Ambedkar and the Hindu Culture

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ByEdmund Weber
The Indian Neo Buddhism has aroused a movement since the 50s, which propa-gates Buddhism as the top form of the Indo-genous dharma. - The vast majority of that new religious movement belongs to the Dalits [1], people whose en-dogamous communities have been excluded from the varna system [2a] since centuries. The varna system is the traditional hierarchic structure of the relation-ships of those Indian communities who mutually acknowledge themselves as constituent members of their society. These varna jatis established a social class of people devoid of any basic social right. Declared as 'Untouchables' these peo-ple lost all human substance in the eyes of the varna jatis. Yet, that social degra-dation didn't primarily spring from racial, religious or even cultural reasons but from economic ones. When the old Indian agrarian production became a little more productive the division of labour was established as basic structure of the society; but in India the productivity remained on a low level during centuries so that the new non-productive jatis had to keep down the costs of the material pro-duction and the necessary services; they needed cheapest labour. Yet, they achieved that aim by creating totally oppressed jatis which they could exten-sively exploit. Through such a Dalitisation the varna jatis established the most cost-saving system of exploitation at all - even more cost-saving than slavery. 2
The slave-holder had to buy and to maintain his slave and couldn't send him away just as he wished - even if the slave became unable to work. Yet, the varna jatis could deal with the Dalits according to their particular interests and use them according to demand - without any responsibility. Not being even property of the varna exploiters the outlawed people were transformed through the proc-ess of Dalitisation from god-like human souls into cheap and downtrodden working bodies - unable to get themselves out of their cruel situation during cen-turies. The Dalitisation and even the creation of the varna system was a long lasting more or less uncontrolled social process of complex social interactions. Deriving it from a book or an ideology or religion is an absolutely naive view of real history. Such an interpretation is produced by the old brahmanical belief in the power of thought, spoken and written words and mantras. The Dalitisation got its shakti from the real unfathomable social process wallowing through the history and determining the historical chances of the people. The brahmanas and even Manu only tried to codify, to explain and to justify a found system that the social process had produced long time ago. - That social process is becoming reversed now. In India that reversion would have happened earlier if the invad-ers and colonialists hadn't have artificially maintained the antiquated Dalitisa-tion. Under the new social conditions ultimately dissolving the traditional sys-tem of exploitation there isn't any need of the Dalit system - anymore. Neverthe-less, although officially propagating the abolition of the 'caste'-system the so-called Savarnas [2b] try to maintain the out-dated varna system even to-day. The ongoing process of nationalisation of the Indian society which is intensively promoted by the Hindutvavadis successfully starts to completely eradicate that fossil system from Indian society. - Therefore, the Dalits are becoming increas-ingly aware of their lack of rights in the last decades and making the betterment of their social conditions a central point of Indian policy. So they are starting to play an important active and passive role in the Indian society. Not least, be-cause of their millions of votes they have become a powerful vote bank. All po-litical parties in India are highly interested nowadays in having their share of that cake. - Even the Dalits of the Neo Buddhist Religion are getting some ideo-logical and political influence in India to-day. Yet, within the Indian Buddhist minority they have become the most powerful group - not only numerically con-stituting the majority of the Indian Buddhists but also being politically very ac-tive, well trained and aggressive.
These Neo Buddhists go back to the so-called 'Father of the Indian Constitution' Dr Bhimrao Ramji Sakpal, alias Ambedkar (1891-1956) [3]: therefore, they are called Ambedkarites. - Ambedkar belonged to the Mahar jati [4], which is one of the higher ranking jatis of the Untouchables in Maharashtra. Unlike the mass of his jati associates Sakpal succeeded with the help of his brahmanical school teacher in making an academic career. His brahmanical guru lent him even his own brahmanical name Ambedkar. By means of a scholarship from the Maha-raja of Baroda Ambedkar could attain the degree of a Bachelor of Arts from Bombay university in 1912. A state scholarship of the principality of Baroda 3
permitted him to study afterwards at Columbia university in New York from where he graduated as a Master of Arts. A scholarship granted by the Maharaja of Kolhapur enabled him to study law at London so that he could take a degree as a Barrister-at-Law and a doctorate in economics. He has lived again in Bom-bay since 1923 launching into a very intensive activity as an attorney and teacher. However, he didn't make a career for himself, but became completely committed to the interests of the Untouchables: by means of upbringing, agita-tion and organisation of the Dalits. - That commitment made him the recognised leader of the Indian Untouchables and brought him the highest public offices of the colonial and free India. He became a member of the British Viceroy's Coun-cil, the chairperson of the constitution committee [5] and a minister of justice of the first free Government of India.
Ambedkar has mostly been known as a political leader of the Untouchables up to 1950. He set up three political parties to advocate the interest of the Untouch-ables in the public. His latest foundation, the Republican Party, is still active in Mahahrashtra, mainly as a communal party of the Mahars - however allied with the Congress party. - Politically set against the Indian National Congress of Mo-handas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948) and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) and compared to the Muslim league of Mohammed Ali Jinnah (1976-1948), the founder of the Indo-Islamic state of Pakistan, unsuccessful, Ambedkar put in order to help his jati associates more effectively on the religious card. - Concern-ing the religious background of Ambedkar we have to take notice that his family belonged to the Kabir Panth [6]. This Bhakti religion didn't acknowledge any jati and varna boundaries in religious, not yet in practical respect, and wor-shipped the Nirguna Rama. The origin from a Ram Bhakti Hinduism strongly denying the ruling varna system by religion and interpreting the Holy in the Nir-guna way determined his further religious and political development.
