Squandered Heritage
For 65
years, media and academia have failed to do justice to the towering intellect
that Ambedkar was. Successive governments have undermined the Constitution he
so admirably piloted and his role in its framing has been either exaggerated or
underestimated. And now, in a cruel irony, the Sangh Parivar is seeking to
usurp his legacy, distorting everything he stood for.
Published : Jun 10, 2015 12:30
IST
A.G.
Noorani

Dr B.R. Ambedkar.
IT is not
amusing but highly reprehensible to see the Sangh Parivar lay claim to B.R.
Ambedkar and his rich intellectual and political legacy. Twenty-five years ago
it tried the same trick with Gandhi, whom its mentor, M.S. Golwalkar, and L.K.
Advani had scorned. Now the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) Sarkaryawah,
Bhaiyaji Joshi, proclaims that Ambedkar was a “Mahamanav” who “needs to be
studied and understood in totality” (sub-text: discard elements in the whole
which the RSS cannot accept). This one takes the cake: “We should collectively
create a harmonious society for which he fought throughout his life.” He went
so far as to compare RSS founder K.B. Hedgewar with Ambedkar and assert that
“the objectives of both were same” ( Organiser ; April 26,
2015).
The Parivar attacked Ambedkar
for his Hindu Code Bill and was up in arms when his work, Riddles in
Hinduism , was published. ( Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings
and Speeches , Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, Vol.
4. This entire series is ably compiled from his published and unpublished
writings; cited volume wise herein.)
Ambedkar, on his part, was
unsparing in his critiques in that and in other works. “Hindu society is a
myth. The name Hindu is itself a foreign name. It was given by the Mohammedans
to the natives for the purpose of distinguishing themselves. It doesn’t occur
in any Sanskrit work prior to the Mohammedan invasion…. Hindu society as such
does not exist. It is only a collection of castes…. Castes don’t even form a
federation. A caste has no feeling that it is affiliated to other castes except
when there is a Hindu-Muslim riot” ( Annihilation of Caste ,
Chapter VI, Vol. 1). Volume 12 contains this dissertation for the M.A.
Examination in Columbia University (1913-15).
The Sangh Parivar is unlikely to
be pleased by his understanding of India’s history as these extracts suggest:
“It is a mistake to suppose that the Mussalman sovereigns of India were
barbarous and despots. On the other hand, majority of them were men of extraordinary
character. Mohammed of Ghazni ‘showed so much munificence to individuals of
eminence that his capital exhibited a greater assemblage of literary genius
than any other monarch in Asia has ever been able to produce. If rapacious in
acquiring wealth, he was unrivalled in the judgment and grandeur with which he
knew how to expend it….’
“Babar, the founder of the
Moghul dynasty in India, found the country in a prosperous condition and was
surprised at the immense population and the innumerable artisans everywhere. He
was a benevolent ruler and public works marked his statesmanship. Sher Shah,
who temporarily wrested the throne from the Moghul, was, excepting Akbar, the
greatest of Mohammedan rulers and, like Babar, executed many public works….
“With the advent of the English,
things began to change. Prosperity bade fair to India and perched itself on the
Union Jack. The evil forces were set forth both on the side of the Parliament
and the East India Company. The Rule of the Company was anything but wise, it
was rigorous, it gave security but destroyed property…. India contributed or
rather was made (to) contribute to the prosperity of England in many ways.” Had
he lived, Ambedkar would have denounced the Parivar for the demolition of the
Babri Masjid.
But neither can the Congress
claim him as one of its own. Volume 9 in that series published his excellently
documented works, What Congress and Gandhi Have Done To The
Untouchables and Mr. Gandhi and the Emancipation of the
Untouchables .
It is trite to say that praise
of Ambedkar has tended to obscure his contributions as a constitutionalist.
