Deras, Caste Conflicts and Recent Violence in Punjab
by Surinder Singh, 13 June 2009
The recent violence in Punjab has taken place as a repercussion of the shootings in a Ravidass temple in Vienna in which the Dera Sachkhand head, Saint Niranjan Dass, was injured and his second- in-command, Saint Ramanand, was killed. This hurt the feelings of the followers of the Dera all over world. The Doaba region in particular was in flames for almost two days before the situation came under control following the appeal by the sants of the Dera.
The present article is divided into three parts: the first part deals historically with the emergence of the Deras in Punjab; the second part deals with the role of these Deras in creating a consciousness among the lower-caste people in the region; and the third part deals with conflicts between the dominant Jat Sikh landed peasantry and the Deras‘ followers at different periods of times.
Emergence of Deras
Punjab has been witness to the emergence of a large number of Deras due to the continued social exclusion and pervading inequality in the social and economic order that refuses to go away despite the rise of Sikhism which in normative terms is opposed to caste based discrimination and glorifies manual labour. There has been another factor that explains the marginal position of the Dalits in the region and that is the concentration of land in the hands of a minority. Thus the ever increasing number of Deras all over the Doaba, Majha and Malwa regions of Punjab is widely attributed to the denial of a respectable place to the Dalits and Backward Caste people in religious places and the Sikh Panth. [Manak, 2007]
In Punjab, the number of Deras are not in hundreds but in thousands. A study conducted by the Desh Sewak, a Punjabi newspaper published from Chandigarh, gives figures that there are more than 9000 Sikh as well as non-Sikh Deras in the 12,000 villages of Punjab. [Ram, 2007, 4067; see also Tehna et al., 2007] There are about 300 major Deras across Punjab and the neighbouring State of Haryana, and these are popular in both States. Out of these a dozen have over one lakh devotees each. [Pubby et al., 2009] There are some prominent Deras like Radha Soami (Beas), Sacha Sauda (Sirsa), Nirankaris, Namdharis, Divya Jyoti Jagran Sansthan (Nurmahal), Dera Sant Bhaniarawalla, Dera Sachkhand (Ballan), Dera Sant Phuriwala, Dera Baba Budha Dal, Dera Begowal, Nanaksarwale. Almost all of them have branches in every district of the State and even outside Punjab in the neighbouring States. Some of them have popularity among the Punjabi Diaspora. Though all these Deras have following among every caste, however, most of the followers of these Deras are Dalits and Backward Caste people who are often economically marginal also.
The history of the Deras in Punjab is older than the Sikh Panth. The Deras in Punjab before the Sikh Panth belong to the Muslim Peer and Yog Nath’s Dera. With the emergence of the Sikh Panth, some prominent Sikh and non-Sikh Deras came into existence as like Udasi Deras, Dera Baba Ram Thaman, Namdhari, Nanaksar. In the twentieth century most Deras came into existence, which are popular today, as Radha Soami, Sacha Sauda, Nirankari, Dera Sachkhand Ballan and Dera Bhaniarawalla.
Deras and Dalit Consciousness
These Deras have their egalitarian ideology, which is strictly followed by the devotees of these Deras. There is no place for caste or religion based discrimination. These Deras present simple but sharp elements of social protest in their teachings that have gone a long way in providing a basis for the rise of radical consciousness. [Ram, 2008, 1341] Some of these Deras have established their schools and health care centres. They encourage the lower-caste poor children to study and help them financially, so that they could earn their livelihood in a respectful way and help their community to lead a dignified life.
Dera Sachkhand Ballan, one of the most popular Ravidass Deras in Punjab, has played an important role in raising Dalit consciousness. The Ad Dharm movement of 1920 and Ravidass Deras played a historical role in the formation of Dalit consciousness in Punjab. The Ad Dharm movement has carved a separate religious identity for these lower-caste people. The movement projects Ravidass as their spiritual Guru, a sacred book Ad Parkash, their own separate ritual traditions; they salute each other in the name of Jai Guru Dev and respond with Dhan Guru Dev. In this way they create a separate religious identity. [Ram, 2004, 335-36] These Ad Dharmi people have followers of the Dera Sachkhand Ballan. The Deras provide education and health care, which further strengthen the surging popularity of the Deras among the Dalits. One of the Dera’s Sant Sarwan Dass encouraged the Dalit children to study and helped them financially. He urged the poor people to educate their children so that they could earn their livelihood in a respectful way and help their families and community to lead a dignified life. Thus these schools are not only providing quality of education in a Dalit friendly environment but also act as an agency for generating Dalit consciousness. [Ram, 2008, 1342]
Since its beginning, the Ad Dharm movement led by Babu Mangoo Ram and the Ravidass Deras have been giving stress on having education and health. Education provides them both social consciousness and makes them financially well-off. Today the Ad Dharmis and followers of this Dera have been far more conscious and are also financially well-off as compared to other Dalit communities in Punjab. As a whole the Dalit community in Punjab and especially in the Doaba region has gained by acquiring non-agricultural occupation and also by going abroad in big numbers.
Deras and Caste Conflicts in Punjab
The recent violence that has taken place in Punjab has its genesis in the lopsided polity of Punjab and its closed nature of land-property relationship. The Dalits and backward classes in Punjab feel excluded from making the political and economic choices for the State as Jat Sikhs, constituting 20 per cent of the population, own 60 per cent of the land and control the politics and economy of Punjab. The recently awakened and economically empowered marginal classes have been moving out of the villages and even when they live in the villages they are increasingly taking on non-agricultural activities. One also finds separate Gurudwaras and community centres for the Dalits in the villages of Punjab. There has also been struggle over the common property resources (Shamlat Land) in rural Punjab where land is scarce. The newfound assertion of their identity and demand for political and economic space along with social respectability have often met with the violence by the dominant Jat Sikh peasantry. [Thakural, 2009] Significantly the Dalits constitute almost one-third of the population of Punjab which is the highest in the country as a whole.
The recent attack on the two sants and their followers is also due to the fundamentalist Sikh organisations’ objection to treating the Dera Gurus at par with the ten Sikh Gurus and for keeping the Guru Granth Sahib along with the idols of Sant Ravidass.
The recent Dera conflict in Punjab is incidentally not a new phenomenon. Before this, many conflicts between the radical or fundamentalist Sikhs and Dera followers have taken place in Punjab. Mention can be made of the Sikh-Nirankari conflict (1978), Sikh-Bhaniarawalla follower’s conflict (2001), Sikh-Sacha Sauda followers conflict (2007).
Summing Up
The emergence of Deras all over Punjab is indicative of the assertion of the Dalits in the State trying to discover and consolidate their distinct identity to attain self-respect and also asking for their autonomous space in the social, economic and political life of the State. The recent conflict is yet another illustration, though an unfortunate one, of the community’s anguish over their historic denial in the land of the Sikh Gurus who vehemently opposed caste based discrimination, nay, rejected the caste system outright.
[The author is grateful to Dr Ronki Ram and Dr Ashutosh Kumar for reading the earlier drafts and giving valuable comments.]
References
Manak, Satnam Singh (2007): ‘Sikh Panth Ajoye Sankatt Da Sahmna Kiye Karye’, Rojana Ajit, May 22.
Tehna, Avtar Singh (2007): ‘Kyon Banday Hann Deras?’, Desh Sewak magazine, June 3.
Pubby, Vipin (2009): ‘Deciphering Deras’, The Indian Express, May 26.
Ram, Ronki (2008): ‘Ravidass Deras and Social Protest: Making Sense of Dalit Consciousness in Punjab’, Asian Studies, Vol. 67, November.
Ram, Ronki (2004): ‘Untouchability, Dalit Consciousness, and the Ad Dharm movement in Punjab’, Contribution to Indian Sociology, Sage Publication, New Delhi, September-December.
Ram, Ronki (2007): ‘Social Exclusion, Resistance and Deras’, Economic and Political Weekly, October 6.
Thakural, Gobind (2009): ‘Sikh Baicharye Anderly Takraw Da Mukh Karn Ke Ha?’, Rojana Ajit, Jalandhar, May 29.
Mishra, Vandita (2009): ‘Inside Dera Sachkhand’, The Indian Express, May 31.
The author is a Research Fellow, Department of Political Science, Panjab University, Chandigarh.
Courtesy: Mainstream
Monday, 15 June 2009
Sunday, 7 June 2009
Of Babas and Deras
The phenomenon of Deras, in centerstage following the Vienna killings, is fascinating for the space occupied by these in the socio-cultural and religious milieu. Eminent sociologist Surinder S Jodhka in this piece edited from a longer article in the Seminar writes on the peculiar institution of Babas and Deras in Punjab
The satsang hall at village Ballan near Jalandhar, the headquarter of Dera Sachkhand
Babas, sants, gurus, peers and their deras have been an important part of the religious landscape of Punjab for a long time. As institutions of popular or folk religion outside the more organized structures such as mosques and temples, they represented the enchanted universe of pre-modern religiosity. It was perhaps through these rather loose and open structures of faith traditions that the Sikh Gurus were able to communicate their message to the wider society of the region. The inherent plurality of Sikh tradition, and of the times, is clearly reflected in the holy Granth compiled by the Sikh Gurus.
The religious geography of Punjab has seen many changes over the last century. It saw the emergence of new institutions of religious authority and crystallization and construction of newer boundaries across communities. The partition of Punjab in 1947 and its reorganization into a Sikh majority state in 1966 further sharpened the sense of difference, or even antagonism, across communities. However, notwithstanding this sharpening of religious and political identities, or well worked out academic formulations in terms of epistemic shifts, deras and babas have continued to survive and, some would venture to say, thrive in Punjab. Though many deras are old, not all of them are ancient. Newer deras and babas keep emerging even today.
There are considerable differences of form and substance among the different deras. A large majority of deras are simply Sikh gurdwaras being run by an individual baba/sant or have been built in memory of a baba/sant and run by his descendents and/or followers. Many of these deras adhere to the conventions of Sikh preaching as they have evolved over the years. The SGPC recognizes them as gurdwaras without any hesitation. Some of the prominent Sikh personalities of the recent past have come from these deras. Bhindranwale, who became a symbol of Sikh militancy during the 1980s, came from one such dera. Similarly Bibi Jagir Kaur, who was previously president of SGPC, heads a dera of her own.
In the second category would be those deras that continue to practice Sikhism but do not follow the model evolved by the SGPC in its entirety. They are closer to what has been called Sanatan Sikhism by historians of Sikh religion. A third category of deras would be those where the institution of a living Guru is still practised. Though invariably locating their origin in Sikh history, they can be described as having evolved into separate sects. These include the deras of the Namdhari Sikhs and Nirankaris. Some Dalit Sikhs also have separate deras of their own where centrality is given to the Guru Granth. For example, though Ravidasi Dalits are listed as Sikhs, they have their own separate deras. Ad-Dharmis and Ravidasis worship Guru Granth because it contains the writings of Ravidas. Finally, there are also deras which have nothing to do with Sikhism. These include Sufi shrines, many of which are managed by local Sikhs and/or Hindus. Similarly, some of the deras closely resemble Hindu temples and have Hindu gurus and managers running them.
Why do people go to the dera? Without undermining the spiritual value that a visit to a dera has for a devotee, some of the more mundane reasons too are by no means insignificant. The most frequently stated reason for going to the dera is the fact that it fulfils one’s mannat, literally meaning a wish or desire. ‘If you have pura vishwash (complete faith and trust), your wish will certainly be fulfilled.’ The most important of these mannats is the desire to have a male child. The patriarchal ethos of agrarian Punjab not only helps prenatal sex determination clinics to flourish, but also seems to sustain the babas and deras.
An equally important reason is the code of conduct that the gurus at deras insist upon for their followers, the most attractive of these being the insistence on giving up consumption of liquor and other drugs.6 It is invariably the women of the house who insist on visiting the dera and given the spiritual sanctity of the act, they manage to take their husbands and other male members of the family along. However, once they are sufficiently motivated, the men are encouraged to take naam from the guru. Taking of naam would require a pledge from the devotee to a life of discipline, which may include giving up consumption of alcohol and, in some cases, even caste identity. Incidentally, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the growing popularity of such babas has made any difference to the alcohol and drug culture of rural Punjab.