The confrontation of his Untouchable jati with the Savarnas which caused also him the usual humiliations was nevertheless more lenient for him. It's true, the support of progressive high jati Hindus made him take an almost unprecedented social rise. However, as a leader of the Mahar community and of the other Un-touchables he used his entire intellectual ability, ideological power and political influence for their interests and aspirations which he formulated programmati-cally, legitimised religiously and realised politically. - Seeing clear-sightedly that in the traditional Indian context the religious motivation is the most impor-tant issue for the liberation fight even of the Indian Dalits Ambedkar intensively looked out a useful socio-religious ideology. - The Kabir Panth, the traditional religion of his family, did not come into consideration since it represented only a small frozen quietistic community without any political interest and therefore for a modern mass liberation fight equipped not at all. - First, he planned to convert together with his jati associates to Sikhism. The then vice president of the Golden Temple Managing Committee in Amritsar, Sardar Dalip Singh Doabria, requested him for this purpose pointing out to the allegedly egalitarian character of the Sikh religion. [7b] That primary option may have stemmed from the fact, 4
that the founder of Ambedkars family religion, Kabir, may have been initially been a Sikh. The essential reason to put Sikhism into consideration was the cul-tural one: the religion of Guru Nanak to the Hindu Culture. [7c] - However, Ambedkar protruded more and more with pro-Buddhist statements since India had become independent; he required his political and social supporters, particu-larly his jati associates, to start celebrating Buddha Jayanti, Buddha's Birthday, every year. Under the title 'The Buddha and the Future of His Religion' he pub-lished in the Maha Bodhi Journal a programmatic article in the same year. He wrote, that Buddhism is the only religion that suits for the world, emphasising 'reason, morality, liberty, equality and fraternity' [8a]. Ambedkar established a new Buddhist dharma. Picking up the ideals of the French Revolution he created a religious-bourgeois social ideology denying the Marxist ideology and the egalitarian neo casteism of M. K. Gandhi. His turn to such a social bourgeois Buddhism - never found in India and elsewhere before — finally led to his per-sonal religious conversion: Ambedkar took in Nagpur (Madhya Pradesh) diksha from the eldest Buddhist monk of India, U Chandramani Mahastavir, at the 14th of October 1956, some weeks before his death in December, in this way joining Buddhism ritually and officially [8b]. The convert immediately founded the Bharatiya Bauddha Mahasabha ('Indian Buddhist Union'), seemingly imitating the Hindu Mahasabha. Together with Ambedkar some hundred thousand fol-lowers mostly Mahars converted to that Ambedkariten Neo Buddhism [9]. Be-cause of this mass conversion the number of the Indian Buddhists increased from 1956 to 1951 up to 3 250 000 members [10]. No doubt, by means of the Ambedkar movement the Indian Buddhism took an enormous upswing. Since those times uncountable Buddhist events have been performed and new Bud-dhist institutions, associations and monasteries were established at many places. The Neo Buddhism inspired also the small minority of traditional Indo-Buddhism mostly existing in the Himalayan areas (Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkhim, Assam, etc.).
That mass conversion was certainly a big success for the increase of Buddhism in India, nevertheless the other side of the coin consisted in the split of the Dalit masses which were mostly Hindus and not interested to leave their traditional religions and to join the new Buddhist community. Ambedkar's attacks on the Savarna Hinduism had biographically seen their first origin - as above suggested - in Kabir's Avarna Hinduism [11]. To fight that Savarna Hinduism which dis-criminated against the Untouchables Ambedkar as a son of a Kabirite family didn't need any radical religious conversion. Such a fight has been and is par-ticularly today a possibility within Hinduism itself. Ambedkar's turn to Bud-dhism wasn't so much a consequence of the non-political attitude of his original religion but far more because of substantial political reasons. In his view the Na-tional Indian Congress under the leadership of M. K. Gandhi was incapable and too reluctant to change the living conditions of the Untouchables. He saw that Gandhi's political movement was ready to give the Muslims a lot of advantages but refused to concede the same to the Hindu Untouchables. The Hindu modern-5
ists, the so-called Hindutvavadis [12], absolutely committed to a united, jati and varna free Hindu nation, completely agreed with Ambedkar on this issue. Yet, their political influence was still very small in those times so that Ambedkar didn't ask them for support.
The actual political leadership of the Hindu masses was controlled by the open and hidden Savarna jatis of all Indian religions including Christians and Mus-lims. Their very successful organisation was the already mentioned Indian Na-tional Congress led by a Gujurati Vaishya Bania, M. K. Gandhi, and a Kashmiri brahmin, Jawaharlal Nehru. The Indian National Congress represented above all the great land owners and agriculturists who were mostly Savarnas and who were not naturally interested to grant any human and social rights to the Dalits. In addition, the ruling socio-economic class successfully prevented with the aid of the Indian National Congress the national upbringing, so that the lower jatis couldn't get any higher professional qualification to escape poverty nor develop a consciousness of emancipation to eradicate their deep implanted inferiority complex. The ruling class of free India also refused the introduction of a general compulsory military service fearing the military and intellectual arming of the masses. This service could have made an important contribution to the national education particularly to the Dalits and would have reduced the one-sided bond-age of the military on the higher jatis. At last, the compulsory military service would have reinforced the unity of India. All those progressive developments the ruling class didn't and don't want till today; to maintain it's socio-economic power it used and uses the splitting of the Indian masses into minorities, castes and religions imitating successfully the fundamental strategy of the British raj: ruling by dividing. Therefore, M. K. Gandhi couldn't never initiate any revolu-tionary crusade against the Savarnas to free the Untouchables from the retching grip of their oppressors [13]. Moreover, Gandhi didn't just refuse the jati system as such but merely the mental discrimination against single jatis, primarily against the Untouchables. In spite of Gandhi's Harijan ideology and in spite of a lot of anti-caste-discrimination laws, the influence of the jati system in general and of the Savarnas in particular, has increased more and more during the dec-ades of the Nehru dynasty.
Although Ambedkar identified the Savarna Hinduism as the most powerful en-emy of the Untouchables yet he kept in a decided manner a firm hold on the Indo-genous dharma which he and the Hindutvadis call 'Hindu Culture'. There-fore, Islam and Christianity were as serious alternatives out of question. Indeed, he compared himself with that Moses, [14] "who liberated his people from slav-ery" and highly respected Jesus Christ; but he was repelled by the Christians be-cause they "never fought for the removal of social injustice" and practised them-selves in southern India the Savarna system [15]. Ambedkar especially took ex-ception to the fact that those Untouchables who converted to Christianity be-came "selfish and self-centred": "They don't care a snap of their finger what be-comes of their former caste associates so long user system they and their fami-lies, or they and a little group who have become Christians, get ahead"[16]. The 6
Christian converts even denied their jati associates, they were contemptible trai-tors of their caste association. Therefore, he didn't want any increase of the number of such Christians. In addition, the increase of Christians would only reinforce the power of the British colonialism [17]. Moreover, Christianity might be only ninety percent a copy of Buddhism [18].