However, even this recognition does less than full justice to that tower of
intellect. He was head and shoulders above constitutional lawyers like Tej
Bahadur Sapru. For, he was steeped in history—Indian, English European and
American—in Hinduism, in the Vedas and the Upanishads, and in Economics. His
erudition in constitutional law was rooted in these intellectual disciplines
and raised him above the mere constitutional lawyer, however famous. In this,
he was peerless. Learning was harnessed to a razor-sharp mind, skilled in logic
and dialectics.
Neither academia nor the media
have acquitted themselves creditably. Even half a century after his death, a
definitive biography has not been written. The media revels in trivia, of which
the most ridiculous is the persistent statement, even in leading dailies, that
he “wrote” the Constitution at Wayside Inn, a restaurant in the Kala Ghoda
neighbourhood of Mumbai. He did go there when he practised at the High Court.
But from 1942 he lived mostly in New Delhi—moreover, one cannot write a
Constitution on the dining table of a restaurant.
Enriched mind On the other hand, his
notable efforts on India’s behalf are ignored; for example, his searching
cross-examination of Winston Churchill at the Round Table Conference (RTC) in
London. Indeed, his role at the RTC itself is underplayed, with attention
focussed almost exclusively on his differences with Gandhi and his advocacy of
the cause of the untouchables, as they were then known. This is of a piece with
neglect of the RTC’s proceedings themselves. They were a preparation for the
drafting of the Government of India Act, 1935, which served as India’s
Constitution from April 1, 1937, to August 14, 1947 (minus the federation
part), and, with adaptations, from August 15, 1947, to January 25, 1950. The
Constitution of India came into force the next day and it is based largely on
the Act of 1935. Debates in the RTC’s committees were better informed than
those in the Constituent Assembly since the former had the best of India’s
legal talent. On some of the provisions of our Constitution, notably the moribund
Inter-State Council, it is from the deliberations in London, rather than those
in New Delhi, that one acquires an understanding of their raison d’etre .
Uniquely, Ambedkar was an active participant in both.
However, well before that he had
enriched his mind with a deep study of constitutionalism. Unlike other
constitutional lawyers, his study of history, political science and economics
had shaped his outlook considerably.
Even as far back as January 27,
1919, he revealed the depth of his knowledge in his written statement and
evidence before the Southborough Committee on Franchise. He differed from the
British as well as the simplistic Indian approach. He reckoned with India’s
social diversities, which the Congress steadfastly refused to do. He said,
“Except the Hindus, the rest of the divisions are marked by such complete
freedom of communication from within that we may expect their members to be
perfectly like-minded with respect to one another. Regarding the Hindus,
however, the analysis must be carried on a little further. The significant fact
about the Hindus is that before they are Hindus they are members of some caste.
The castes are so exclusive and isolated that the consciousness of being a
Hindu would be the chief guide of a Hindu’s activity towards non-Hindus. But as
against a Hindu of a different caste, his caste-consciousness would be the
chief guide of activity. From this, it is plain that as between two Hindus, caste
like-mindedness is more powerful than the like-mindedness due to their both
being Hindus.” (Vol. 1, page 249.)
The problem was to devise an
electoral system that would enable the minorities—religious and caste—to be
properly represented in the legislature. “The Untouchables are usually regarded
as objects of pity but they are ignored in any political scheme on the score
that they have no interests to protect. And yet, their interests are the
greatest. Not that they have large property to protect from confiscation. But
they have their very persona confiscated. The socio-religious disabilities have
dehumanised the untouchables and their interests at stake are therefore the
interests of humanity. The interests of property are nothing before such
primary interests…. The Congress is largely composed of men who are by design
political Radicals and social Tories. Their chant is that the social and the
political are two distinct things having no bearing on each other. To them the
social and the political are two suits and can be worn one at a time as the
season demands” (Vol. 1, pages 255 and 263). He proposed his own scheme in a
supplementary written statement.