Apart from the mythic value and the personal charismatic appeal of the babas, the deras also offer a sense of security to their followers, a personal touch, something completely missing in the mainstream gurdwaras or temples where one feels anonymous, a part of the crowd. As Professor Jagroop Singh, a scholar who has been working on deras, mentioned: ‘Deras give their followers a sense of security and belonging. Once you are inside the dera you feel like you belong to the community. Somehow they feel that the dera is a secure space. It belongs to everyone. No one will bother us here. This is particularly important in the context of growing insecurity all around.’7
Deras are invariably non-sectarian in nature. Even when they have acquired the status of a sect, they do not insist on being part of an exclusive normative system for the adherents. Dera identity has traditionally been more like an ‘add-on’ identity. One continues to be a Sikh or a Hindu or a Muslim and still gets blessings or naam from the guru or the pir at the dera. Not only would a typical devotee of a dera continue to visit the more ‘mainstream’ shrines of their respective faith systems, s/he would invariably visit more than one dera and could in fact have multiple gurus.
Notwithstanding the spiritual self-image and identity of the babas and their deras, they are not free from more mundane concerns, such as land, money and power. Some of the deras own substantial amounts of land. One of the deras I visited in a village called Dhianpur in Gurdaspur district owned nearly 600 acres of land, the entire land of the village. Local cultivators were all tenants of the dera. Another dera in the same district reportedly owned nearly 4000 acres of land. One of the residents there said, ‘This dera is like a mini empire. All the land that you can see from here belongs to the dera. Land was given to us first by some Mughal rulers and later by Maharaja Ranjit Singh.’ Bigger deras such as the Radhasoamis and Sacha Sauda would have even more land. The land ceiling laws do not apply on dera lands.8 The Radhasoami Dera actually has a land acquisition officer. And given their spread across the country, these assets are indeed substantial.
Apart from the fixed assets, deras also get regular income in the form of offerings and contributions from visitors. ‘Once a dera acquires a name, money comes without much effort. Though the followers are invariably poor, the deras are mostly rich’, reported Professor Sohal, a historian at the Guru Nanak Dev University. Even a relatively unknown dera could attract substantial donations. Devinder Kaur, a student of political science at the Guru Nanak Dev University who is writing her dissertation on one such dera of a sufi pir called Dera Baba Shekh Phatta, estimated that the daily remuneration of the dera is around one lakh rupees. The dera is being managed by a group of local entrepreneurs who pay an annual sum of Rs 80 lakh to the Wakf Board as contract money. The right to manage the dera is auctioned every year by the Wakf Board and the highest bidder gets the contract.
Given their material resources and persuasive power, deras have begun to influence the political process in the state as well. Bhupinder Singh Thakur, another scholar working on the deras in Gurdaspur district reported that, ‘Though most of them do not openly support any political party, they indeed convey their preferences to their followers.’ It has become almost mandatory for the political elite of the state to visit prominent deras at regular intervals and seek ‘blessings’ from the babas. This obviously gives the babas a sense of power and influence.
It is this growing influence of the babas that worries the mainstream Sikh leadership which identifies with the SGPC.
The rise of the Singh Sabha movement during the late nineteenth century and the gurdwara reform movement in the 1920s marked an important turning point in the religious history of Sikhs and contemporary Punjab. The formation of SGPC not only brought the historic gurdwaras of the region under the control of one body, it also codified what it meant to be a Sikh. In his well-known, though controversial book, The Construction of Religious Boundaries, Harjot Oberoi describes this as an epistemic shift.9
The new Sikh elite that emerged under colonial patronage transformed a rather loose faith tradition into a well-structured religious system and rewrote the social grammar of Sikhism. The peasants and common people in Punjab practised an ‘inherently contaminated and plural’ way of life which was undermined and a new identity emerged where the Sikhs began to see themselves as a religious community endowed with their specific history, sign, space and tradition. Through different sets of activities, this elite succeeded in injecting a new definition into ‘the everyday life of the faithful.’
Oberoi’s book was widely criticised for presenting an exaggerated view on the historical shift during the colonial period. Some took it as an insult to the faith and Sikh sensibilities and criticized Oberoi for being anti-Sikh.
How does one look at the contemporary reality of popular religiosity in Punjab in the context of the rather impressionistic ethnography of the babas and the deras that I have presented above? Does one see it as a reality that always existed? Were the historians wrong in their formulation about the change in religious geography of Punjab during the colonial period? Did the pluralistic traditions disappear or even decline substantially? Or should we look at the current popularity of the babas and deras as reflecting a resurgence of popular religiosity in post-modern times, where deras become attractive and fashionable in a context where community life is fast disintegrating? Should we look at deras as open and casteless spaces where Dalits and the marginalized peasantry experience a sense of security and relief, away from the hostile realities of caste violence and agrarian crisis?
The secular institutions and social movements that once articulated the discontent and aspirations of the marginals have simply disappeared from the soil of Punjab. The civil society of Punjab has still not come out of the deleterious effects of the Khalistan movement of the 1980s and the state’s violent response to it. There are virtually no civil society organizations or NGOs active anywhere in Punjab! It is possible that some or all of these processes have been in operation to produce the current state of affairs.
In the absence of any serious engagement with ground realities, these formulations remain at best loose hypotheses. The attempt of the three Sikh organizations to reach out to the people of Punjab through cooperation of the sants, babas and the deras certainly reflects a growing recognition of the plural and complex religiosity of the common people of contemporary Punjab. However, without the backing of serious anthropological engagements with everyday religion and the rapidly changing cultural life, such activist posturing could end up becoming mere sloganeering and sermonizing.
Courtesy: www.punjabpanorama.blogspot.com
The phenomenon of Deras, in centerstage following the Vienna killings, is fascinating for the space occupied by these in the socio-cultural and religious milieu. Eminent sociologist Surinder S Jodhka in this piece edited from a longer article in the Seminar writes on the peculiar institution of Babas and Deras in Punjab
The satsang hall at village Ballan near Jalandhar, the headquarter of Dera Sachkhand
Babas, sants, gurus, peers and their deras have been an important part of the religious landscape of Punjab for a long time. As institutions of popular or folk religion outside the more organized structures such as mosques and temples, they represented the enchanted universe of pre-modern religiosity. It was perhaps through these rather loose and open structures of faith traditions that the Sikh Gurus were able to communicate their message to the wider society of the region. The inherent plurality of Sikh tradition, and of the times, is clearly reflected in the holy Granth compiled by the Sikh Gurus.
The religious geography of Punjab has seen many changes over the last century. It saw the emergence of new institutions of religious authority and crystallization and construction of newer boundaries across communities. The partition of Punjab in 1947 and its reorganization into a Sikh majority state in 1966 further sharpened the sense of difference, or even antagonism, across communities. However, notwithstanding this sharpening of religious and political identities, or well worked out academic formulations in terms of epistemic shifts, deras and babas have continued to survive and, some would venture to say, thrive in Punjab. Though many deras are old, not all of them are ancient. Newer deras and babas keep emerging even today.
There are considerable differences of form and substance among the different deras. A large majority of deras are simply Sikh gurdwaras being run by an individual baba/sant or have been built in memory of a baba/sant and run by his descendents and/or followers. Many of these deras adhere to the conventions of Sikh preaching as they have evolved over the years. The SGPC recognizes them as gurdwaras without any hesitation. Some of the prominent Sikh personalities of the recent past have come from these deras. Bhindranwale, who became a symbol of Sikh militancy during the 1980s, came from one such dera. Similarly Bibi Jagir Kaur, who was previously president of SGPC, heads a dera of her own.
In the second category would be those deras that continue to practice Sikhism but do not follow the model evolved by the SGPC in its entirety. They are closer to what has been called Sanatan Sikhism by historians of Sikh religion. A third category of deras would be those where the institution of a living Guru is still practised. Though invariably locating their origin in Sikh history, they can be described as having evolved into separate sects. These include the deras of the Namdhari Sikhs and Nirankaris. Some Dalit Sikhs also have separate deras of their own where centrality is given to the Guru Granth. For example, though Ravidasi Dalits are listed as Sikhs, they have their own separate deras. Ad-Dharmis and Ravidasis worship Guru Granth because it contains the writings of Ravidas. Finally, there are also deras which have nothing to do with Sikhism. These include Sufi shrines, many of which are managed by local Sikhs and/or Hindus. Similarly, some of the deras closely resemble Hindu temples and have Hindu gurus and managers running them.
Why do people go to the dera? Without undermining the spiritual value that a visit to a dera has for a devotee, some of the more mundane reasons too are by no means insignificant. The most frequently stated reason for going to the dera is the fact that it fulfils one’s mannat, literally meaning a wish or desire. ‘If you have pura vishwash (complete faith and trust), your wish will certainly be fulfilled.’ The most important of these mannats is the desire to have a male child. The patriarchal ethos of agrarian Punjab not only helps prenatal sex determination clinics to flourish, but also seems to sustain the babas and deras.
An equally important reason is the code of conduct that the gurus at deras insist upon for their followers, the most attractive of these being the insistence on giving up consumption of liquor and other drugs.6 It is invariably the women of the house who insist on visiting the dera and given the spiritual sanctity of the act, they manage to take their husbands and other male members of the family along. However, once they are sufficiently motivated, the men are encouraged to take naam from the guru. Taking of naam would require a pledge from the devotee to a life of discipline, which may include giving up consumption of alcohol and, in some cases, even caste identity. Incidentally, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the growing popularity of such babas has made any difference to the alcohol and drug culture of rural Punjab.
Apart from the mythic value and the personal charismatic appeal of the babas, the deras also offer a sense of security to their followers, a personal touch, something completely missing in the mainstream gurdwaras or temples where one feels anonymous, a part of the crowd. As Professor Jagroop Singh, a scholar who has been working on deras, mentioned: ‘Deras give their followers a sense of security and belonging. Once you are inside the dera you feel like you belong to the community. Somehow they feel that the dera is a secure space. It belongs to everyone. No one will bother us here. This is particularly important in the context of growing insecurity all around.’7
Deras are invariably non-sectarian in nature. Even when they have acquired the status of a sect, they do not insist on being part of an exclusive normative system for the adherents. Dera identity has traditionally been more like an ‘add-on’ identity. One continues to be a Sikh or a Hindu or a Muslim and still gets blessings or naam from the guru or the pir at the dera. Not only would a typical devotee of a dera continue to visit the more ‘mainstream’ shrines of their respective faith systems, s/he would invariably visit more than one dera and could in fact have multiple gurus.
Notwithstanding the spiritual self-image and identity of the babas and their deras, they are not free from more mundane concerns, such as land, money and power. Some of the deras own substantial amounts of land. One of the deras I visited in a village called Dhianpur in Gurdaspur district owned nearly 600 acres of land, the entire land of the village. Local cultivators were all tenants of the dera. Another dera in the same district reportedly owned nearly 4000 acres of land. One of the residents there said, ‘This dera is like a mini empire. All the land that you can see from here belongs to the dera. Land was given to us first by some Mughal rulers and later by Maharaja Ranjit Singh.’ Bigger deras such as the Radhasoamis and Sacha Sauda would have even more land. The land ceiling laws do not apply on dera lands.8 The Radhasoami Dera actually has a land acquisition officer. And given their spread across the country, these assets are indeed substantial.
Apart from the fixed assets, deras also get regular income in the form of offerings and contributions from visitors. ‘Once a dera acquires a name, money comes without much effort. Though the followers are invariably poor, the deras are mostly rich’, reported Professor Sohal, a historian at the Guru Nanak Dev University. Even a relatively unknown dera could attract substantial donations. Devinder Kaur, a student of political science at the Guru Nanak Dev University who is writing her dissertation on one such dera of a sufi pir called Dera Baba Shekh Phatta, estimated that the daily remuneration of the dera is around one lakh rupees. The dera is being managed by a group of local entrepreneurs who pay an annual sum of Rs 80 lakh to the Wakf Board as contract money. The right to manage the dera is auctioned every year by the Wakf Board and the highest bidder gets the contract.
Given their material resources and persuasive power, deras have begun to influence the political process in the state as well. Bhupinder Singh Thakur, another scholar working on the deras in Gurdaspur district reported that, ‘Though most of them do not openly support any political party, they indeed convey their preferences to their followers.’ It has become almost mandatory for the political elite of the state to visit prominent deras at regular intervals and seek ‘blessings’ from the babas. This obviously gives the babas a sense of power and influence.
It is this growing influence of the babas that worries the mainstream Sikh leadership which identifies with the SGPC.
The rise of the Singh Sabha movement during the late nineteenth century and the gurdwara reform movement in the 1920s marked an important turning point in the religious history of Sikhs and contemporary Punjab. The formation of SGPC not only brought the historic gurdwaras of the region under the control of one body, it also codified what it meant to be a Sikh. In his well-known, though controversial book, The Construction of Religious Boundaries, Harjot Oberoi describes this as an epistemic shift.9
The new Sikh elite that emerged under colonial patronage transformed a rather loose faith tradition into a well-structured religious system and rewrote the social grammar of Sikhism. The peasants and common people in Punjab practised an ‘inherently contaminated and plural’ way of life which was undermined and a new identity emerged where the Sikhs began to see themselves as a religious community endowed with their specific history, sign, space and tradition. Through different sets of activities, this elite succeeded in injecting a new definition into ‘the everyday life of the faithful.’