Ambedkar's choice finally fell for three reasons to Buddhism. He said: "I prefer Buddhism because it gives three principles in combination which no other relig-ion does. Buddhism teaches Prajna (understanding against superstition and su-pernaturalism), Karuna (love), and Samata (equality). This is what man wants for a good and happy life "[19]. That picture of Buddhism is nothing else than an idealising construction for political reasons, devoid of any historical and ac-tual evidence. The primary motive of Ambedkar's conversion was not so much of religious but of social and political nature. His main intention consisted in developing the worldly emancipation of the Untouchables. No wonder that a half million of his jati associates, the Mahars, accepted to follow him. Anyway, a change of religion by a caste and to follow a caste leader into an other religion is a very typical phenomenon within the Indian caste system. These masses mostly hadn't any relation to Buddhism before their conversion and followed Ambedkar for reasons of personal loyalty only. In such a way, a convert ex-plained: "We became Buddhists because Dr. Ambedkar told us so"[20]. An other one said: "I got thinking about economic and social betterment and then I just followed Ambedkar to Buddhism"[21]. A third one confessed: "I had no other incentive but blind love for Ambedkar and the people. This is true for many"[22]. - Ambedkar's Buddhism obviously appears to be "a religion of lib-eration of the oppressed in society"[23]. On the one hand, through this definition Ambedkar's Neo Buddhism became the strongest rival of Christian and Muslim social ideologies and on the other hand, the sharpest opponent of the Savarnas. The Savarnas prevented very successfully with the help of the Indian National Congress the emancipation of all the Dalits. Because of the numerical domi-nance of Hindus within the Indian Savarna community Ambedkar developed an abstract anti-Hinduism blaming the Hinduism as such for the delusion of un-touchability. Therefore, the anti-Hindu turn stems from the fact that the ruling class of India under the political leadership of the Indian National Congress sup-pressed the emancipatory power of the Hindus and abused the Hindu tradition for the tacit justification of the continued Savarna practise in spite of their con-trary political declarations. Facing the numerical reality that the vast majority of the Untouchables are also Hindu, Ambedkar had to propagate religious conver-sion. The Dalits were told to become Buddhists and leave Hinduism if they want to be worldly liberated. That undifferentiated anti-Hinduism must necessarily fail. It isolates the Neo Buddhism from the Hindu Dalits and let it become in the long run a cast religion: predominantly as cast religion of the Mahars. Such de-velopments happened in the Indian religious history very often. However, that self-isolation would be only a repetition of the old caste models: both the relig-ion as well as other cultural elements are limited to one's own caste. The restric-7
tion to the caste horizon is currently secured by an aggression Ambedkar mobi-lised against the Hinduism in general. - The Ambedkarites represent in the con-temporary India the strongest Buddhist power. Even if the traditional Indian Buddhists separate themselves from them, in such a way, they increasingly em-boss the picture of Buddhism in the eyes of the Hindus, of the Muslims and Christians: as a religion destroying relationships, preaching intolerance and us-ing religion for political purposes. In spite of that extreme anti-Hindu propa-ganda [23a] the modernist Hindus don't condemn the mass conversion of Hindu Untouchables to Buddhism. The Hindutvavadis understand Buddhism as a part of the Hindu dharma. Such a conversion is seen only as a change within the Hindu fold. Therefore, the Hindus accept a such conversion earlier than the mass conversions to Christianity and Islam. The two other religions are unacceptable because they don't belong to the dharma. - Ambedkar also joined the Indian Buddhism, because of its actual non-existence. By this he could solve three dif-ficult problems: 1. Under any circumstances didn't Ambedkar want to separate his movement from the Indo-genous dharma; therefore, his reason for choosing Buddhism as religious alternative was his strong attachment to the Hindu Cul-ture. 2. Since there didn't actually exist any ritually pure Buddhist castes in India anymore, in case of conversion Ambedkar didn't have to reckon on any caste conflict with Buddhist Savarnas. Therefore, in Sri Lanka Ambedkar's Buddhisa-tion of the Singhalese Dalits would have been made fail by the Buddhist Goyi-gama jatis. 3. Although Ambedkar interpreted Buddhism in a very unusual way [24] he hadn't even to fear any religious conflict since a powerful Buddhist or-thodoxy didn't exist in India. It seems as if the old Indian dharma uses Ambed-kar's movement as a historical possibility of the dharmic re-integration of the Untouchables, which was prevented by the very anti-modern caste system.
Ambedkar's decision to convert to the Buddhist wing of the Indo-genous or Hindu dharma and his decisive rejection of any religion of non-Indian origin on one side, and the absence of any remarkable mass conversion to Islam or Chris-tianity since his conversion on the other side is a success of the Indian dharma nobody was expecting before. The Christian and Muslim ideologists, missionar-ies and extremists were believed the dharma religions would vanish and the Hindu people convert to their adharmic faiths. Ambedkar has obviously ren-dered the Hindu Culture great service stopping the downfall of the dharma in India in general and the advance of Communism, Christianity and Islam within the Dalit fold in particular. The anti-Hindu Ambedkarism simply shows the overwhelming intellectual power of the Indian dharma tradition making dialecti-cal progress with his evolution through the cunning of the dharmic reason. Am-bedkar knew that his dharmic option for the Sikhism and later on for Buddhism and against Islam and Christianity was completely in accordance with the Hin-dutvavadis placing greater importance to the affiliation to the Hindu Culture in general than to the affiliation to a particular traditional or new Hindu sect. - In his fight to liberate the Dalits Ambedkar never left the Hindu Culture option. Even when Ambedkar was reflecting the possibility to join Sikhism he made a 8
clear statement that only a religion of the Hindu Culture could be an alternative for the depressed castes: "Looking at these alternative faiths purely from the standpoint of Hindus, which is the best - Islam Christianity or Sikhism? Obvi-ously, Sikhism is the best."[25a] By this choice they have not to leave the Hindu Culture: "If the Depressed Classes join Islam or Christianity, they not only go out of Hindu religion, but they also go out of Hindu Culture. On the other hand, if they become Sikhs they remain within Hindu culture"[25b]. He ironically added, that his option for the Sikhs was "by no means a small advantage to the Hindus"[26]. No doubt, Ambedkar's historic choice was a clear vote for the Hindu Culture. In spite of vehement attacks on the Savarna Hinduism he never planned to eradicate the Indo-genous or - using Ambedkar's and the Hindut-vavadis' term - Hindu Culture.