Ambedkar was in no condition to
boycott the Simon Commission. His counsel was not sought by the Motilal Nehru
Committee, which was appointed by the All Parties Conference to prepare a draft
Constitution of India (1928). He prepared a detailed report for the Simon
Commission. One is struck by his nationalist fervour in advocating a powerful
Centre with power “to coerce a recalcitrant or rebellious Province acting in a
manner prejudicial to the interests of the country”. This was two decades
before the provision for President’s rule in the States was adopted by the
Constituent Assembly.
At the RTC in London, he
attacked the princes’ claims and spoke up for the rights of Indians. In the
real sense of those hackneyed words, Ambedkar was a freedom fighter. The
Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, was put in a corner when he
deposed before the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform.
“Dr B.R. Ambedkar: I think there
is a general agreement that the ultimate goal of India’s Constitution is to be
Dominion status?
Sir Samuel Hoare: It has
constantly been so stated.
Dr B.R. Ambedkar: So that on the
question of the ultimate goal, there is really no dispute?
Sir Samuel Hoare: That would be
so, yes.
Dr B.R. Ambedkar: Now what I
want to ask you is this: in view of that, would you be prepared to put this in
the Preamble to the Government of India’s Constitution that India would be
Dominion status, leaving the question of the time and the pace to be determined
by circumstances as they arise?
Sir Samuel Hoare: I do not think
here and now I would like to give a pledge as to what is or is not put in the
Preamble of an Act of Parliament. I, myself, am prejudiced against Preamble of
Acts of Parliament, for reasons good or bad, and I would rather say neither yes
nor no to Dr Ambedkar’s question.”
At one point, Hoare acknowledged
that “Dr Ambedkar’s very acute mind has discovered a gap in the White Paper….
It is an omission that we propose to set right in any final draft”.
The majority and the minorities Ambedkar was rightly
oppressed by the reality that Indian society had a permanent communal majority
and permanent communal minorities. Sample these comments: “People who rely upon
majority rule forget the fact that majorities are of two sorts: (1) Communal
majority and (2) Political majority. A political majority is changeable in its
class composition. A political majority grows. A communal majority is born. The
admission to a political majority is open. The door to a communal majority is
closed. The politics of a political majority are free to all to make and
unmake. The politics of a communal majority are made by its own members born in
it.
“How can a communal majority run
away with the title deeds given to a political majority to rule? To give such
title deeds to a communal majority is to establish a hereditary government and
make the way open to the tyranny of that majority. This tyranny of the communal
majority is not an idle dream. It is an experience of many minorities.” On
another occasion, he wrote: “In India, the majority is not a political
majority. In India the majority is born; it is not made. That is the difference
between a communal majority and a political majority. A political majority is
not a fixed or a permanent majority. It is a majority which is always made,
unmade and remade. A communal majority is a permanent majority fixed in its
attitude. One can destroy it, but one cannot transform it. If there is so much
objection to a political majority, how very fatal must be the objection to a
communal majority?... My proposals do not ask the Hindus to accept the
principle of unanimity. My proposals do not ask the Hindus to abandon the
principle of majority rule. All I am asking them is to be satisfied with a
relative majority. Is it too much for them to concede this?… Without making any
such sacrifice, the Hindu majority is not justified in representing to the
outside world that the minorities are holding up India’s freedom. This false
propaganda will not pay. For, the minorities are doing nothing of the kind.
They are prepared to accept freedom and the dangers in which they are likely to
be involved; provided they are granted satisfactory safeguards.”
In a memorandum on “States and
Minorities”, he wrote: “Unfortunately for the minorities in India, Indian
nationalism has developed a new doctrine which may be called the Divine Right
of the Majority to rule the minorities according to the wishes of the majority.
Any claim for the sharing of power by the minority is called communalism, while
the monopolising of the whole power by the majority is called nationalism.”
In the plenary session of the
RTC, he declared: “We hold that the problem of the depressed classes will never
be solved unless they get power in their own hands .” That
alone, rather than mere safeguards, can assure protection to the minorities—a
share in power.