Oberoi’s book was widely criticised for presenting an exaggerated view on the historical shift during the colonial period. Some took it as an insult to the faith and Sikh sensibilities and criticized Oberoi for being anti-Sikh.
How does one look at the contemporary reality of popular religiosity in Punjab in the context of the rather impressionistic ethnography of the babas and the deras that I have presented above? Does one see it as a reality that always existed? Were the historians wrong in their formulation about the change in religious geography of Punjab during the colonial period? Did the pluralistic traditions disappear or even decline substantially? Or should we look at the current popularity of the babas and deras as reflecting a resurgence of popular religiosity in post-modern times, where deras become attractive and fashionable in a context where community life is fast disintegrating? Should we look at deras as open and casteless spaces where Dalits and the marginalized peasantry experience a sense of security and relief, away from the hostile realities of caste violence and agrarian crisis?
The secular institutions and social movements that once articulated the discontent and aspirations of the marginals have simply disappeared from the soil of Punjab. The civil society of Punjab has still not come out of the deleterious effects of the Khalistan movement of the 1980s and the state’s violent response to it. There are virtually no civil society organizations or NGOs active anywhere in Punjab! It is possible that some or all of these processes have been in operation to produce the current state of affairs.
In the absence of any serious engagement with ground realities, these formulations remain at best loose hypotheses. The attempt of the three Sikh organizations to reach out to the people of Punjab through cooperation of the sants, babas and the deras certainly reflects a growing recognition of the plural and complex religiosity of the common people of contemporary Punjab. However, without the backing of serious anthropological engagements with everyday religion and the rapidly changing cultural life, such activist posturing could end up becoming mere sloganeering and sermonizing.
Courtesy: www.punjabpanorama.blogspot.com
Saturday, 6 June 2009
Exploring the Myth of Casteless Sikh Society in Punjab
By Ronki Ram
The recent violent conflicts in Punjab represent a typical case of a marginal community’s (dalits) fight against social exclusion and the resistance that it encounters from a dominant caste. Despite improvement in economic position over the years, there has not been a commensurate improvement in the social status of dalits even after their conversion to Sikhism as caste iniquities, in the form of dominant cultural patterns, still persist in Punjab. The emergence of a large number of deras as alternate spiritual sites for the oppressed is linked to this phenomenon.
The recent violent clashes (May 2007) between followers of the Dera Sacha Sauda (syncretic religious centre established in 1948 with its headquarters in Sirsa, Haryana) and different groups of Sikhs, and also other kinds of social conflicts between jat1 Sikhs and dalits2 in the state, mark a crucial turn in the political history of Punjab. The raison d’être of these conflicts surpasses the much talked about “short-term politics of revenge” and shows up the deep socio-religious hierarchies in the so-called casteless Sikh society in Punjab. On the one hand, they lay bare the dormant structures of social discrimination that permeate the fabric of Sikh society, and on the other, point towards the neoconservative Sikhs’ anxiety about the Sikh-Khalsa identity. They pose a serious challenge not only to the political stability in the state but also to the institutions of democracy in India.
The Akalis-Dera Sacha Sauda row over the dera’s chief Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh’s mimicking of the iconography of Guru Gobind Singh, seems much to do with the prevalence of the doctrinally-rejected system of caste hierarchy among the Sikhs. The rising salience of caste hierarchy within the Sikh panth (society) has disillusioned the dalit Sikhs, who at one point of time had embraced Sikhism in the hope of escaping social exclusion imposed on them by the Hindu ‘varna vyavastha’ (social order). This seems to push them towards the deras and other non-Sikh socio-religious organisations that promise dignity and social equality. The majority of the followers of various Sacha Sauda-type deras come from the dalit families. This near-exodus of dalits from Sikhism towards the alternative socio-spiritual space provided by the deras invite the hostility of clerics of the established mainstream religious order, who see it as a serious challenge to the Sikh-Khalsa identity. Moreover, the politicisation of the deras and the accompanying pontifications further complicate the issue. Persistent attempts by various Sikh organisations to win over disgruntled dalit Sikh followers of the Dera Sacha Sauda during the recent Akalis-Dera crisis is a case in point.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section problematises the Sikhs-Deras crisis in the larger context of dalit assertion and its implications for religion-based politics in Punjab. The second section deals with the phenomenon of caste and caste hierarchy within the Sikh panth, and the place it assigned to dalit Sikhs. The patterns of jat Sikh domination in Punjab and how it forced the dalits to seek a separate caste identity is discussed in the third section. The fourth section, based on ethnographic research in rural Punjab, documents some of the recent jat-dalit conflicts in the state.
I Sikhs-Deras Crisis in a Larger Context
Punjab has the distinction of being home to the largest proportion (29 per cent) of scheduled castes (SCs) population in the country with the lowest share in the ownership of land ( 2.34 per cent of the cultivated area). The SCs in Punjab belong to different religions and castes. Mazhabis and ramdasias, the two dalit castes among the Sikhs, particularly the mazhabis, are the most deprived. They embraced Sikhism in the hope of gaining social equality, but even in the new religion untouchability continued to be practised against them. Evidence of untouchability against dalit Sikhs is vividly reflected in the Khalsa Dharam Sastra of 1914 [Oberoi 1994: 106] and also in a number of resolutions adopted by the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) from 1926 to 1933 [Singh 1933 as quoted in Puri 2003: 2697]. Although the Sikh reformers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries preached in favour of removing untouchability, no concerted efforts were made in practice in that direction. Social opprobrium continues to afflict them and other dalits. Some of them feel that jat Sikhs treat them as badly in the gurdwaras as they do in their farmlands [Tehna et al 2007]. They have been forced to live in separate settlements, contemptuously called ‘thhattis’ or ‘chamarlees’, located on the western side and away from the main body of the villages. They carry no “say” in the local structures of power. All the Sikh organisations like gurdwaras, Sikh deras, SGPC, and Shiromani Akali Dal are under the control of the jat Sikhs. In a recent empirical study of the caste background of the members of the SGPC, conducted by Narinderpal Singh, it is found that 80 per cent of its administrative posts are under the control of the jat Sikhs, 15 per cent under other castes and only 5 per cent are with the dalit Sikhs (mazhabis and ramdasias). All the three current secretaries of the Shiromani Committee are jat Sikhs. Out of its six current additional secretaries three are jat Sikhs, one is Labana Sikh and two belonged to Other Backward Castes [Singh N 2007a]. Dalits are often heard complaining that the jat Sikhs refused to consider them equal even after death by disallowing cremation of their dead in the main cremation ground of the village. This has forced them to establish separate gurdwaras, 3 ‘janjghars’ (marriage centres) and cremation grounds. It is against this backdrop of social exclusion that a large number of dalits have been veering away from the mainstream Sikh religion and enrolling themselves into various forms of non-Sikh deras in Punjab. Another probable cause behind the large-scale dalit following of the deras could be the absence of a strong dalit movement in the state.
However, the phenomenon of deras is not new to Punjab. Rather it is as old as the Sikh faith. During the period of the historic gurus, different deras of udasis, minas, dhirmalias, ramraiyas, handali, and that of massandis cropped up. All these earlier deras were primarily the outcome of the disgruntled and unsuccessful attempts of the “fake” claimants to the title of guru [for details see: Chaturvedi 1951:360-69; Marenco1976: 28-30; Bingley 1970: 85-93; Archer 1946: 221-226; Grewal 1996:39-46]. Apart from these, there were many more deras that came up at different intervals on the long and tortuous consolidation of the Sikh religion. Some of the most prominent among them were Bandei Khalsa (Bandapanthis), Nanakpanthis, Sewapanthis, Bhaktpanthi, Suthrashahi, Gulabdasi, Nirmalas and the Nihangs [Chaturvedi 1951:361-69; Mcleod 1984:121-33]. But what distinguished these earlier deras from the contemporary ones is that they could not become the centres of dalit mobilisation.
Proliferation of Deras
According to a latest study conducted by the Desh Sewak, a Punjabi daily published from Chandigarh, there are more than 9,000 Sikh as well as non-Sikh Deras in the 12,000 villages of Punjab [Tehna et al 2007]. In Sikh deras, Sikh rahit (code of conduct) is observed strictly. Whereas in the non-Sikh deras, different ritual practices are followed. The Radha Soamis, Sacha Sauda, Nirankaris, Namdharis, Divya Jyoti Sansthan, Bhaniarawala and Ravidasis are among the most popular non-Sikh deras. Almost all of them have branches in all the districts of the state as well as in other parts of the country. Some of them are very popular among the Punjabi diaspora and have overseas branches in almost all the continents of the world. The composition of these deras is along caste lines. Though majority of the followings in every case comes from dalits, backward castes and poor Jat Sikh peasantry, their command is still in the hands of the upper castes [Muktsar 2007]. Among them the chief of the Nirankari deras belonged to the khatri caste, and that of the Sacha Sauda and Radha Soamis come from the jat Sikhs of the Sidhu and Dhillon sub-castes respectively. In the case of Sikh Deras, a large majority of their following comes from jat Sikh community and they are invariably run by jat Sikhs. It is rare that the head of a Sikh dera would be a non-jat Sikh. Even if there would be one he could never be a dalit. At the most dalit Sikhs’ participation in Sikh deras is confined only to various kinds of menial services as well as the narration of the sacred text (Guru Granth Sahib) and performing of kirtan (musical rendering of sacred hymns) [for detail see: Ram 2004a: 5-7]. Those who perform kirtan are known as raagis, the professional narrators are designated as granthis and others who render menial service are called sewadars. Majority of the raagis, granthis and sewadars are dalit Sikhs. Very few jat Sikhs take up such professions (based on field conversations). In the Sikh deras, only gurubani of Guru Granth Sahib is recited. But in the non-Sikh deras along with the recitation of gurubani from Guru Granth Sahib, other sacred texts are also referred to. Idol worship and devotion towards a human guru is also not an anathema in non-Sikh deras. It is due to the presence of such non-Sikh practices that the phenomenon of non-Sikh deras has been described by Meeta and Rajivlochan as the “alternate guru movement in Punjab” [Meeta and Rajivlochan 2007:1910].
Challenge to Khalsa Identity
This alternate movement in Punjab with its “loose syncretistic practices” throws a formidable challenge to Sikh-Khalsa identity. Modernity and apostasy are its two other main adversaries [Swami and Sethi 2007; see also Singh Madanjeet 2007]. Modernity is considered to be corrupting the young Sikhs who become lackadaisical in their observance of the Khalsa principles advocated by the 10th master. Though Bhindranwala tried to assert the Sikh-Khalsa identity by taking up the cudgel with a dissident sect of the Nirankaris and preaching hatred against the Hindus [Singh K 2007b], he could not prevent the movement of dalits towards non-Sikh deras. These deras, in fact, pose an even more serious challenge to mainstream Sikhism. The number of followers of these deras seems to “far exceed that of the Golden temple-based clerical establishment” [Swami and Sethi 2007]. It is in this context that confrontation between the deras and the mainstream Sikhism assumes a critical importance with farreaching implications for the relationships between dalits and jat Sikhs in Punjab. The jat Sikhs of Punjab are primarily an agricultural community, the dominant caste in the state. The Sikh empire of Ranjit Singh and the subsequent British rule over Punjab helped them considerably in that regard by establishing their hold over the land in the state [Marenco 1976: Chps IV-VII; see also Liu 1982: 387-95]. Dalits, on the other hand, were deprived the ownership of land under the Punjab Alienation of Land Act (1900). This along with the absence of alternate job avenues forced them to work on the land of the jat Sikhs for their livelihood. Dalits’ relationship with the jats, thus, is that of landless agricultural workers versus landlords, which in turn led to contradictions between them. The two communities are engaged in a power struggle.
However, there are many dalits in Punjab who have improved their economic conditions by dissociating themselves from their caste occupations as well as distancing themselves from agriculture [Jodhka 2004]. They have strengthened their economic position through sheer hard work, enterprise, and ventures abroad. Some of them have also established their own small-scale servicing units, and work as carpenters, barbers, blacksmiths, masons and so on [for details see: Ram 2004a: 5-7]. In addition, they have also been politicised to a large extent by the socio-political activities of the famous Ad Dharm movement [for details see: Juergensmeyer 1988; Ram 2004], and the various Ravidass Deras [Qadian 2003]. Thus, they have not only improved their economic status but have also liberated themselves from the subordination of the jat landowners.