The basic value of the Hindutvavadis [27] as mentioned above is the mainte-nance of Hindu Culture in an united Hindu nation; in their opinion is the most important factor weakening the Hindu Culture the creation of the caste system. Therefore, it's quite logical that the destruction of the caste system and the eradi-cation of the untouchability are fundamental aims of the Hindutvavadis. [28] Therefore, Hindu nationalism is nothing else than the political will to strengthen the Indian nation by unification; but the unity can only be reached through a casteless society of equal citizens. That fundamental interest of the Hindutva movement makes clear that in spite of some important differences there is never-theless an basic ideological convergence between Ambedkar and Hindutva: the maintenance of Hindu Culture. - Ambedkar wanted the destruction of the caste system by caste-motivated reasons, the Hindutva wants the same by national ones. Due to this common interest it is no wonder that "Ambedkar had intimate relations with the Hindutvawadis"[29] of the Hindu Mahasabha and its president V. D. Savarkar. Both ones were joined together in the decisive will to extinguish untouchability from the Hindu society. The judgement of the Hindutva move-ment on the untouchability was classically formulated by Savarkar as follows: "This system of untouchability is unwarrantable and suicidal, hence only for the sake of humanity we the Hindus should eradicate it"[30]. With the official of the Hindu Mahasabha, Munje, Ambedkar exchanged extensively letters; once he asked him concerning his possible conversion for advice [31]. Later on he criti-cised Savarkar for not doing enough to defend the Hindu interests in face of the British-Muslim conspiracy! [32] During the second world war, however, both ones played the military card: "Savakar blessed Ambedkar's programme of mili-tarisation. He expressed confidence that under the able leadership of Ambedkar the Mahar brethren would exhibit their military merits and strengthen the 'col-lective power' with their militancy"[33]. That the chief of the Hindu Mahasabha appreciated the military arming of the Untouchables, shows very clearly about the narrow kinship between Ambedkar and Hindutva [34]. If the Hindutva would have been the enemy of the Dalits how could the leader of an radical Hindu organisation accept the military power of the Untouchables? That the chief of the Hindu Mahasabha the military arming of Untouchables greeted, no 9
doubt, shows clearest the narrow kinship between Ambedkar and Hindutva [34]. Over and above that Savarkar declared in order to stop the Pan-Islamism con-jured by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, such an alliance "would be retaliated by hatch-ing pan-Hindu-Buddhism." The "Hindu-Bouddh unity from Jamnu to Japan" would put an end to the machinations of Jinnah [35].
There is no doubt, Buddhism was by the Hindutva seen as is an integral part of Hindu Culture from the very beginning [36]. In the frame of this understanding of the Bauddha dharma as part of the more general Hindu dharma the conver-sion of Ambedkar was nothing else than a change of an apartment within the same house. Therefore, it's not surprising that Ambedkar writing the Indian con-stitution co-operated narrowly with the Hindu Mahasabha [37]. Together with the Hindutvavadis he fully shared the idea of 'Hindu nationalism'; just this ide-ology was his essential motive not convert to Islam and Christianity: "Conver-sion to Islam or Christianity will denationalise the Depressed Classes"[38]. Am-bedkar's criterion of Indian nationalism didn't consist in the identification with the abstract Indian Nation but with the Indo-genous dharma; therefore he ex-cluded Christians and Muslim from but included Hindus and other dharma peo-ple into the Indian Nation. Under any circumstances the Untouchables shouldn't leave the Indian dharmic nation but become her fully acknowledged members.
To surmount the traditional social isolation of the Untouchables in India Am-bedkar realised sharp-sightedly that this was possible only by the integration of the Dalits into the Hindu fold, into the majoritarian dharma society; otherwise the converted Dalits would give up or loose the solidarity of all the other Hindu Dalit castes. Conversion to adharmic communities has made the Dalits fully helpless victims of their oppressors inside and outside their new community. Beyond that: conversion to adharmic communities weakened the possible power of the Dalit community as a whole and was therefore nothing else than a disas-trous betrayal of the solidarity of the Untouchables. Logically, the dharma na-tionalism was an essential item for the emancipation of the Untouchables. Sepa-rating the Untouchables from the Indo-genous dharma didn't mean nothing else than their denationalisation. The Untouchables shouldn't under any circum-stances been alienated form the other parts of the Indian dharma society. It's ob-vious: Ambedkar believed in the emancipate power of the Indo-genous dharma for the Dalits: neither Christianity nor Islam could give the Dalits the chance to become free. Therefore it was very clear that Ambedkar didn't want to strengthen Muslims or Christians although they always disseminated to be egali-tarian and casteless religious communities [39]!
Although Ambedkar knew that all these communities were caste ridden never-theless his basic argument against them didn't consist so much of their casteistic reality but in their adharmic character! Even if they would have been casteless he wouldn't have accepted a conversion to them. The argument of the denation-alisation stated here reveals that Ambedkar took the Indian Muslims and also the Indian Christians as communities, that didn't belong to the country, to the nation [40], reveals him as a very exclusive and extremist Indo-genous nationalist. Af-10
ter having excommunicated Christians and Muslims from the Indian nation, the question arises: Who, then, did according to Ambedkar belong to that Indian dharmic nation? The Hindus, the Sikhs and the Buddhist, those people only who follow the Indo-genous dharma, called by the Hindutvavadis Hindu dharma [41]. However, the absolute dominance of the Indo-genous dharma went in the thinking of Ambedkar even further. Even the caste aspirations have to be subor-dinated to the dharma! He calculates: "On the other hand, if they embrace Sikh-ism, they will not only not harm the destiny of the country but they will help the destiny of the country."[42a] Destiny, however, means dharma, the Indian dharma, which besides Sikhs and Buddhists in spite of sharp criticism also the Hindus also belong to. The Untouchables aren't allowed to damage that dharma - therefore only a religious change within "the destiny of the country" comes into consideration. Only following the Indo-genous dharma, the Dalits can build a more advanced India. Ambedkar then appeals to the non-Muslim, the actual Hindu nation: It might be exactly the same way in interest of India, that the Un-touchables, if they must change their belief, the Sikhism accept [42b]. There-fore, the common nation of the Hindus, the Buddhists and Sikhs, the Indo-genous religious communities, must have an interest next to it, that the Untouch-ables don't desert to the Christians who were collaborating with colonial rulers and the Muslims who are only interested in their communal domination. The exclusion of the two exogenous religious communities, which are denational-ised, and therefore doesn't belong to the nation shows very clearly, that Ambed-kar's nationalism wasn't based on racial, caste or religious but on cultural crite-ria, on the Indo-genous culture or the dharma arising from the soil of India - which as we said above the Hindutvavadis call 'Hindu dharma' or 'Hindu Cul-ture'.
