://m.dailyhunt.in/news/india/english/the+wire+english-epaper-wireng/bengal+elections+2026+why+political+parties+are+averse+to+the+dalit+question-newsid-n710277313

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s Critique of Philosophy of Hinduism

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s Critique of Philosophy of Hinduism 

SR Darapuri I.P.S.(Retd.)

 

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, a prominent Indian social reformer, jurist, and the principal architect of the Indian Constitution, was deeply critical of Hinduism's philosophical foundations. In works like *Philosophy of Hinduism* (part of his unfinished *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches* series), *Riddles in Hinduism*, and *Annihilation of Caste*, he systematically "put Hinduism on trial" as a way of life, evaluating it through the lenses of social utility (community benefit) and individual justice (personal rights), alongside the French Revolution's ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. He argued that Hinduism, far from promoting moral progress or social harmony, entrenched inequality and served the interests of the Brahmin caste, rendering it incompatible with reason, science, and human dignity. This critique culminated in his conversion to Buddhism in 1956, which he saw as a rational alternative emphasizing equality and compassion.

 Core Philosophical Critiques

Ambedkar's views centred on Hinduism's failure to evolve through "revolutions" (like those of Copernicus or Darwin) that rid religion of irrationality and advance society from "savage" to "civilized" states. He defined philosophy of religion as both descriptive (its teachings) and normative (critical assessment of those teachings for moral governance). Key arguments include:

 Sanctification of Inequality via Chaturvarnya (Caste System): Hinduism's core doctrine of the fourfold varna system (Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Shudras) philosophically justifies hierarchy as divinely ordained, denying equality and liberty. Scriptures like the *Manusmriti* enshrine Brahmin supremacy in knowledge, wealth, and rights, while condemning Shudras to servitude, denying them Vedic access, and imposing unequal punishments (e.g., lighter fines for Brahmins abusing others). Untouchables (outside the varnas) face total ostracism as "Unseeables" or "Unapproachables," perpetuating marginalization. Ambedkar likened this to a "fascist ideology" akin to Nazism, breeding supermen (Brahmins) at the expense of the weak, with no room for fraternity—only jealousy and division that weakened Hindu society against invasions.

 Absurdities and Moral Bankruptcy of Scriptures: Ambedkar dismissed the Vedas as "worthless" and non-infallible, filled with immorality like incest, violence, animal sacrifices, black magic, and soma-induced intoxication—hardly divine revelations but tools for priestly control. The Upanishads contradict the Vedas, originally rejecting them before being co-opted. The “Bhagavad Gita” ("Manu in a nutshell") was, in his view, composed to counter Buddha's anti-caste revolution, promoting duty-bound inequality over ethical reform. Foundational myths, such as those of Rama and Krishna, were not ideals but exposés of patriarchal violence and moral flaws, used to uphold Brahminic dominance.

 Brahmaism and the Illusion of Unity: The philosophical concept of Brahmaism—that all existence is the essence of Brahma—implies universal equality and fraternity, superior even to mere brotherhood. Yet, Ambedkar argued, Brahmins hypocritically subverted it to justify caste and gender hierarchies, preventing true social democracy. Gods like Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva embody this instability: locked in feuds, rising and falling in prominence (e.g., Indra demoted, Shiva elevated from a "thief-king"), with avatars and Trimurti concepts revealing sectarian propaganda rather than eternal truth.

 Rejection of Reason and Moral Autonomy: Hinduism demands blind faith in arbitrary commands, stripping moral life of freedom and reason (prajna). It sanctifies poverty, superstition, and supernaturalism while enforcing unjust laws favouring one class. Concepts like “ahimsa” (non-violence) were inconsistently applied—shifting from Vedic meat-eating to vegetarianism, then back via Tantric rituals—serving Brahmin control, not ethics. The Kali Yuga was endlessly prolonged to excuse immorality and manipulate rulers.

Why He Renounced Hinduism?

Ambedkar saw no scope for reform within Hinduism, as its philosophy was inherently anti-egalitarian and anti-rational, choking the "missionary spirit" of equality. Buddhism, by contrast, aligned with liberty (no god-imposed fate), equality (“samata”, rejecting caste), and fraternity (“karuna” compassion), grounded in reason and science without soul, afterlife, or inequality. His goal was not mere critique but enlightenment: to provoke Hindus toward rational self-examination and dismantle Brahmanic "deception" for a just society.

 

Inequality, Polarization, and Democratic Backsliding

 

Inequality, Polarization, and Democratic Backsliding

Susan Stokes

(Summary of “WHY ELECTED LEADERS SUBVERT DEMOCRACY” https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/986019/pdf )

The passage argues that economic inequality weakens democracy by fostering distrust, polarization, and susceptibility to authoritarian leaders. Inequality can lead people to dehumanize the poor and lose confidence in institutions such as governments, courts, media, and education systems. Evidence from the United States shows that rising inequality over decades has coincided with declining trust in these institutions. India is another example of this phenomenon.

Polarization and Rise of Autocrats

Highly unequal societies tend to become politically polarized, where group interests sharply diverge. This polarization benefits would-be autocrats, who exploit divisions to gain power. Citizens in polarized environments are more willing to tolerate attacks on democratic institutions if they fear the opposing political side more.

Political leaders themselves often drive polarization, not just reflect it. Research shows that democratic decline is linked to elite rhetoric rather than public rejection of democracy. Leaders use economic grievances—often blaming minorities or migrants—to deepen divisions.

“Trash-Talking” Democratic Institutions

In addition to polarization, leaders weaken democracy through “democratic trash-talk”—systematically portraying institutions as corrupt and ineffective. This reduces public trust and makes institutional attacks seem justified. Unlike polarizing rhetoric, this strategy avoids backlash by convincing citizens that institutions are not worth defending.

Examples from countries like Mexico and Venezuela show how such rhetoric can lead to institutional restructuring, often increasing executive control (e.g., politicizing courts or electoral systems).

Why People Believe Such Leaders

Citizens may believe misleading or false claims due to:

• Emotional manipulation (anger, fear, moral outrage)
• Psychological framing of problems as deliberate harm by others
• Strong emotional attachment to leaders

However, education and critical thinking can counter misinformation.

How Democratic Backsliding Can Be Resisted

Despite challenges, democracies retain some resilience:

1. Political Elites

• Should address inequality through pro-poor policies
• Reconnect with working-class voters
• Use institutional mechanisms (legislatures, courts) to resist authoritarian moves
• Face a dilemma: whether to use aggressive tactics (“hardball”) or maintain norms

2. Civil Society

• Media, universities, NGOs, and professional groups play a key role
• They expose abuses, mobilize citizens, and defend democratic norms
• Even under repression, civil society can slow democratic erosion

3. Courts and Legal Actors

• Courts can still check executive power, even in weakened democracies
• Lawyers and professional bodies can uphold ethical standards

4. Citizens (Voters and Protesters)

• Elections remain a crucial mechanism to remove backsliding leaders
• Public protests and voting behaviour can reverse democratic decline
• Economic failures and corruption often reduce support for such leaders

Conclusion

Democratic backsliding is serious but not inevitable. While inequality and polarization create opportunities for authoritarianism, collective action by political actors, civil society, and citizens can resist and even reverse democratic decline. Active participation is essential, as democratic rights weaken if not exercised.