With an improved economic position and a sharpened sense of social consciousness, dalits in Punjab started demanding a concomitant rise in their social status that has also probably pushed them closer to the alternate religious bodies promising dignity and social equality. In the process, they also challenged the dominant caste and its claims to represent true Sikhism. The jat Sikhs, however, interpreted it as a challenge to the Sikh-Khalsa identity, which further deepened the existing contradictions between them and the dalits. That is what has led to a series of violent caste clashes between dalits and jats in Punjab in the past few years, as also the repeated confrontation (1978 Nirankaris crisis, 2001 Bhaniarawala crisis and 2003 Talhan crisis) between the Akalis and followers of one or the other non-Sikh deras. The confrontation between the Akalis and the premis of the Dera Sacha Sauda is the most recent case in point. These clashes seem to be more about identity politics between jat Sikhs and dalits than a row over religion. They are in no way a manifestation of communalism in the state. However, given the religious milieu of the social sphere in Punjab they often assume a communal posture. They, in fact, are signs of an emerging dalit assertion against social exclusion that have all the possibilities of snowballing into violent conflicts if left unresolved.
What we have argued above is that the root cause of various jat-dalit conflicts lies in the structures of social exclusion, and the rising process of dalit assertion and the resistance it encounters. Why the dalits, despite their conversion to Sikhism and better economic conditions, failed to overcome their lower social status and how does that push them towards deras and also fomented confrontation with them and jat Sikhs is what we are going to delineate in the next sections.
II Sikhs, Caste Hierarchy and Dalits
Punjab is a Sikh (63 per cent) majority state. However, around 60 per cent of the Sikh population consists of jat Sikh caste [Singh Joginder 1997: 178-9; Puri 2003: 2693]. Moreover, jat Sikhs as a single largest caste constitute roughly 1/3 (30 to 33 per cent) of the total population of the state (based on conversation with scholars, knowledgeables, and political activists). They also wield control over land, religion and politics in the state [Pettigrew 1978; Singh Gobinder1982; Muktsar 2007; Subhash 2004]. Being agriculturalists, almost all of them live in villages (over 90 per cent). Dalits, who constitute as much as 29 per cent of the total population of the state, which comes close to the number of the jat Sikhs, is another major community heavily concentrated (over 80 per cent) in the villages. Moreover, in districts like Nawan Shahr, Muktsar, Jalandhar, Faridkot, and Hoshiarpur the proportion of dalits in the total population tends to be as high as 40.46, 37.75, 37.69, 36.17, and 34.28 per cent, respectively [Census of India 2001]. In many villages the population of dalits exceeds 50 per cent, particularly in the Doaba region of Punjab consisting of Jalandhar, Kapurthala, Nawan Shahr and Hoshiarpur districts. From this, it can be inferred that villages in Punjab are predominantly jat and dalit [cf Taylor, Singh M and Booth 2007: 331; Puri 2004: 90]. Caste constitutes an integral part of the routine village life [Kaur 1986: 229]. In an agrarian society like Punjab where the two major communities of jat Sikhs and dalits live in extreme contrast of affluence and deprivation, caste seems to assume critical importance. Although Sikh doctrine does not assign any place to the institution of caste and laid stress on the brotherhood of all irrespective of caste, religion, gender and occupation, it must not be inferred, as argued by Paramjit S Judge, “that Sikhism was able to transform the caste structure into an egalitarian moral community of the Sikhs. Sikhism remained far from a casteless society” [Judge 2002: 184; see also: Marenco 1976; Mcleod 1996; Puri 2003]. In the Punjab censuses between 1881 and 1931, more than 25 castes were recorded within the Sikh community, including jats, khatris, aroras, ramgarhias, ahluwalias, bhattras, sainis, labanas, lohars, kambohs, mahatam, chhimbas, nais, ramdasias, jheers, mazhbis, and rangretas [Verma 2002: 33]. Out of these, 11 – two agrarian castes (jat and kamboh), two mercantile castes (khatri and arora), four artisan castes (tarkhan, lohar, nai, and chhimba), two outcaste groups (chamar and chuhra), and one distiller (kalal, also termed as an artisan caste in Marrenco 1976: 176) are considered to form the core of the “caste constituency” of the Sikh panth [McLeod 1996: 93-94]. Except the mercantile caste of khatri all other castes including the jats fall in the shudra (artisans) and the ati-shudra (untouchables) categories of the Hindu social order. In other words, Sikhism has primarily been the religion of the dispossessed and plebeians [Singh 1989: 288; Grewal 1998: 205].
Practice of Caste Endogamy
The issue of caste within the Sikh panth has also been affected by the attitude/behaviour patterns of the coverts [Mcleod 1996 84; see also Grewal 1998: 197]. The converts continue to follow their previous caste practices regarding connubium and commensality even after receiving the ‘pahul’ (Sikh form of baptism) [for details see: Cunningham 1849; Mcleod 1996; Marenco 1976; Singh 1977; Singh 1976]. They strictly follow the principle of caste endogamy. As Sewa Singh Kalsi argues, “Inter-caste marriages are strongly disapproved by the sikhs” [Kalsi 1999:260]. In a content analysis study of the caste endogamy among the Sikhs in India and abroad, it is found that marriage alliances are sought from the same caste communities. In India, it is found that 94 advertisements in the column of jat Sikh and 120 in other non-jat Sikh category sought marriage alliances from within their own respective caste communities. Similarly, in UK out of 35 matrimonial advertisements taken up for content analysis, it is found that 24 jat Sikh, three khatri Sikh, two ramgarhia Sikh, two arora/khatri Sikh, one saini Sikh, and three others invited marriage alliances also from their own respective caste communities [Kalsi 1999: 261]. The wide prevalence of intra-caste endogamy among Sikhs in India as well as in the diaspora is further stressed in a recently concluded ethnographic study covering the jat Sikh community spread over in Newcastle (UK) and Doaba region of Punjab [Taylor, Manjit and Booth 2007: 341].
However, there are some scholars who argued that in comparison to the orthodox Hindu caste system, the principle of caste endogamy is “a little weaker” among the Sikhs [Puri 2003:2698; Singh 1989: 293]. This is fine, but given the class and caste background of the Sikh families involved in intermarriages, it can be argued that they are more common among the marginalised jat Sikh peasants. Even in such cases, the normal practice is that “the jats willingly accepted women from the lower castes, but showed no inclination to give their daughters to them” [Judge 2002: 180; see also: Singh I 1977: 72; Walia 1993: 220]. Still what distinguished the phenomenon of caste within the Sikh society from that of its counterpart in the Hindu religion, argues Jagjit Singh, is that intercaste marriages are neither considered sacrilegious nor are “…visited by penalties such as those imposed by the caste ideology” [Singh J 1989: 293]. On the contrary, the opposition in that regard, if any, is more to do with the “prejudice”/”honour” than the “pollution”. To quote him further, “… intermarriages are prevented by sentiment and not by hard and fast rules” [Singh Jagjit 1989: 293]. Prejudice versus pollution apart, the point, however, is that the phenomenon of caste, irrespective of its form, is very much alive within the Sikh society. Even in matters of commensality within the panth, the picture is not that bright either, particularly in the case of mazhabi Sikhs. Reflecting on the distinction between the “caste” and “outcaste” members of the panth, Joyce Pettigrew observed: “The only custom in which any solidarity was expressed among the jats on a caste basis was that in the village they did not visit the houses of mazhabis, take food from them, eat with them or intermarry with them” [1978: 44; see also: Grewal 1998: 210; Bains and Johnston 1995:48]. Although the jajmani/sepidari mode of production – the prominent socio-economic structure in Punjab based on traditional patron-client relationship – ceased to exist of late, the dominant castes still considered the artisan and menial Sikh castes as chhotian-jatan/nikia-minia-jatan (low castes). In this regard, it is appropriate to quote Izmirlian: “Master [teacher] Gurdial Singh was born a Ramgarhia in 1915. The reality of his caste identification surrounds him like a shroud because Ramgarhias are carpenters and viewed as menials by jat Sikh agriculturists” [as quoted in Kalsi 1999:259, emphasis in original].
Caste Hierarchy in Sikh Faith
Thus, in addition to the covergence of “caste constituency” and “attitude”, a sort of distinct caste hierarchy has also cropped up within the panth [Marenco 1976; McLeold 1996; Murray 1970; cf Singh Gurdev (ed) 1986; Singh Jagjit 1981; Singh Jagjit 1985; Singh Jagjit 1989; Grewal 1998]. In the Sikh caste hierarchy, the jats who were otherwise assigned the lower status in the Hindu social order claim to occupy the top position [Singh I 1977:70; see also Judge 2002:178-85]. Next to jat Sikhs comes the khatri Sikhs who belonged to the mercantile caste to which also belonged all the 10 historic gurus of the panth [Marenco 1976: 296; Singh Bhagat 1982a: 146-47; Alam 1982:103-07]. The ramgarhia (former tarkhan/carpenter) and ahluwalia (former Kalal/distiller) Sikhs are placed next or even equal to the khatri Sikhs due to their military adventures during the ‘misl’ period [Mcleod 2000: 216-34]. In the similar descending order, Marenco argues that [t]he other agricultural Sikh castes, like the kamboh, mali and saini Sikhs, and the other trading Sikh castes, like the arora Sikhs, and the other artisan Sikh castes, like the lohar or sunar Sikhs, came somewhere after the aforementioned castes in the hierarchy. Then there were the Sikh menial castes (jhinwars, kahars, banjaras, labanas, bahrupias, batwals and barwalas), and, last of all, there were the Sikh untouchables, the ramdasias and mazhabis, who ranked lowest despite the many advances they had made since conversion to Sikhism [Marenco 1976: 296, emphasis in parenthesis added; see also: Puri 2003:2698].
Dalit Sikhs are further divided among themselves along caste lines. Ramdasia Sikhs considered themselves superior to the mazhabi and rangreta Sikhs.
Another dimension of the Sikh caste hierarchy is the distinction between the sahajdhari (non-baptised) and the keshdhari (baptised) orders of the panth. Sahajdhari-keshdhari dichotomy, in fact, makes the Sikh caste hierarchy rather more complex. The keshdhari Sikhs, also known as Khalsa, are generally considered superior to the sahajdharis. But this does not come true in the case of the mazhabi Sikhs who, despite their being khalsa, are still considered inferior to that of sahajdhari. The practices of endogamy and commensality are also considered to be more closely observed by the sahajdhari Sikhs in comparison to that of the Khalsa [Marenco 1976: 43, 50, 63, 64-65, 153 and 157; Judge 2002: 180 and 184]. But this viewpoint seems to be contested by Rashpal Walia who observed that “nihangs (saint-soldier/immortal) with upper caste background don’t partake of food cooked for those with mazhabi Sikh origin… Most important, the ‘amritpan’ ceremony for the mazhabi Sikhs among the nihang is also separately performed [Walia 1993:219 and 250, emphasis in parenthesis added].
However, scholarship is sharply divided over the patterns of caste hierarchy within the panth. Some scholars are of the opinion that the practices of brahminic ritual purity do not hold any ground in Punjab [Ibbetson 1883, rpt 1970:1-87; Singh Jagjit 1989: 291-97]. In Punjab the defining principles of caste hierarchy are different from that of the brahminical. They are based on hard manual labour on one’s own land, caste homogeneity, martial strength, numerical preponderance in the mainstream Sikh religion, and hold over the politics in the state. Furthermore, it is the complex combination of all these different sources of power (social, ethnological, economic, political, religious, and numerical) that determines the status of the inmates of the Punjabi society. The only caste in which all these multiple identities coalesce is that of jats in Punjab. Jats are jat Sikhs by caste, khalsa or Singh by religion, martial4 by virtue of their being sturdy and an important part of the armed forces in the past and even present, and landowners by virtue of their hold on cultivation.
All these different identities reinforce each other and thus help jat Sikhs, who constitute roughly one-third of the total population of the state, to become the dominant caste in Punjab. Such a rare combination of powerful multiple identities and their concentration in a single caste as well as religion is conspicuous by its absence among the dalits, who, interestingly enough, are almost equal to the jat Sikhs in terms of their numerical proportion in the total population of the state. But unlike jat Sikhs, dalits are sharply divided into 38 castes, scattered in different religions (Hinduism, Sikhism, Christianity and Buddhism), mostly landless, economically marginalised, socially oppressed and politically neglected. It is in this context of extreme disparity between the otherwise numerically comparable communities of jat Sikhs and dalits that the distinct pattern of caste hierarchy assumes critical importance in Punjab. This unique but often overlooked phenomenon of numerical near parity and extreme socio-economic disparity is what brought these two communities in open confrontation with each other, on the one hand, and also forced the dalits to seek refuge in various deras in the state, on the other.