Regarding the Indo-genous culture as the highest value and connecting the lib-eration of the Dalits with the dharma he prevented the massive emigration of the Untouchables from the Indo-genousn culture. Indeed, it isn't wrong to say that Ambedkar kept the Hindu Dalits from leaving the Indo-genous dharma by be-coming adharmic Christians or Muslim; but he did more, no less: he even tied ideologically the Dalits to the dharma - paying as price the justified denunciation of the Savarna Hindus who oppressed the karuna ethics of the Hindu dharma. As rulers the Savarnas forced the varna Hindus into the discrimination of the Dalits. Within the traditional Indo-genous religious communities there was actually hardly any varna caste which could escape that prejudice. The Hindutvavadis being no caste but a voluntary organisation and only a small group lacked any political importance in those times. - So, adopting the Buddhism as a new caste religion of the Mahar Untouchables Ambedkar found a brilliant compromise. Buddhism almost absent in India and therefore not controlled by Savarnas be-longed nevertheless to the dharma. Converting to that religion one would be lib-erated from the ideological dominance of the Savarnas and got hold of the dharma. Considering the Savarnas' ideology that the Dalits don't belong to the dharma society Ambedkar succeeded in integrating the Untouchables into the 11
dharma society for the first time. His identity wasn't based on religion, jati, varna or language but on the Indo-genous culture. Therefore, his Neo Buddhism only seems to have been anti-Hindu. It was anti-Savarna. Rather, Ambedkar started a social movement, which will most effectively get rid of the socially grounded deformation of the dharma in future. Reason is that his movement ba-sically agrees with the Hindutvavadis to maintain the Indo-genous culture, the dharma, and to reach this aim through a social revolution, that is the eradication of untouchability and the whole caste system. That objective convergence of the Dalit and Hindutva interests will inevitably bring together both movements. Therefore, the newly made political coalitions between the BJP and Dalit parties are very logical; they will continue even if the Dalit leaders influenced by the Congress ideology are very inconsistent in political affairs. Nevertheless, the egalisation of the Indian and particularly the Hindu society propagated by the Hindutvavadis and pre-formulated in Swami Vivekananda's socio-political pro-gramme of Brahmanisation including all castes and people [43] is backed by the Dalit movement. The liberation of the Dalits absolutely depends on the equalisa-tion of the whole people and the eradication of the Savarnic splitting of the In-dian society.
Notes
1] The Indian Untouchables call themselves 'Dalits' today. Cf., James Massey: Dalits in India, Delhi 1995, p. 15 seq.
2a] The colonial term 'caste' is muddling the two sociological categories meaning completely different social states of affairs: 'jati' and 'varna'. Jati means real working community of birth, marriages, of profession, culture and religion; varna, however, means the social rank, status, ordo.
varna does not mean the work-sharing assignment of the jatis. This has been always an ele-ment of the jatis themselves. The socio-cultural evaluation of the jatis, their ranking place, is expressed by the hierarchical varna.
The Dalits fell out of the prevailing varna. They were regarded by the Savarnas [see next note] as avarnas. Nevertheless, they are living also in endogamous groups separating them-selves with hierarchical assignment from all the other Dalit jatis. Therefore, it is in every re-spect non-valid to designate them as 'casteless'.
India is up to now as the series 'People of India', edited by the Anthropological Society of India (ASI), Delhi 1993 seq., has blatantly proved a society embossed by the jati system. India consists of 4635 identified jatis. The jatis are the subjects of the Indian society and not the individuals. Therefore, the Indian society isn't a system of the relations of individuals (Theo-dor W. Adorno) but a system of relations of jatis. The sociology of castes has confirmed these investigations. Over and above that it has shown, that the power of the jatis didn't fall down during the time of the Nehru dynasty - more than that the power increased (cf., D.L. Sethi: Caste and Politics: A Survey of Literature. In: Contributions to South Asian Studies 1. Ed. by Gopal Krishna. Dehli 1979).
A lot of Indian parties officially rejecting the caste system in their manifestos; don't find it any problem yet in order to gain votes and power to make more or less openly politics on jati ba-sis. Such a jati communalism is particularly practised by those political parties which favour minorities. The Neo Buddhist and Christian Dalit leaders are practising that jati communalism too being of the opinion that the emancipation of the Dalits could be successful only by stabi-12
lising the All-Indian solidarity of the Dalit jatis. That communalism is a new social fact be-cause it has become a nation wide jati communalism including all jatis of the same varna or Avarna status. The new nationalised jati consciousness is concentrating the power of the tradi-tionally singularised jatis.
All those tendencies have brought about a real renaissance of the whole but new caste system in India today. It is somehow an triumph of M. K. Gandhi's social concept of a system of equalised jatis. Yet, the reinforcement of the nationalised and equalised jatis is a highly dan-gerous development threatening the unity of the country.
However, the Hindutvavadis can't practise jati communalism because they are ideologically interested in empowering a non-divided nation of equal Indian citizens. The so-called 'nation-alism' in India doesn't mean in a Western manner an ideology propagating aggressive politics against other and foreign nations but an ideology for promoting the social integration of the nation. The Christian European colonialists successfully prevented such a modernising devel-opment in India to maintain their exploiting regime.
While the majority of the Indian politicians don't have any problem to declare themselves to a jati the approval of the varna system is yet regarded as reprehensible. The public defence of the varna doctrine comes about only rarely today. Anyhow, the Varnaism in combination with the Jatiism, e.g. in the case of love matches and other forms of the private interest, is common practice. This also goes for the so-called progressists and the press media supporting them. In contrast to the open pro-varna traditionalists the repress all memory of their own varna arro-gance practice and their jati communalism withdrawing their actual way of life from any crit-ics of public discourse. This repression of the own practise by the majority of the Indian soci-ety of all religious communities and the almost absurd imputation of the Hindutvavadis as communalists (during simultaneous defamation as nationalists!) leads - up to now successful - to the situation, that India has been hindered to get a position in the world community ade-quate to the already developed potentials and resources.