It was formidable intellectual
equipment that Ambedkar brought to bear on his tasks in the Constituent
Assembly from 1946. He understood better than most what was demanded of its
members and, later, of those who worked it. In 1943 he approvingly quoted these
wise words of Balfour: “If we would find the true basis of the long-drawn
process which has gradually converted medieval monarchy into a modern
democracy, the process by which so much has been changed and so little
destroyed, we must study temperament and character rather than intellect and
theory. This is a truth which those who recommend the wholesale adoption of
British institutions in strange lands might remember with advantage. Such an
experiment can hardly be without its dangers. Constitutions are easily
copied; temperaments are not and if it should happen that the borrowed
Constitution and the native temperament fail to correspond, the misfit may have
serious results. It matters little what other gifts a people may
possess if they are wanting in these which, from this point of view, are of
most importance. If, for example, they have no capacity for grading their
loyalties as well as for being moved by them; if they have no natural
inclination to liberty and no natural respect for law; if they lack good humour
and tolerate foul play; if they know not how to compromise or when; if they
have not that distrust of extreme conclusions which is sometimes misdescribed
as want of logic; if corruption does not repel them; and if their divisions
tend to be either too numerous or too profound, the successful working of
British institutions may be difficult or impossible. It may indeed be
least possible where the arts of parliamentary persuasion and the dexterities
of party management are brought to their highest perfection. ” The
stratagems available in the parliamentary system are used without respect for
its true spirit.
Constitutional morality Ambedkar’s three warnings
in the Constituent Assembly as it completed its labours in November 1949 are
often quoted—the perils of hero worship; satyagraha or civil
disobedience; and neglect of social and economic uplift. All three have gone
unheeded, though. But even more tragic is the utter indifference to the far
more insightful remarks he made in the Constituent Assembly on November 4 while
introducing the Draft Constitution:
“I agree that administrative
details should have no place in the Constitution. I wish very much that the
Drafting Committee could see its way to avoid their inclusion in the
Constitution. But this is to be said on the necessity which justifies their
inclusion. Grote, the historian of Greece, has said: ‘The diffusion of
constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community but
throughout the whole, is the indispensable condition of government at once free
and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the
working of a free institution impracticable, without being strong enough to
conquer ascendancy for themselves.’
“By constitutional morality
Grote meant ‘a paramount reverence for the forms of the Constitution, enforcing
obedience to authority acting under and within these forms yet combined with
the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and
unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts
combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen amidst the
bitterness of party contest that the forms of the Constitution will not be less
sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own.’
“While everybody recognises the
necessity of the diffusion of constitutional morality for the peaceful working
of a democratic Constitution, there are two things interconnected with it,
which are not, unfortunately, generally recognised. One is that the form of
administration has a close connection with the form of the Constitution. The
form of the administration must be appropriate to and in the same sense as the
form of the Constitution. The other is that it is perfectly possible to pervert
the Constitution, without changing its form by merely changing the form of the
administration and to make it inconsistent and opposed to the spirit of the
Constitution. It follows that it is only where people are saturated with
constitutional morality such as the one described by Grote that one can take
the risk of omitting from the Constitution details of administration and
leaving it for the legislature to prescribe them. The question is, can we
presume such a diffusion of constitutional morality? Constitutional
morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realise
that our people have yet to learn it. Democracy in India is only a top-dressing
on an Indian soil which is essentially undemocratic ” ( Constituent
Assembly Debates ; Vol. 7, page 38).Now, 67 years later,
constitutional morality is far weaker than it was then. It barely exists.
The authors of the Constitution
opted for the British parliamentary system as a matter of course. At the very
outset of their deliberations, at a joint meeting, on June 5, 1947, of the
Union Constitution Committee and the Initial Constitution Committee. Vallabhbhai
Patel announced the decision in the Constituent Assembly on July 15, 1947:
“Both these committees met and they came to the conclusion that it would suit
the conditions of this country better to adopt the parliamentary system of
Constitution, the British type of Constitution with which we are familiar”
( CAD , Vol. IV, page 578).