On the other side of the debate, there are some scholars [Singh Jagjit 1989; Singh Gurdev 1986] for whom caste hierarchy within the panth is a misnomer. Jagjit Singh was of the opinion that the phenomenon of caste hierarchy stands on three pillars (i e, caste ideology, brahmins, and the caste-society) of the brahminic orthodoxy. Since none of them is found within Sikhism, it is absurd to talk about caste and caste hierarchy in the panth [Singh Jagjit 1989:281]. Moreover, almost all the castes of the “Sikh caste constituency” have been able to enhance their social status [Singh Jagjit 1981; Judge 2002:184]. The mazhabi and the ramdasia Sikhs are the only exception. Despite their lowest rank in the Sikh caste hierarchy, even mazhabis and ramdasias consider themselves superior to their counterpart in the Hindu caste system. Although ramdasias have originated from chamars, they considered themselves superior to the latter [Ibettson (1883) 1970: 297, 302; Bingley 1970: 62; Marenco1978: 130 and 285-86; Singh Jagjit 1989:296]. Similarly, mazhabis too consider themselves socially superior to their erstwhile community fellows (balmikis) with whom they would not fix marriages [Walia 1993: 226].
Though social mobility among the caste constituency of the panth is often referred to as one of the greatest achievements of the new religion, which facilitated some of the shudra castes even to acquire the status of dominant castes in the state, but that was not the sole aim of the panth of Nanak and his nine predecessors, who provided a clear vision and also worked meticulously for the creation of an egalitarian social order completely free from the structures of caste and caste hierarchy. But soon after the end of the gurus period, some sort of caste hierarchy emerged within the panth with the jat Sikhs occupying the top position and the dalit Sikhs sitting at the base. Intermarriages and interdinings are among the prime tests as to the annihilation of caste system. But on both these accounts the Sikh society has failed miserably, particularly in the context of the dalit Sikhs. As far as interdinings among the jat, khatri, ramgarhia, ahluwalia, and other artisan Sikh castes are concerned, one can definitely talk about the phenomenon of the social mobility among them all. However, barring khatris, there was not much difference between the social positions of the jats (dominant castes) and that of the other artisan castes even before their conversion to Sikhism. They were all clubbed together in the category of the shudras and commensality was not a taboo for them. In fact, what matters the most in this context is the change in the status of the dalit Sikhs and their relations with the dominant castes within the panth. They really present a tough problem [Mcleod 2000; Grewal 1998:208]. In matters of commensality clear distinctions are made between the “caste” and “outcaste” members of the panth [Grewal 1998: 210; Walia 1993: 203 and 233]. The dominant castes (jats, khatris and ramgharias) continued to identify the ramdasia, rangreta and mazhabi Sikhs (the outcaste) by their earlier titles – chamars and chuhars [Ibettson (1883) 1970:268-69]. “They are still not tolerated within the main halls, and are forced to sit separately in a corner at the entrance of the gurdwaras. Among them also sat even the baptised mazhabi and ramdasia Sikhs”[Bhullar 2007] In her field based doctoral study of the “Problem of Untouchability among Sikhs in Punjab”, Rashpal Walia found that “mazhabi Sikhs feel that their status in Sikh society is still lowest… though, they are not removers of night soil” [Walia 1993: 264, 266-67]. What we have argued so far is that caste hierarchy does exist within the panth. Mazhabis and ramdasias are continuing to face discrimination on grounds of caste. This is probably one of the major reasons behind their move towards the deras as well as confrontation between them and jat Sikhs.
III Patterns of Dalit Subordination
Power in Punjab revolves around the axle of land. Much of the available agricultural land (more than 80 per cent) is owned by the jat Sikhs, and a very large majority of the scheduled castes (SCs) population (over 95 per cent) is landless. They just shared only 4.82 per cent of the number of operational holdings and 2.34 per cent of the total area under cultivation (1991 Census). In other words, despite the fact of their being in highest proportion in the population of the Punjab in the country, a very small number of them (less than 5 per cent) are cultivators (lowest in India, 1991 Census). Nowhere in India, dalits are so extensively deprived of agricultural land as in the case of Punjab. This rendered a large majority of them (60 per cent, 1991 Census) into agricultural labourers and made them subservient to the landowners, who invariably happen to be jat Sikhs. The hold of the jats on the land was so strong that dalits were never considered part of villages.
Their residences were located outside the main premises of the villages. So much so that the land on which the dalit houses were built were also considered to have belonged to the jats [Virdi 2003: 2 and 11]. This used to keep the dalits always in fear lest the jat landowners ordered them to vacate the land. The abysmally low share of the dalits in the land seems to be the major cause of their hardships and social exclusion. It is also an indication of the historical denial of human rights to them [Thorat 2006:2432]. The slightest sign of protest by the dalits for the betterment of their living conditions often provoked the jats to impose social boycott on them [for an excellent account of social boycott see Bharti 2007:5-21; Judge 2006:12].
Green Revolution and Jat-Dalit Confrontation
The existing division between the jats and dalits got further deepened during the course of green revolution in the post-1960 Punjab. The process of green revolution transformed the traditional subsistence character of the agriculture into commercial farming. The market-oriented agriculture favoured the landowners and further marginalised the dalits [Gill 2004:225-40]. Interestingly, it was also during this phase that a new middle class of educated dalits emerged in Punjab. The advent of this new class among the dalits coupled with the rise of the Ambedkarite movement in the region led to the formation of dalit consciousness in the state. The emergence o f the dalit consciousness induced the dalit agricultural labourers to ask for higher wages in the rural settings of Punjab, especially in its Doaba sub-region. The dalit struggle for higher wages often employed pressure tactics of refusal to work unless the landowners increase the wages. In fact, it was during this very phase of transition in the agrarian economy of Punjab that the process of dalit immigration to Europe, North America, and the Gulf assumed great importance. However, it may be pointed out in the passing that the emergence of the process of dalit immigration from Punjab coincided with the phenomenon of the influx of migrant labour from Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh into Punjab [Sidhu et al 1997]. The influx of migrant labour has further sharpened the contradiction between the dominant peasant castes and the landless dalits in that it provided the former cheaper labour compared to the local ones. Moreover, the changed cropping system under the green revolution squeezed the extent of farm labour to a few peak periods – paddy transplantation, paddy harvesting-cum-threshing, and wheat harvesting [Bhalla 1987]. The traditional agriculture system, capable of providing almost round the year regular work, was changed into a commercial agriculture set-up that did not offer more than 75 days work annually (based on fieldwork calculations). In turn, dalits have to seek employment in other sectors for the rest of the year. Thus, the dalit labourers, sandwiched between the influxes of cheap migrant labour on the one hand and mechanised farming on the other, began to look for job in different sectors other than the agriculture. The alternative job opportunities reduced the dependence of the dalits on landowners. The social mobility of the new middle class dalits based on their relative emancipation from the dependence on the agricultural labour along with their subsequent diversification into the service sector facilitated the emergence of dalit assertion in Punjab that brought them in open confrontation with the dominant caste in the state. The phenomenon of dalit-dominant caste confrontation draws heavily on the prevalent structures of social discriminations and the politicisation of caste in the state [Judge 2006:11]. The next section deals with the phenomenon of dalit contestation of social exclusion and the resistance it received from the dominant caste in the state.
IV Social Exclusion and Resistance in Punjab
The recent cases of dalit social exclusion in the form of publicly announced social boycotts are, in fact, not a new phenomenon in Punjab. Dalits had been subjected to such cruelties for a long time now. Social boycotts were imposed on them during their heroic Ad Dharm struggle in Punjab in the early decades of the 20th century [for details see Ram 2004: 332-35]. Social exclusion continued to afflict them even after India became independent.
The frequency and intensity of atrocities against them increased manifolds during the green revolution as a reaction to the growing dalit assertion for better working conditions and higher wages [Singh 1980; Sidhu 1991; Gill 2000]. It is generally seen that whenever the dispossessed raise voice for their human rights, they have been greeted with severe hardships.
Rarely a day passes in Punjab when dalits are spared of a social boycott by the jat Sikhs in the villages over the last few years. After the much-publicised violent conflict in the village Talhan, Punjab is witnessed to a series of similar cases. The pattern of conflicts in all such cases often remained the same as it was during the green revolution phase. In almost all the conflicts, social boycott was imposed on the dalits who were asserting for a share in the local structures of power such as partnership in the village common lands, membership in the management committees of the religious bodies, entry into the panchayati raj institutions, etc. Pandori Khajoor village in Hoshiarpur district, village Bhattian Bet in Ludhiana district, Talhan, Meham and Athaula villages in Jalandhar district, Patteraiwal village in Abhor district, Jethumajra and Chahal village in Nawan Shahr district, Aligarh village near Jagraon in Ludhiana district, Domaeli and Chak Saboo villages in Kapurthala district, Dhamiana in Ropar district, Abuul Khurana village near Malout in Mukitsar district, and Dallel Singh wala, Kamalpur and Hasanpur villages in Sangrur, and Jhabbar village in district of Mansa are among the prominent cases of jat-dalit conflicts in the state. The most recent one is about the clashes between the various groups of Sikhs and the premis of the Dera Sacha Sauda in different parts of Punjab.
However, the Sacha Sauda row is not the only one of its kind. An almost similar crisis has also rocked the state in 2001, when another baba, popularly known as Piara Singh Bhaniara, imitated the 10th guru not only by wearing a shining coat and headgear but also by riding a horse in the similar style. Furthermore, Bhaniara of the Dhamiana village in Ropar district of Punjab “insisted that his sons be addressed as ’sahibzadas’ in the manner of title used to address the sons of the gurus” [Meeta and Rajivlochan 2007:1191]. He also managed a separate granth (Bhavsagar Samundar) running into 2,704 pages parallel to that of the sacred text of the established mainstream religion in the state. All this was enough to spark off a series of violent clashes between the followers of the mainstream religion and that of the sect of the Bhaniarawala. Bhaniara, himself a mazhabi Sikh, draws a large majority of his following from the mazhabis. Almost all the bigwigs in the political corridors of Punjab, particularly union minister Buta Singh, his nephew and former legislator Joginder Singh Mann, former Akali MP Amrik Singh Aliwal, six time legislator and former Punjab minister, Gurdev Singh Badal and his son Kewal Badal, who supported his sect also belonged to the mazhabi caste. Since the majority of the followers of Bhaniara belonged to the mazhabi caste, and that of the mainstream Sikh religion to the jat Sikhs, the crisis turned out to be an identity conflict between the dalits and the dominant caste in the state of Punjab.
Bhaniarawala Phenomenon vs Sacha Sauda Row
Though “the Bhaniarawala phenomenon” and the Sacha Sauda row look similar in many ways, in the volatile territory of the realpolitik in Punjab they seem to attribute different meanings to the sharpening contradictions between the dalits and the dominant castes. During “the Bhaniarawala phenomenon” there was almost a consensus among the various factions of the Akali Dal over the course of action to be taken against the indicted Bhaniara.
Whereas in the case of Sacha Sauda there is a difference of opinion among the various groups of the Akalis as to the nature of agitation for the arrest of its chief as well as the form of punishment. It is, perhaps, for the first time in the history of the Akalis
that such a difference of opinion emerged among them. It also indicates that the moderates and some of the redical groups within the Akalis as well are concerned more with the hard earned peace in the state than to bargain it with any cost or sort of some long-term political gain. Another unique aspect of the present crisis is that the Hindu population of the state played a very positive role in condemning the sacrilegious act of the head of the Sacha Sauda. But still, the dalit-jat Sikh equation remains the focal point of the crisis. In fact, it is this equation with which the real question of peace in Punjab is taged. Unless and until an amicable and a durable solution to this fast emerging jat-dalit confrontation is located, Punjab is probably bound to plunge into a deep crisis at a time when the Sikh religion “evinces the need for a reassertion”,5 and the dalits assertion goes global.
The following sub-sections briefly explore the probable underlying causes of the recent caste-based conflicts in Punjab. For paucity of space, only Talhan and Meham conflicts are taken up as two ethnographic case studies. In both the cases, the bone of contention has been the management of the local deras. In the case of Talhan, dalits were denied participation in the managing committee of the ’smadh’ (grave) turned gurdwara, whereas in Meham dalits were forced to surrender their control over the Udasi Dera of Baba Khazan Singh.