Instead of this, provided there is no political change, India threatens to become an insignifi-cant 'banana republic'. (Cf., Arun Shourie: 'It Is Just That The Banana Is large'. In: http://bjp.org/ bjp/articles/ shourie/may31-97.htm).
In addition, the ignoring of the conceptional distinction of jati and varna has prevented the progressive transformation of a still protective social system. The ideologically motivated mixing up of the destructive varna system with the still supportive jati system de-stabilises the social identity of the masses living under conditions dissolving the traditional dharma.
That strategy of weakening the Indian masses practised by the British rulers has been adopted by the political and ideological successors of the colonialists. Propagating individualism while practising communalism is the a very effective schizopheno-gene method of mass control. Some politicians and ideologues of the Dalits and the OBCs show very clearly that successful politics in favour of their people is only working if they fight the varna system and use the their own jatis as basis of their fight for complete equality.
But because of that schizophrenic propaganda the majority leaders of the Untouchables follow the crypto-varnaic politicians and intellectuals instead of the Hindutva nationalism. Repress-ing Varnaism and isolating jati communalism are still the dominant factors of Indian politics, nationalism yet is only a minoritarian force. The BJP led government (since 1998) shows a little change in the mentality. but the very aggressive reactions of the communalists and Savarnas of the mass media and their political parties reveals the power of the colonial tradi-tion to divide the Indian Nation.
2b] Savarnas, vide note 11].
3] Cf., Eleanor Zelliot: The Dalit Movement. In: Dalit - International Newsletter Vol.1 No.1 (1996) p. 1 seq. and Balkrishna Govind Gokhale: Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar: Rebel against Hindu tradition. In: Religion and Social Conflict in South Asia. Ed. by Bardwell L. Smith. Leyden 1976, p. 14 seq. 13
4] Cf., Ambedkar and the Neo Buddhist Movement. Ed. by T. S. Wilkinson and M. M. Tho-mas. Madras 1972 (= Wilkinson), particularly: T. S. Wilkinson: Buddhism and Social Change among Mahars.
5] With the help of that position he achieved the Buddhist wheel of dharma being included into the Indian national flag and Ashoka's lion capital chosen for the national symbol of the free India.
6] Gokhale, op. cit., p. 17; regarding the Kabir religion cf. William J. Dwyer: Bhakti in Kabir. Patna 1981.
7b] B. A. M. Paradkar: The Religious Quest of Ambedkar. In: Wilkinson, p. 55-70
7c] B. A. M. Paradkar op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 56
8a] D. C. Ahir: Buddhism in Modern India, 1991, p. 18
8b] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 65 seq.
9] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 66
10] Ahir, op. cit., p. 22
11] Savarnas, the people supporting and practising the dominant varna system, are present in all Indian religious communities as well as in so-called secular ones i.e. the Marxist parties. Cf., Jose David: Communist Kerala citadel crumbling under casteist ostracism. Indian Ex-press, 9th of March, 1997; Imtiaz Ahmad: Caste and Social Stratification among Muslims in India. Delhi 1979; there see: A. R. Momin: Muslim Caste in an Industrial Township of Ma-harashtra. - The Savarnas declare Avarnas those jatis which do not belong to the varna system of Manu (brahmanas, kshatriyas, vaishyas and shudras). Very often, scholars were and are adopting Manu's model as a description of the real Indian society but this is very doubtful. The Indian sub-continent has been a conglomerate of extremely different cultures. One of them has been the varna dominated sub-cultures. Islamic invaders of India and particularly the colonial rulers used and reinforced Manu's model. Bimal Chandra Mahapatra: Buddhism and Socio-Economic Life of Eastern India, Delhi 1995, has recently shown that just the Buddhist kings [of Orissa and Bengal] introduced the brahmanical varna system. Believing in the ide-ology that Buddhism basically fights the varna system he is amazed about that fact and writes: "Though Ksammankara (sc. the king of Orissa, 9th century A.D.; the author) was a staunch follower of Buddhism he established four orders (caste) in their proper place" (p. 78-9). The ideological pressure produced by Western indological propaganda is so heavy that Mahapatra can't use his own critical evidences to correct the ideological interpretation of Buddhist his-tory; confused he even neutralises his own evidences according to the rule that it can't be what's not allowed. Therefore he denounces the Buddhist ruler to disregard the Buddhist teachings! (op. cit.) According to Mahapatra's studies it becomes more and more evident that just during the centuries of Buddhist rule the varna system was spread all over India. The Hindu Bhakti movement started the fight against that system. The frontal attack on the varna system in India has its origin in the Hindu religion and on no account in the Buddhist one.
12] Hindutvavadis (Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP], the Vishva Hindu Parishad [VHP], the Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh [RSS] and so forth are fighting for unity, equality and evolu-tion of the Hinduism. Their enmity against the caste system i.e. the dominance of the jati over the nation as well as the discrimination of jatis, particularly of the Dalits, is not only morally motivated but also a question of political reason.
The vehement aggression which they are suffering in India has its roots their nationalism. Their enemies believe that the Hindutvavadis are indeed ready to extinguish the caste system. The other political parties are known to limit to the corresponding declamations and to misuse in a communalistic way the castes as 'vote bank' for the polls (particularly the Indian National Congress, the Samajwadi of Party and of the Janata Dal). Therefore, it is very easy to under-stand that the Indian People's Party [BJP], the political wing of the Hindutvavadis, 1997 sup-ported the election of a Dalit as Indian President; likewise they were successful with their 14
initiative to elect a Dalit as speaker of the Lok Sabha for the first time (March 1998) - as for the rest against the voices of the above mentioned parties.
13] Ambedkar: Gandhi and the fast. In: Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches. Edited by Vasant Moon. (=WS), vol. 8, Bombay 1990, p. 375 seq.
14] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 59
15] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 59; Ambedkar is the most authorised con-temporary witness, that the missionaries' ideology, the Indian Christians were unlike the Hin-dus committed to social justice, is nothing else than propaganda.
The same goes for the mission ideology too spreading the prejudice the varna system not to be valid among the Christians of India and to be particular to the Hinduism.
That the Savarna Christianity flourishes strongly today, has been discovered by the revolts of the Christian Dalits within the church.
The Christian Dalits could indeed get some leading positions of the Indian churches (e.g. the episcopate in Chennai and Delhi); the Savarna Christians yet control the church management and hold the disposal of the western financial resources in their own hand.
16] No doubt, that's indeed the most fatal moral reproach being ever raised against the Indian Christian converts.