However, as Gladstone said, the
British Constitution “presumes more boldly than any other, the good faith of
those who work it”. As a parliamentary committee said, the “understandings and
habits of mind” by which the Constitution functions are “bound up with the
growth of mutual confidence between the great parties of the State,
transcending the political differences of the hour”. The Constitution is rooted
in a national consensus. It works on the understanding that the system is more
important than the immediate political gain. Public opinion acts as a referee.
Flouted from the outset India’s leaders began
flouting the Constitution from the very outset. President Rajendra Prasad
raised a hue and cry over the imposition of President’s Rule in Punjab in June
1951. The office of the President, and later the judiciary, suffered. The civil
service was suborned. Governors became dalals of the political
party in power at the Centre.
It had all begun fairly early;
as far back as 1937, when the Congress had its first taste of power in the
provinces. The issue was whether the Speaker of the Uttar Pradesh Assembly,
P.D. Tandon, should resign from the Congress. Both Gandhi and Nehru strongly
asserted that he should not. That was the beginning of the departure from
British conventions. They have been abandoned now, reducing the Constitution to
a skeleton denuded of life and blood. The judiciary was no less eager to ignore
British judicial culture. One gets a flavour of the gap between the Indian and
British judicial cultures from an erudite work, The English Judges:
Their Role in the Changing Constitution by Robert Stevens. He is a
practising barrister, a Bencher of Gray’s Inn, to which Ambedkar belonged, and
an academic as well. Two quotes from it suffice to drive the point home. The
Times (London) criticised in these terms on March 10, 2004, one of the
finest Lords, Chief Justice Lord Woolf. It said he “cannot quite make up his
mind whether he is a liberal reformer or the shop steward for the only trade
union in the country whose members wear wigs and not hard hats or cloth
caps”.
Sometime back this writer said
in these pages that the Army is the country’s most powerful trade union. I
should add that judges of the Supreme Court have been as ardently trade
unionist. Stevens sharply remarks, “Judges choosing judges is the antithesis of
democracy” (page 144). We have had this obscenity for nearly a quarter of a
century thanks to the ipse dixit of the Supreme Court in
blatant violation of the Constitution. It passed muster because we have had
weak governments since 1991. As Lord Bingham said in 2001: “The courts tend to
be most assertive…when political organs of the state are least
effective.”
On November 1, 1948, Ambedkar
said: “I feel that it [the Constitution] is workable, it is flexible and it is
strong enough to hold the country together both in peace time and in war time.
Indeed, if I may say so, if things go wrong under the new Constitution, the
reason will not be that we had a bad Constitution. What we will have to say is
that Man was Vile” ( CAD , Vol. 7, pages 43-44).
He resigned from the Union
Council of Ministers on September 27, 1951, fought the first general election
in 1952 in opposition to the Congress, and lost. Differences with the ruling
party widened to the extent that he delivered an embittered and unflattering
disavowal in the Rajya Sabha on September 2, 1953. “People always keep on
saying to me, ‘Oh you are the maker of the Constitution’. My answer is I was a
hack. What I was asked to do, I did much against my will.” He added: “I am
quite prepared to say that I shall be the first person to burn it out. I do not
want it. It does not suit anybody….”
Ambedkar’s role in the framing
of the Constitution has been either exaggerated or underestimated. The style
and content of his performance in the Constituent Assembly as the prime mover
of the Draft Constitution have been neglected completely.
He was capable of a shocking
factual error on a defining moment in Canada’s constitutional history, the
Governor-General’s refusal of a dissolution to Prime Minister Mackenzie King in
1926. He tended to be perfunctory, even testy and short, in his replies ( CAD ;
Vol. 7, page 270). His health was failing.
It is, however, not so much his
admirable piloting of the Constitution in the Constituent Assembly as his
vision, the spirit behind the entire enterprise, and the fundamentals he
propounded, which alone make the text meaningful, which compel admiration.
The vision was abandoned and the
fundamentals were flouted. Lesser men came after him.
Courtesy: Frontline