Talhan
The Talhan conflict was based on the issue of dalit representation in the jat Sikh-dominated management committee of the smadh-turned-gurdwara named after Shaheed (martyr) Nihal Singh, a local carpenter (backward caste) who died while laying Gandd (wooden wheel) at the base of a well in Talhan village. The primary motive behind the conversion of the smadh into a gurdwara was widely seen as an effort to grab the large amount of money (approximately Rs 50 million [$ 1.1 million] offered at its alter by the jats of the village and the adjoining areas) [Philip 2003]. The jats of Talhan (25 per cent), who control most of the agricultural land in the village and until recently enjoyed unquestioned domination in the social and political life of the village,
established their control over this gurdwara through the office of the gurdwara management committee. Despite being a majority in the village, the dalits of Talhan (72 per cent) were kept out of the membership on the gurdwara management committee because of their lowly caste (conversation with Ram Talhan, Banga, April 16, 2006). They employed every possible method to seek entry into the committee peacefully. But the dispute remained unresolved. This ultimately led to a fight between the jats and the dalits in January 2003. Subsequently, the jat Sikhs publicly announced a social boycott of the dalits. They stopped visiting their shops and also banned their entry into the fields owned by them even for answering the call of the nature (conversation with L R Balley, Banga, April 16, 2006).
To fight back the social oppression, dalits organised a dalit action committee (DAC) under the leadership of L R Balley, a prominent Ambedkarite of the region. The DAC organised dharnas and hunger strikes in the village and Jalandhar city. Repeated appeals by the DAC failed to move the administration [Singh 2003]. On June 5, 2003, the conflict took a violent turn. And soon it snowballed into the adjoining areas. Boota Mandi, a suburb of Jalandhar city, became the epicentre of the violence. It was here that an Ad Dharmi, Vijay Kumar Kala, fell victim to the police firing, an event that suddenly propelled Talhan and Boota Mandi onto the national scene. Talhan and Boota Mandi were virtually converted into a garrison. And the village was sealed off for a couple of days. Although the violence was controlled by the district administration, it took the contending parties 18 days to reach a compromise, and another two months for the agreement to come into effect.
Whatever be the cause of the violence, it is clear that by the time it erupted, the dalits had achieved a state of consciousness that not only empowered them to say a firm “no” to their tormentors but also encouraged them to ask assertively for an equal share in the structures of power at the village level. In contrast, the jat Sikhs, who have thrived amidst a meek silence of the dalits, are finding it hard to resist the mounting dalit assertion against the centuries old system of social exclusion [for more details see Ram 2004b: 906-12].
Meham
Meham conflict is another case of recent jat-dalit confrontation, and a vindication of the presence of caste hierarchy among the Sikhs. The village Meham has total population of 1967 out of which 893 (45 per cent) belong to the dalits. Most of the dalits belong to the balmiki caste. The Ad Dharmi, another dalit caste, constitutes 20 per cent of the total population [Judge 2006:14]. The jat Sikhs are about 20 per cent of the total population of the village. Jats, balmikis and the Ad Dharmis each have their own gurdwara in addition to the disputed dera of Khazan Singh Udasi in Meham. Dalits in Meham are diversified into various non-cultivation professions that has not only helped them abandon their customary caste-based occupations but also liberated them from the subordination of the jat Sikhs. However, despite the dissociation of the dalits from their hereditary professions and distancing from the agriculture, they failed to raise their social status in the eyes of the jats, who still consider them unequal. This has led to tensions between the jat Sikhs and the dalits in the village.
Though the context of the Meham conflict is different from that of the Talhan, the patterns and the forms of social oppression are same in both of them. In Talhan, the dalits were denied membership in the jat-dominated management committee of the disputed shrine turned gurdwara of Shaheed Nihal Singh. Whereas in Meham, the jat Sikhs forcibly took over the control of the dera of Khazan Singh Udasi that was being looked after by the Ad Dharmis of the village for the last six decades. They replaced all the udasi symbols with that of the Khalsa, and also objected to the offerings of liquor and the distribution of the same as a prasad (sacramental food) among the devotees at the dera as it violates the Sikh code of conduct (conversation with Darshan Nahar, Nurmahal, October 25, 2006).
The Ad Dharmi argued that the tradition of offering liquor at the smadh in the dera is in no way an act of sacrilege as the dera was never a site of Sikhism. They further reiterated that the jat Sikhs brought the question of Sikh rahit into the picture in 2003 when they placed Guru Granth Sahib on the premises of the dera. Moreover, the very presence of the mazaars (graves) in the precincts of the dera ruled out the possibility of its being a gurdwara (conversation with C L Chumber, Jalandhar, October 25, 2006). Probably, the rising cost of the land in the state and the tremendous increase in the offerings at the dera over the last few years due to rich remittance from the Punjabi diaspora, especially from the doaba sub-region, could have prompted the jat Sikhs of the village to assert their claim on the dera [Kali 2003]. However, unlike in Talhan, the timely intervention of the police brought the Meham conflict under the control for the time being and the dispute has been referred to the court. Currently, the dera is placed under a government receiver who has been assigned the task of the management of the shrine.
The conflicts in Talhan and Meham, thus, reflect the underlying layers of tensions between the hitherto all powerful and dominant jat Sikhs, and the newly emerging assertive class of dalits. Given the rising level of social consciousness among dalits, the dominant caste has been finding it difficult, if not impossible, to ignore their demands for a share in the local structures of power.
Conclusion
This paper argues is that the jat-dalit confrontation is an offshoot of the socio-religious and economic chemistry of Punjab. The root cause, perhaps, lies in the perception of dalits about the incompatibility between the egalitarian social ethos of Sikhism and the manifestation of social exclusion in the dealings of the dominant jat Sikh community in the state. The dalit Sikhs find that they are still considered as “other”. The domination of jat Sikhs, however, does not compare at all with the graded system of brahminical caste hierarchy. They became dominant because of their “patient vigorous labour” as cultivator par excellence, caste homogeneity, martial status, control over the land, numerical preponderance in the Sikh community, and their hold over the power structures in the state. Dalits, equally sturdy and hard-working as well as numerically quite close to the proportion of the jat Sikhs in the state, continue to face social exclusion in spite of their conversion to Sikhism and relative improvement in their economic conditions. Their social exclusion coupled with landlessness and political marginalisation appears to be the major factor behind their move towards various deras promising dignity and social equality. However, the increasing level of dalit assertion, benefits of affirmative action, remittances and diversification in the realms of economy have given them a strong sense of equality inspiring to assert for share in the local and state power structures albeit met with stiff resistance put up by the dominant caste. This has created a sort of fault line indicative of violent confrontation between the dominant and the downtrodden in the state, long boasted of as a casteless society.
Email: ronkiram@yahoo.co.in
Notes
[This paper, presented at different international and national seminars, is primarily
based on my field observations and a large number of conversations with dalit activists and writers, followers of various deras, scholars and political
personalities. I wish to sincerely thank them all, particularly Paramjit Singh Judge, Amarjit Grewal, K C Sulekh, L R Balley, Balwant Singh, and Sadhu Ram Talhan, for their critical inputs. I also thank P S Verma and Harish K Puri for meticulously going through the various drafts. Their scholarly
comments and critical observations helped me in improving the arguments
presented in the paper. To Seema Goel, for taking care of the household
during my long visits in the field as well as extended hours in the study, I owe a special debt. The views expressed herein are, of course, my own.]
1 Jats are the landowning and dominant peasant caste in Punjab. For details see [Bingley 1899; Habib 1996; Ibbetson 1970 (1883): 97-131; Marenco 1976; Pettigrew 1978].
2 The ‘dalit’ is a broad term that incorporates the scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes and the backward castes. However, in the current political discourse, it is mainly confined to the scheduled castes and covers only those dalits who are classified as Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists
but excludes Muslim and Christian dalits.
3 Dalits have separate gurdwaras in about 10,000 villages out of a total of 12,780 villages in Punjab (Dalit Voice, Vol 22, No 17, September 1-15, 2003: 20). A survey of 116 villages in one tehsil of Amritsar district showed that dalits had separate gurdwaras in 68 villages [Puri 2003: 2700]. Yet another field study of 51 villages selected from the three sub-regions of Punjab found that dalits had separate gurdwaras in as many as 41 villages [Jodhka 2004:79].
4 The rise of militancy in Sikhism in the 16th century was generally attributed to the martial nature of the jats [Habib 1996:100; see also Mcleod 1996:12; Pettigrew 1978:26]. For counter arguments on this theme see [Grewal 1998; Singh (ed) 1986, especially the sixth part; and Singh 1985].
5 EPW (editorials ‘Punjab: ‘Protecting’ Religion’), May 26, 2007:1884.
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This entry was posted on October 14, 2007 at 3:54 pm and
Wednesday, 20 May 2009
Why Dalits have slammed Mayawati’s Sarvjan Formula?
S.R.Darapuri
Kanshi Ram and Mayawati started their politics with “Tilak, Traju aur Talwar- inko maro jute char” (beat the Brahmins, Banias and Thakurs with shoes) and “Vote hamara raj tumhara nahin chalega” (we won’t allow you to rule us with our vote). Besides this, in order to attract Dalits (Scheduled Castes.) they gave the slogans like “Baba tera mission adhura, Kanshi Ram karenge pura” (Kanshi Ram will fulfill the mission left incomplete by Dr. Ambedkar) and “Political power is the key to the entire problem.” Through these slogans they aimed at attracting and agitating the dalits against the ‘Savarans’( higher castes) and they succeeded also to a good extent. This polarization of dalits was further facilitated by the political vacuum created by the division and downfall of Republican Party of India which was established by Dr. Ambedkar himself in 1956.
Since 1995 Mayawati made various experiments to broaden the base of her Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). In the beginning it was known as the party of the dalits only. Later on Muslims and Other Backward Castes were also co-opted. It fought the 1993 Assembly election jointly with Samajwadi Party (S.P.), a party of Other Backward Classes and made good gains. It resulted in the formation of first coalition government of BSP and SP in Uttar Pradesh state of India. This coalition of natural allies became a subject of discussion all over India but soon a clash of personal ambitions resulted in its fall in June, 1995. Kanshi Ram and Mayawati grabbed the post of Chief Minister by making an unethical and opportunist alliance with Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP.), a party of orthodox Hindus and the bitterest enemy of dalits. This put the dalit movement and dalit politics on the path of opportunism bereft of principles. It not only confused the direction of dalit politics but also fogged the difference between friends and foes of dalits. This alliance not only gave a lease of life to the dying BJP but also broke the natural alliance of dalits and Backward Castes for ever. This unprincipled and opportunistic alliance was justified as being essential for getting into power and party workers were mislead by this briefing.
This alliance with BJP not only confused the dalits but Muslims also moved away from BSP as they consider BJP as their bitterest enemy. During the first tenure of BSP rule in 1995 some land was distributed to empower the dalits because till then the party workers had some presssure on the party leadership. But later on in order to please the Upperr Caste people dalit interests were given a go bye and getting power became the sole motive of the party leadership. After first tenure of Chief Ministership of Mayawati, this process became faster and BSP raced towards ‘Sarvjan’ throwing aside the Bahujan. In every election moneyed, musclemen and mafias were given preference being winning candidates and dalits were restricted to reserved seats only. Party mission was overtaken by money power and muscle power. Old missionary party workers and those who were close to Kanshi Ram were made to exit the party unceremoniously. As such dalits were put on the margin in the party but they continued to be with the party with the hope that one day they may also get some benefit of government but their hopes were belied.
From 1995 to 2003 Mayawati thrice became the Chief Minster of Uttar Pardesh (U.P) but she always took the help of Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP). During this period neither any dalit agenda was chalked out nor any effort was made in that direction. During 1993 this author during many discussions with Kanshi Ram suggested chalking out a dalit agenda but my suggestions were ignored. I think it was done purposely because declaration of an agenda brings upon a duty to implement it and if failed it brings upon the responsibility and accountability for the failure. It is a matter of regret and sorrow that a party seeking political power in the name of dalits has not framed any agenda till to date as a result of which the dalits have been deprived of any gain coming from a government being run in their name. The result is that the dalits of U.P. are the most backward dalits in whole of India barring those of Bihar and Orissa. During this period moneyed and musclemen of Upper Castes have been managing to get Assembly and Parliament tickets and getting elected they been enjoying the fruits of power whereas dalits with a meager representation have been deprived of all such benefits.