However, that reproach also shows how much Ambedkar's conscience was committed to the faith to and solidarity with one's own jati.
Ambedkar very clearly saw that these Christians jati apostates became useful helpers for weakening the protective Dalit jatis and therefore obedient servants of the colonial regime and the higher jatis.
17] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 60 seq.
18] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 62
19] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 62. That description of Buddhism is pure wish thinking. Although well educated in historiography Ambedkar invented by actual ideo-logical reasons that modern Ideal Buddhism.
The international propaganda follows that ideology, exempting the Buddhists from public criticism knowing that violence inwards (China, Cambodia, Burma, they Shri Lanka), aggres-sion outwards (China, Japan) or moral decay (Thailand) are in use and democracy and human rights are mostly unknown in predominantly Buddhist countries.
20] Adele M. Fiske: The Understanding of 'Religion' and 'Buddhism' among the India's New Buddhists. In: Wilkinson, p. 112
21] Adele M. Fiske, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 112
22] Adele M. Fiske, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 112
23] Adele M. Fiske, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 119; cf., Edmund Weber: Religion - A source of Oppression and Liberation (of the Dalits). In: Bulletin of the Christian Institute for Religious Studies, Batala, vol. 23, no. 2, July 1994, p. 1 seq.; cf., Journal of Religious Culture, No. 2, 1997 (http://www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/htdocs/FB/fb6a/religion/relkultur02).
23a] That behind the fight against the solidarisation the of the mostly Hindu Dalits and the Dalits belonging to minoritarian religions is not only an Indian but also a western interest it can easily be learned from the aggressive propaganda of the already mentioned American 'DALIT International Newsletter'. Owen M. Lynch: 'Dalit Buddhism: The Liberate Bodh Gaya Movement' (Vol. 3 No.1, Feb. 1998) is a very good example, how non-Indian pressure groups abusing Buddhist religion attempt to misuse the Dalits to destabilise India. The Bud-dhists should also be raised at the same time against the Hindus. The author feels, that India's historical chance depends on the renewal of Hinduism particularly by its reunion with its Buddhist tradition and on the decisive fight of the Hindutvavadis against the Savarna system. Within the general strategy to weaken India it's just the primary function of those Western so-called pro-Dalits to stop the threatening re-unification of Buddhists and Hindu Dalits. 15
24] Vakil: Gandhi-Ambedkar-Dispute. New Delhi 1991 (=Vakil), p. 107: "Ambedkar did not explain Buddhism as it was but as what it ought to be".
25a] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 56
25b] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 56. Ambedkar decided in connection with the Pakistan question quite decisive: "There (sc. in India; the author) has been a cultural unity from time immemorial". That cultural unity includes all Indians and shouldn't given up, "sim-ply because some Muslims are dissatisfied"! (WS, vol. 8, p. 348)
26] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 56
27] See note 12.
28] The Second Hindu World Congress 1977 in Prayag (Allahabad) passed the following de-cision: "(1) To protest untouchability even if it is practised anywhere; (2) To create immedi-ately uch an atmosphere in which such tendencies and attitudes could be discouraged and dis-pelled; (3) To arouse social consciousness to disqualify all tendencious efforts to fan the pas-sion over untouchability for political bargaining by anti-national elements. This Vishva Hindu Sammelan makes an unequivocal declaration that nobody among the Hindus is an untouch-able"[Hindu Vishva, March April 1979, Vol. 14, No 7 & 8, Special Number: Second World Hindu Conference].
One of the seven fundamental objectives of Vishva Hindu of Parishad which is the biggest Hindu Organisation of the world reveals what the Hindutvavadis are ready to do: (7) "To eradicate the concept of untouchability from the Hindu society"[Global Vision 2000. Global Conference Washington D.C. 1993, p. 54]. Examples of the systematic injury of the untouch-ability taboo through Hindutvavadis, here through members of the Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh, gives H. V. Seshadri: 'The 'Mantra' for Exorcising Untouchability [Hindu Vishva, No-vember 1985, p. 7 seq.] The Hindutvavadis have a strategic reason forcing them to drive for-ward the extermination of the untouchability: their Hindu nationalism.
Ambedkar's and the Hindutvavadis' arguments are the same ones: the Hindu society can only survive by introducing social equality.
Like Ambedkar the Hindutvavadis are strong anti-caste Hindus; they sharply conflict with the casteism practising Savarnas. The Savarnas are amongst all religious communities and are active particularly in the so-called secular parties which are using the caste system for politi-cal purposes.
Ambedkars prophetic comment: "In my opinion only when the Hindu society becomes a casteless society that it can hope to have strength enough to defend itself. Without such inter-nal strength, Swaraj (sovereignty) for Hindus may turn out to be only a step towards slavery" (WS, vol. 1, 1989, p. 80) nobody else has understood better and determined dealt than the anti-caste Hindus of the Hindutva.
Ambedkar's ideas and the anti-caste ideology of the Hindutvavadis being very close, he at-tempted even to join the Hindu Mahasabha.
The most recent examples of the continuous pro-Dalit ideology of the Hindutvavadis is the support of the Bharatiya Janata Party for the first Dalit woman, Ms Mayavati, to become Chief Minister of the most populous Indian state Uttar Pradesh.
The BJP is favouring the Dalits: they are brothers and sisters within the Hindu community.
On occasion of the Protestant National Congress (Evangelischer Kirchentag) in Frankfurt am Main (1987) Vishva Hindu Parishad which took part in this event declared in an official statement: "Good bye to Untouchability. Untouchability has been the scourge of India. ... Caste has not been created by God or nature. Still untouchability had run deep roots in the hearts and minds of of the caste Hindus who arrogated themselves a superior suit. ... The Vishva Hindu Parishad tried and was successful in the last Prayag (Allahabad) Sammelan (congress) in putting forth a resolution condemning this practice of untouchability in un-equivocal terms by the Mathadhipaties (leaders of the Maths, will say gig and important Hindu centres and monasteries), which was forcefully supported by various religious heads. 16
Nearly 36 dharmacharyas (theological authorities), Jagatgurus (great religious leaders) and leading Swamis (monks) signed a resolution condemning practice of untouchability ...". It becomes clear here that the Hindutvavadis divide up the Hindu into two classes: 1st the Savarnas practising the caste system and 2nd those people condemning that system.Apart from the Hindutvavadis, the most important Hindu authorities of India are belonging to the second ones today. Anti-Hindu propaganda attempts to mislead the world public by means of systematic misinformation, spreading the totally absurd lie that the Hindutva movement might be inspired by caste spirit.
