1. Factors Responsible for the Downfall of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)

 

1.    Factors Responsible for the Downfall of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)

SR Darapuri, National President, All India Peoples Front

The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), founded by Kanshi Ram in 1984 as a vehicle for Dalit and marginalized community empowerment, achieved its peak in 2007 by winning an absolute majority in Uttar Pradesh (UP) with a broad "Sarvajan" coalition. However, since 2012, the party has faced a steep decline, evidenced by its vote share dropping from around 30% in 2007 to 9.39% in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections (0 seats won), and only 1 seat in the 2022 UP Assembly polls. This erosion stems from a combination of internal, strategic, and external factors. Below, I outline the key reasons, drawing from analyses across political commentary and academic insights.

 1. Leadership Failures and Centralization Under Mayawati

   Mayawati's prolonged dominance has led to a highly centralized, dynastic structure that stifles innovation and accountability. The party shifted from Kanshi Ram's grassroots movement to a "supremo-centered" entity, with decisions like appointing her nephew Akash Anand as successor alienating cadres. Corruption allegations, including links to land mafias and personal wealth accumulation, tarnished her image, while her limited campaigning (often attributed to fears of central agency probes) reduced visibility. Post-election, she blamed external factors like EVMs and Muslim distrust rather than internal reforms, eroding credibility.

 2. Erosion of the Core Dalit Voter Base

   The BSP's traditional Jatav Dalit support (about 10% of UP's population) has fragmented, with even loyal voters splitting between BSP, BJP, and SP-Congress alliances. More critically, non-Jatav Dalits (the majority of UP's 21% SC population) shifted en masse to the BJP since 2014, attracted by its "subaltern Hindutva" and welfare schemes like Ujjwala and PM Awas Yojana. Post-2022 surveys showed less than half of Dalits voting BSP, with a quarter of Jatavs and half of non-Jatavs moving to BJP. This reflects the party's failure to address aspirations of an upwardly mobile Dalit middle class.

3. Loss of Broader Coalitions and Minority/OBC Support

   The 2007 "Sarvajan" strategy briefly united Dalits, Brahmins, Muslims, and OBCs, but backlash from Dalit cadres forced a retreat to core voters, alienating allies. Brahmins defected to BJP, Muslims to SP, and OBC groups like Kurmis, Koeris, and Rajbhars followed suit due to BSP's inability to sustain inclusive messaging. In 2024, minorities and OBCs overwhelmingly backed the SP-Congress INDIA bloc, leaving BSP as a "spoiler" that indirectly aided BJP by splitting anti-BJP votes.

4. Organizational Decay and Leadership Exodus

   The party has suffered a mass exodus of stalwarts, including MPs like Kunwar Danish Ali and Ritesh Pandey, and MLAs defecting to BJP or SP for "greener pastures." Ground-level cadre has withered, with no visible banners or rallies in core Dalit areas during elections, signaling disinterest. This stems from transactional politics—welcoming defectors for funds/tickets without ideological vetting—turning the BSP into an "election machine" rather than a sustained movement.

 5. Ideological Rigidity and Failure to Adapt to Political Shifts

   BSP's subdued criticism of BJP, silence on issues like constitutional erosion, and abstention from opposition campaigns (e.g., "Save the Constitution") allowed rivals to capture Dalit anxieties. It neglected socio-economic reforms like redistribution during its 2007-2012 rule, focusing on symbolism (e.g., Ambedkar statues) over governance. In a bipolar UP polity dominated by BJP-SP, BSP's refusal to form effective alliances (fearing subordination of Dalit interests) isolated it further.

6. Broader External Pressures: BJP's Dominance and Polarization

   The BJP's organizational strength, welfare populism, and Hindu nationalist appeal have fragmented Dalit-Bahujan unity, drawing non-Jatav SCs and OBCs into its fold. Events like the Ram Temple inauguration amplified this, while BSP's anodyne strategy failed to counter it. Additionally, the rise of new Dalit voices (e.g., Bhim Army's Chandrashekhar Azad) has diluted BSP's monopoly on Dalit mobilization.

 While these factors explain the BSP's sharp downturn, some analysts argue it's not "permanent." The party's ~10% consistent vote share reflects a resilient core, and historical recoveries (e.g., post-1990s dip) suggest potential revival if Mayawati fosters second-line leadership and adapts to caste census demands. However, without introspection, irrelevance looms in UP's evolving landscape.

Courtesy: grok.com