BSP, which is doing politics in the name of Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, in its effort to secure power has totally ignored his warning in which he had said that “dalits have two enemies. One is Brahmanism and the other is Capitalism and dalits should never compromise with them.” But Mayawati has compromised with both by co-opting Brahmans and Corporate sector. At present dalit politics has become a tool for power grabbing. It reached its height when before 2007 Assembly elections Mayawati formed Dalit Brahman Bhaichara Committees (Dalit Brahmans Brotherhood Committees) headed by a Brahman president and a dalit as secretary.
The election success of BSP during 2007 was mainly attributed to the important role played by Brahmans and they got a lion’s share in power which was much disproportionate to their population. Dalits were reduced to the level of second class players in the Party and in minister ship. This methodology of co-opting Upper Caste people was publicized as new “Social Engineering” and BSP was transformed from the Party of dalits to a Party of Sarvjan (all inclusive).
During this period slogans such as “Haathi nahin Ganesh hai, Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh hai” (it is not an elephant but a trinity of Brahma, Vishnu and Mahesh- all Hindu gods) and “Brahman shankh bajaiga, Haathi dilli jaiga”( Brahman will blow the conch and elephant will march towards Delhi) were coined to placate the Upper caste persons much to the chagrin of dalits. Elephant symbolizes the symbol of BSP. The Varna system of graded inequality became fully operative in the Party and dalits were further pushed to the margin.
Even now during the present régime of Mayawati, dalits have been totally ignored and Sarvjan have occupied the front seats. All important ministerial posts have been given to Upper caste people. Mayawati’s personal corruption has percolated to all the branches of administration and U.P. has been assessed to be “ an alarmingly corrupt state”. The various welfare schemes aiming at empowering dalits and other weaker sections of society have fallen a prey to all pervading corruption thereby depriving the intended beneficiaries of their benefits.Balatant corruption came to light during recruitment to the posts of Safai Karamcharies (Sweepers). Similar complaints surfaced during other recruitments also. It is said that there might be only a few lucky persons who escaped payment of high price for government jobs. The funds intended for development works were spent on installation of statues including her own and creating royal memorials and parks.
Since 1990 UP has been deprived of any development and creation of employment opportunities. This lack of development has adversely affected the dalits as a result of which they have become the most backward dalits in whole of India. As per 2001 senses their sex ratio, literacy rates and works participation rate are much lower than their counter-parts in other states. A fall of 13% dalits from the category of cultivators to the category of landless labourers during the last decade (1991-2001) indicates their disempowerment.
If judged from the angle of protection against atrocities on dalits, there has been no decrease during Mayawati’s rule. On the contrary as a result of written and oral orders of Mayawati the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act-1989 has become inoperative. This act was intended to prevent atrocities and award stringent punishment to the perpetrators of atrocities on Dalits. The atrocity cases against dalits are taking place as before but they are not being registered by police. As a result of non-registration of cases the dalits are condemned to suffer atrocities and deprivation from monitory compensation. The intention behind not allowing the registration of cases is to keep the crime figures low thereby projecting a crimeless state. In spite of all this burking of crime, UP stands first in whole of India in terms of crime against dalits. As such Mayawati has totally failed to give even legal protection to dalits.
The action of Mayawati of ignoring the dalits and giving preference to Upper Castes has resulted in disillusionment and anguish amongst dalits. This has been displayed by them during the recent 2009 Lok Sabha elections. Most of the criminals, moneyed men and muscle men fielded by Mayawati have been defeated as the dalits did not vote for them. Mayawati now and earlier also gave tickets to the persons whom she had herself accused of threat and assault during the Guest House case of 2nd June, 1995. But dalits refused to oblige her and almost all have been defeated.
Mayawati as before had confined the dalits to 17 reserved seats only out of whom only 2 have been elected. If we look at the allotment of tickets during this election it is found that Brahmins being 7.5% of total population of the state were given 20 tickets i.e. 25% of total seats whereas the dalits with 21% population were given 17 reserved seats only. Out of the total 20 seats won by BSP, 5 are Brahmins and only 2 are dalits. On account of this hold of Brahmins in the party, the people have started calling BSP as a Brahmins Samaj Party. From the angle of representation dalits are marginalized in the party. This has been one of the major grievances of dalits against Mayawati.
With a view to attract Most Backward Classes, Mayawati sent a recommendation to the Central Government for inclusion of 16 castes in the list of Schedule Castes. Earlier Mulayam Singh had also made a similar attempt which was opposed by dalits as it would have harmed their reservation quota. It was challenged in the court and had to be dropped. This action of Mayawati irritated the dalits. Whereas Mayawati strongly recommended the case for 10% reservation for the poor among the Upper Castes, she did not show a similar interest in respect of dalits. Her declaration of granting 10% reservation to dalits in private sector has remained on paper only.
Mayawati’s way of ignoring dalits and treating them as a bonded vote bank has irritated a large section of awakened and oppressed section of dalits and has instilled in them a feeling of alienation. But as before Mayawati tried to befool them by projecting a possibility of her becoming the Prime Minister of India. But most of Dalits refused to be taken in. A big chunk of Chamar and Jatav votes, which is the core vote bank of Mayawati, moved away from her to Congress fold. The other Dalits sub-castes like Pasi, Dhobi, Khatik and Balmiki had earlier moved towards SP and BJP. Most Backward Classes also deserted Mayawati. Afraid of Mayawati’s love for BJP Muslims also walked away from BSP. This resulted in a limited success on 20 seats only as against a projected tally of 50-60 seats whereby she could stake her claim for the Prime Ministership.
The disheartening defeat of BSP during this election has clearly shown that vote base of BSP has shrunk. Not only Muslims and Most Backward Classes have deserted BSP but a big chunk of dalits have also moved away from it to Congress. Dalit society has been badly divided on sub-caste lines. Dalit movements and dalit politics have fallen a pray to opportunism, corruption and immorality. Today it is standing at cross roads. It is not only a danger signal for Mayawati but for whole of dalit society. Will Mayawati and Dalit intellectuals think over it with their cool mind? If it is not done immediately it may again result in betrayal of dalit interests. There is a fear of dalits again becoming political slaves of Congress. It should be a matter of grave concern and serious introspection by all Ambedkarites.
Going by present signs Mayawati has refused to learn any lesson from her debacle. As rightly pointed out by B.G. Verghese in ‘Deccan Herald’ dated 2009 “the lesson Mayawati requires to learn is that she has been cut to size not on account of conspiracies against Dalit-ki-beti (daughter of a dalit) but because of her own greed, corruption and authoritarianism that is fast blunting her original appeal as a Dalit leader intent on forging a wider social alliance. People do not want innumerable self-aggrandizing statues and mausoleums at the cost of good governance and welfare. She perhaps still has time to learn and mend her ways.”
The recent election results show that dalits have rejected Mayawati’s much trumpeted up “Sarvjan Formula” and she needs to do a serious introspection and learn from her mistakes otherwise it will prove to be a missed opportunity.
S.R.Darapuri
Kanshi Ram and Mayawati started their politics with “Tilak, Traju aur Talwar- inko maro jute char” (beat the Brahmins, Banias and Thakurs with shoes) and “Vote hamara raj tumhara nahin chalega” (we won’t allow you to rule us with our vote). Besides this, in order to attract Dalits (Scheduled Castes.) they gave the slogans like “Baba tera mission adhura, Kanshi Ram karenge pura” (Kanshi Ram will fulfill the mission left incomplete by Dr. Ambedkar) and “Political power is the key to the entire problem.” Through these slogans they aimed at attracting and agitating the dalits against the ‘Savarans’( higher castes) and they succeeded also to a good extent. This polarization of dalits was further facilitated by the political vacuum created by the division and downfall of Republican Party of India which was established by Dr. Ambedkar himself in 1956.
Since 1995 Mayawati made various experiments to broaden the base of her Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). In the beginning it was known as the party of the dalits only. Later on Muslims and Other Backward Castes were also co-opted. It fought the 1993 Assembly election jointly with Samajwadi Party (S.P.), a party of Other Backward Classes and made good gains. It resulted in the formation of first coalition government of BSP and SP in Uttar Pradesh state of India. This coalition of natural allies became a subject of discussion all over India but soon a clash of personal ambitions resulted in its fall in June, 1995. Kanshi Ram and Mayawati grabbed the post of Chief Minister by making an unethical and opportunist alliance with Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP.), a party of orthodox Hindus and the bitterest enemy of dalits. This put the dalit movement and dalit politics on the path of opportunism bereft of principles. It not only confused the direction of dalit politics but also fogged the difference between friends and foes of dalits. This alliance not only gave a lease of life to the dying BJP but also broke the natural alliance of dalits and Backward Castes for ever. This unprincipled and opportunistic alliance was justified as being essential for getting into power and party workers were mislead by this briefing.
This alliance with BJP not only confused the dalits but Muslims also moved away from BSP as they consider BJP as their bitterest enemy. During the first tenure of BSP rule in 1995 some land was distributed to empower the dalits because till then the party workers had some presssure on the party leadership. But later on in order to please the Upperr Caste people dalit interests were given a go bye and getting power became the sole motive of the party leadership. After first tenure of Chief Ministership of Mayawati, this process became faster and BSP raced towards ‘Sarvjan’ throwing aside the Bahujan. In every election moneyed, musclemen and mafias were given preference being winning candidates and dalits were restricted to reserved seats only. Party mission was overtaken by money power and muscle power. Old missionary party workers and those who were close to Kanshi Ram were made to exit the party unceremoniously. As such dalits were put on the margin in the party but they continued to be with the party with the hope that one day they may also get some benefit of government but their hopes were belied.
From 1995 to 2003 Mayawati thrice became the Chief Minster of Uttar Pardesh (U.P) but she always took the help of Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP). During this period neither any dalit agenda was chalked out nor any effort was made in that direction. During 1993 this author during many discussions with Kanshi Ram suggested chalking out a dalit agenda but my suggestions were ignored. I think it was done purposely because declaration of an agenda brings upon a duty to implement it and if failed it brings upon the responsibility and accountability for the failure. It is a matter of regret and sorrow that a party seeking political power in the name of dalits has not framed any agenda till to date as a result of which the dalits have been deprived of any gain coming from a government being run in their name. The result is that the dalits of U.P. are the most backward dalits in whole of India barring those of Bihar and Orissa. During this period moneyed and musclemen of Upper Castes have been managing to get Assembly and Parliament tickets and getting elected they been enjoying the fruits of power whereas dalits with a meager representation have been deprived of all such benefits.
BSP, which is doing politics in the name of Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, in its effort to secure power has totally ignored his warning in which he had said that “dalits have two enemies. One is Brahmanism and the other is Capitalism and dalits should never compromise with them.” But Mayawati has compromised with both by co-opting Brahmans and Corporate sector. At present dalit politics has become a tool for power grabbing. It reached its height when before 2007 Assembly elections Mayawati formed Dalit Brahman Bhaichara Committees (Dalit Brahmans Brotherhood Committees) headed by a Brahman president and a dalit as secretary.
The election success of BSP during 2007 was mainly attributed to the important role played by Brahmans and they got a lion’s share in power which was much disproportionate to their population. Dalits were reduced to the level of second class players in the Party and in minister ship. This methodology of co-opting Upper Caste people was publicized as new “Social Engineering” and BSP was transformed from the Party of dalits to a Party of Sarvjan (all inclusive).
During this period slogans such as “Haathi nahin Ganesh hai, Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh hai” (it is not an elephant but a trinity of Brahma, Vishnu and Mahesh- all Hindu gods) and “Brahman shankh bajaiga, Haathi dilli jaiga”( Brahman will blow the conch and elephant will march towards Delhi) were coined to placate the Upper caste persons much to the chagrin of dalits. Elephant symbolizes the symbol of BSP. The Varna system of graded inequality became fully operative in the Party and dalits were further pushed to the margin.
Even now during the present régime of Mayawati, dalits have been totally ignored and Sarvjan have occupied the front seats. All important ministerial posts have been given to Upper caste people. Mayawati’s personal corruption has percolated to all the branches of administration and U.P. has been assessed to be “ an alarmingly corrupt state”. The various welfare schemes aiming at empowering dalits and other weaker sections of society have fallen a prey to all pervading corruption thereby depriving the intended beneficiaries of their benefits.Balatant corruption came to light during recruitment to the posts of Safai Karamcharies (Sweepers). Similar complaints surfaced during other recruitments also. It is said that there might be only a few lucky persons who escaped payment of high price for government jobs. The funds intended for development works were spent on installation of statues including her own and creating royal memorials and parks.
Since 1990 UP has been deprived of any development and creation of employment opportunities. This lack of development has adversely affected the dalits as a result of which they have become the most backward dalits in whole of India. As per 2001 senses their sex ratio, literacy rates and works participation rate are much lower than their counter-parts in other states. A fall of 13% dalits from the category of cultivators to the category of landless labourers during the last decade (1991-2001) indicates their disempowerment.
If judged from the angle of protection against atrocities on dalits, there has been no decrease during Mayawati’s rule. On the contrary as a result of written and oral orders of Mayawati the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act-1989 has become inoperative. This act was intended to prevent atrocities and award stringent punishment to the perpetrators of atrocities on Dalits. The atrocity cases against dalits are taking place as before but they are not being registered by police. As a result of non-registration of cases the dalits are condemned to suffer atrocities and deprivation from monitory compensation. The intention behind not allowing the registration of cases is to keep the crime figures low thereby projecting a crimeless state. In spite of all this burking of crime, UP stands first in whole of India in terms of crime against dalits. As such Mayawati has totally failed to give even legal protection to dalits.
The action of Mayawati of ignoring the dalits and giving preference to Upper Castes has resulted in disillusionment and anguish amongst dalits. This has been displayed by them during the recent 2009 Lok Sabha elections. Most of the criminals, moneyed men and muscle men fielded by Mayawati have been defeated as the dalits did not vote for them. Mayawati now and earlier also gave tickets to the persons whom she had herself accused of threat and assault during the Guest House case of 2nd June, 1995. But dalits refused to oblige her and almost all have been defeated.
Mayawati as before had confined the dalits to 17 reserved seats only out of whom only 2 have been elected. If we look at the allotment of tickets during this election it is found that Brahmins being 7.5% of total population of the state were given 20 tickets i.e. 25% of total seats whereas the dalits with 21% population were given 17 reserved seats only. Out of the total 20 seats won by BSP, 5 are Brahmins and only 2 are dalits. On account of this hold of Brahmins in the party, the people have started calling BSP as a Brahmins Samaj Party. From the angle of representation dalits are marginalized in the party. This has been one of the major grievances of dalits against Mayawati.
With a view to attract Most Backward Classes, Mayawati sent a recommendation to the Central Government for inclusion of 16 castes in the list of Schedule Castes. Earlier Mulayam Singh had also made a similar attempt which was opposed by dalits as it would have harmed their reservation quota. It was challenged in the court and had to be dropped. This action of Mayawati irritated the dalits. Whereas Mayawati strongly recommended the case for 10% reservation for the poor among the Upper Castes, she did not show a similar interest in respect of dalits. Her declaration of granting 10% reservation to dalits in private sector has remained on paper only.
Mayawati’s way of ignoring dalits and treating them as a bonded vote bank has irritated a large section of awakened and oppressed section of dalits and has instilled in them a feeling of alienation. But as before Mayawati tried to befool them by projecting a possibility of her becoming the Prime Minister of India. But most of Dalits refused to be taken in. A big chunk of Chamar and Jatav votes, which is the core vote bank of Mayawati, moved away from her to Congress fold. The other Dalits sub-castes like Pasi, Dhobi, Khatik and Balmiki had earlier moved towards SP and BJP. Most Backward Classes also deserted Mayawati. Afraid of Mayawati’s love for BJP Muslims also walked away from BSP. This resulted in a limited success on 20 seats only as against a projected tally of 50-60 seats whereby she could stake her claim for the Prime Ministership.
The disheartening defeat of BSP during this election has clearly shown that vote base of BSP has shrunk. Not only Muslims and Most Backward Classes have deserted BSP but a big chunk of dalits have also moved away from it to Congress. Dalit society has been badly divided on sub-caste lines. Dalit movements and dalit politics have fallen a pray to opportunism, corruption and immorality. Today it is standing at cross roads. It is not only a danger signal for Mayawati but for whole of dalit society. Will Mayawati and Dalit intellectuals think over it with their cool mind? If it is not done immediately it may again result in betrayal of dalit interests. There is a fear of dalits again becoming political slaves of Congress. It should be a matter of grave concern and serious introspection by all Ambedkarites.
Going by present signs Mayawati has refused to learn any lesson from her debacle. As rightly pointed out by B.G. Verghese in ‘Deccan Herald’ dated 2009 “the lesson Mayawati requires to learn is that she has been cut to size not on account of conspiracies against Dalit-ki-beti (daughter of a dalit) but because of her own greed, corruption and authoritarianism that is fast blunting her original appeal as a Dalit leader intent on forging a wider social alliance. People do not want innumerable self-aggrandizing statues and mausoleums at the cost of good governance and welfare. She perhaps still has time to learn and mend her ways.”
The recent election results show that dalits have rejected Mayawati’s much trumpeted up “Sarvjan Formula” and she needs to do a serious introspection and learn from her mistakes otherwise it will prove to be a missed opportunity.
Thursday, 14 May 2009
'Political parties have worked to strengthen caste system'
Bhagwan Das, a research associate of Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar, is best known as compiler and editor of the four volumes of Thus
Spoke Ambedkar. He spoke to Prasanna Raghav about his meetings with Ambedkar and the trajectory of Dalit politics in India: When did you first meet Ambedkar? My father, who was politically and socially aware through his readings, was a great admirer of Dr Ambedkar, referring to him as Ummeedkar, the one who brings hope. I used to read every newspaper article about Babasaheb with great interest. When i first went to meet him in Simla in 1943 with a request for a job, i had to wait for seven hours. Impressed with me, he promised me a job and i got my appointment letter in 15 days. Mahatma Gandhi was also against discrimination of Dalits. How were the two leaders different? Gandhi was no friend of untouchables. Though Gandhi sensitised the people of India towards the evils of untouchability, it was only due to Gandhi's fast-unto-death that the right of untouchables to choose their own representatives was snatched away from them in elections. He included and excluded us at the same time. What changes have you witnessed in Dalit politics since independence? It has deteriorated. In the pre-independence days, Dalit leaders used to be well educated and informed about issues regarding their community and the society as a whole. The movement was vibrant. Unlike today it wasn't only lip service and vote-bank politics. They encouraged untouchables to take up education. For example, Babasaheb started three colleges across Maharashtra and a school in Mumbai. Ambedkar didn't only talk about fight against exploitation but also against the caste system. But today, everybody uses Babasaheb's name only for political gains. No present-day politician can ever come close to following what the great Dalit leader preached. They don't even know about his teachings and principles. No Dalit leader can ever acquire a pan-Indian identity like Ambedkar. And that's why Dalits continue to wallow in poverty and illiteracy. Do you think that proliferation of Dalit parties and leaders has changed the course of Indian politics? It has certainly, but only for the worse. Instead of abolishing discrimination, Dalit parties have worked to strengthen the caste system, by further driving a wedge between scheduled castes and other groups. Their method of assertion is wrong. Only a few people in the corridors of power have benefited from the ascendancy of some Dalit leaders. For example, a chamar leader will only work for his community since Dalits as a whole are not united. Has reservation in jobs, education and legislature helped to improve the lot of Dalits? Quota has helped but it has not been implemented properly. Prejudice against us is very strong and officers from our community are still humiliated at the workplace.
Monday, 23 February 2009
Slumdog Shows It’s worth
Dr. Shura Darapuri
“Slumdog Millionaire” has done it!! It has brought the long awaited eight Oscars to India’s credit. India known to be a “Third World”, “Developing” nation has proved it, that given an opportunity it is no way less than any other Developed nation. Success of the film has proved that potential of the country to develop knows no bounds and that the gems of talent lie littered even in the garbage of India, waiting to be picked up. India has proved in many fields be it in archery, shooting, wrestling, hockey, cricket and beauty contest etc. that it never leaves without making its presence felt. This time it has done it in films. From time immemorial there has been an earnest effort on the part of Indian Directors to win an Oscar. It is now that their prayers have been answered with “Slumdog Millionaire” bagging the best film award and getting eight Oscars.
The award could not be denied even by the worst of judges for many reasons. One: the actors were picked up from the slums; they were given the opportunity to prove themselves in acting. They were actually brought into the mainstream by the Director Danny Boyle and Loveleen Tandan and they did not fail them at any stage. On the contrary they came up with flying colours which prove that talent is not the preserve of the high born and the privileged. Given the opportunity an underdog can rise to become a millionaire.
The film is also a reflection on the fact that for long, poverty has been theorized, debated in air conditioned Seminar rooms; the time has now arrived to “Act”.The poor of the country are tired and bored of “distanced” sympathy from the rich and the need of the hour is to extend genuine hand of support so that the poor, excluded sections too get the feel of the “Red Carpet”.
In the history of films and also in the history of India “Slumdog Millionaire” has come as a “Revolution” as the film has successfully carried out its Social Responsibility. It has actually brought the marginalized sections into the mainstream translating their dreams into reality.
Media especially the films can play an important role as far as India is concerned. It has the mass appeal as even an illiterate person knows about Aishwarya Rai getting the Miss World Award. In down South the actors are worshipped like gods. That is how most well known actors confidently join politics. It is important that filmdom should carry its social responsibility by being sensitive to various issues and as in the case of “Slumdog Millionaire” make an effort to translate fiction into reality.
Some of the Bollywood Directors who just confine themselves to depicting of poverty only in terms of showing meagre clothes on the body of female actresses and concentrate on remaking of western films or a films from South, sincerely ought to take lessons from the film “Slumdog Millionaire” which shows sensitivity to the problem and gives solutions also. There should be an ongoing search for talent and depiction of originality. .
Celluloid World has to come on the streets and act for “real.” Similarly, other sectors of the nation should take lessons from the film “Slumdog Millionaire.” So that marginalized groups are given opportunity to join the mainstream to prove their worth and do India proud.
Dr. Shura Darapuri
Reader cum Deputy Director
Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy
Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University (A Central University)
Vidya Vihar, Rae-Bareli Road, Lucknow-226025, U.P., INDIA
Ph.: +91522 2345661 mobile Ph. +919451883620 Fax : +91522- 2441888
Email: shuradarapuri@gmail.com
“Slumdog Millionaire” has done it!! It has brought the long awaited eight Oscars to India’s credit. India known to be a “Third World”, “Developing” nation has proved it, that given an opportunity it is no way less than any other Developed nation. Success of the film has proved that potential of the country to develop knows no bounds and that the gems of talent lie littered even in the garbage of India, waiting to be picked up. India has proved in many fields be it in archery, shooting, wrestling, hockey, cricket and beauty contest etc. that it never leaves without making its presence felt. This time it has done it in films. From time immemorial there has been an earnest effort on the part of Indian Directors to win an Oscar. It is now that their prayers have been answered with “Slumdog Millionaire” bagging the best film award and getting eight Oscars.
The award could not be denied even by the worst of judges for many reasons. One: the actors were picked up from the slums; they were given the opportunity to prove themselves in acting. They were actually brought into the mainstream by the Director Danny Boyle and Loveleen Tandan and they did not fail them at any stage. On the contrary they came up with flying colours which prove that talent is not the preserve of the high born and the privileged. Given the opportunity an underdog can rise to become a millionaire.
The film is also a reflection on the fact that for long, poverty has been theorized, debated in air conditioned Seminar rooms; the time has now arrived to “Act”.The poor of the country are tired and bored of “distanced” sympathy from the rich and the need of the hour is to extend genuine hand of support so that the poor, excluded sections too get the feel of the “Red Carpet”.
In the history of films and also in the history of India “Slumdog Millionaire” has come as a “Revolution” as the film has successfully carried out its Social Responsibility. It has actually brought the marginalized sections into the mainstream translating their dreams into reality.
Media especially the films can play an important role as far as India is concerned. It has the mass appeal as even an illiterate person knows about Aishwarya Rai getting the Miss World Award. In down South the actors are worshipped like gods. That is how most well known actors confidently join politics. It is important that filmdom should carry its social responsibility by being sensitive to various issues and as in the case of “Slumdog Millionaire” make an effort to translate fiction into reality.
Some of the Bollywood Directors who just confine themselves to depicting of poverty only in terms of showing meagre clothes on the body of female actresses and concentrate on remaking of western films or a films from South, sincerely ought to take lessons from the film “Slumdog Millionaire” which shows sensitivity to the problem and gives solutions also. There should be an ongoing search for talent and depiction of originality. .
Celluloid World has to come on the streets and act for “real.” Similarly, other sectors of the nation should take lessons from the film “Slumdog Millionaire.” So that marginalized groups are given opportunity to join the mainstream to prove their worth and do India proud.
Dr. Shura Darapuri
Reader cum Deputy Director
Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy
Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University (A Central University)
Vidya Vihar, Rae-Bareli Road, Lucknow-226025, U.P., INDIA
Ph.: +91522 2345661 mobile Ph. +919451883620 Fax : +91522- 2441888
Email: shuradarapuri@gmail.com
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