The reason for this campaign lies in the fact that the Hindutvavadis have taken over the lead-ership of the Hinduism, have begun to eradicate the caste spirit in the own lines, and in this way helped the Hinduism to become a world-wide equally ranked inter-cultural partner and competitor.
Not only the Islam but also the Hinduism has started to put an end to the religio-cultural colo-nialism.
29] Vakil, op. cit., p. 94 (4)
30] Quoted in Vakil, op. cit., p. 120 note 2
31], Vakil, op. cit., p. 94 (4)
32] Vakil, op. cit., p. 132
33] Vakil, op. cit., p. 132
34] Gandhi's simultaneously instigated anti-military 'Quit India!'-campaign should obviously prevent the anti-caste Hindus and all the Untouchables to prevail the congress and colonial power securing the caste society, a system the Mahatma never wanted to eradicate.
The so-called peaceful resistance and the draw of the Muslims against the Hindu would then have been used to this also.
35] Vakil, op. cit., p. 138 for
36] Vakil, op. cit., p. 138
37] Vakil, op. cit., p. 180
38] Times of India on July 24th, 1936, quoted by B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 56
39] A myth that is currently scattered too by the Pseudo-Secularists of the Congress Party and the left parties of India for tactical reasons: to gain more votes in the elections. Caste research proved the dependence on caste system too of of these religious communities for a long time. The disregard of these research results in the public discussion is used by the Savarnas of all religious communities to divide up the Dalits. Ambedkar himself knew the caste conditions of the Muslim community of India and described them en detail: "Take the caste system. Islam speaks of brotherhood. Everybody infers that Islam must be free from slavery and caste. ... But if slavery has gone, caste among Muslamans has remained. ... But facts for Bengal are enough to show that the Mahomedans observe not only caste but also untouchability." Am-bedkar particularly took in amiss that there is no social reform movement among the Muslims that he finds with the Hindu. In opposite: "Indeed, they oppose any change in their existing practices" (Pakistan: Social stagnation. WS vol. 8, p. 230).
40] Ambedkar decisively rejected in his writing: Pakistan or the Partition of India, Bombay 1940, every possible unity between Hindustan and (that not yet existing but thought as a country of the Indian Muslims) Pakistan: "The unity between Pakistan and Hindustan is a myth," because a "unity" an only be based on a common religious culture: "If unity is to be of an abiding character, it must be founded on a sense of kinship, in the feeling of being kindred. In short, it must be spiritual." However, such a spiritual kinship doesn't exist between Hindu and Muslims. Spiritual relatives are Hindus and Buddhists as the next sentence is illustrating: "Indeed, there is more spiritual unity between Hindustan and Burma than there is between Pakistan and Hindustan" (WS vol. 8, p. 66). Buddhism and Hinduism, therefore, are akin to each other; but Islam (and also Christianity) do not appertain to this family, because Pakistan, 17
that means the Indian Muslim community, "which, to repeat, is politically detachable from, socially hostile and spiritually alien to, the rest of India." To this rest, however, also counts Ambedkar his Neo Buddhists and Untouchables. In such a way, this introduction of heteroge-neity of the Indian Muslims has been radicalized by Ambedkar that he very hardly scolded the Hindu Mahasabha and Mahatma Gandhi because they did not want to accept the separation of Pakistan, rather assuming the possibility that the Muslims could live without any problems in the free India ruled by a majority of Hindus (cf., his article: Hindu alternative to Pakistan. WS vol. 8, p. 129 seq.). Ambedkar was one of the leading anti-Muslim ideologues and politicians who by cultural reasons stood up for the separation of India. In this regard the Hindutvavadis and Gandhi were overtaken by Ambedkar to the right. The extreme criticism of Ambedkar on the Hindu society never made him - and particularly here his absolute adherence to the dharma is very clear - to take into account to emigrate with his Untouchables to Pakistan; in-stead of this, he further let his caste associates in the Hindu caste society so wicked after him. Pakistan was "the obvious remedy" for the termination of the social stagnation of Muslims and of Hindus. Accordingly, he expected from the separation an improvement of the Hindu society he wanted to remain (and which he remained in) - for the benefit of the Untouch-ables!: "Unless there is unification of the Muslims who wish to separate from of the Hindus and unless there is liberation of each from the fear of domination by the other, there can be no doubt that this malaise of social stagnation want not be set right." (WS vol. 8, p. 248) Ambed-kar having to decide between Muslim (and Christian) culture on one side and Hindu dharma on the other one choose the Hindu Culture. His historic decision for Hindustan and against Pakistan shows that Ambedkar knew very well that the liberation of the Dalits couldn't be realised in Muslim or Christian societies although propagating social equality but only within the Hindu society although he was criticising it all the time. The reason may be the historic experience that neither the Christian rulers nor the Muslim conquerors although in power never changed the fate of the Untouchables. The only chance of the Untouchables to get emancipation is within the Hindu society which can be changed by her own moral arguments (revival of the Buddhist compassion) and her own political power (reinforcement of democ-racy).
41] Vakil, op. cit., p. 177: "However, culturally as Ambedkar thought the Buddhism what not different from Hinduism. Therefore the Indian Culture absorbed other religions having their origin in India. The Indian culture removed the separate entities of Buddhism and Jainism." Then Vakil gives the striking argument that Ambedkar understood the Buddhists and other Indo-genous communities as Hindus: "Ambedkar must be in the know of this therefore in the Indian Constitution Buddhist, Jain and Sikh people are treated as Hindus."
42a] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 57
42b] B. A. M. Paradkar, op. cit. In: Wilkinson, p. 57
43] Cf., Journal of Religious Culture No. 05b

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Dalits in U.P. face hunger deaths and suicides

S.R.Darapuri
U.P. has the distinction of having 3.51 crores of Scheduled Castes (SCs) at 2001 census constituting 21.1 % of the total population (16.6 crores) of the state. U.P. holds 1st rank and the 4th rank in terms of absolute number of SC population and its proportion to total population respectively among all the States and UTs. The state has a total of sixty six (66) Schedules Castes. U.P. has also got the distinction of having a Dalit lady Miss Mayawati as Chief Minister for the fourth time. U.P. has also won the distinction of being one the most under developed states of India. It has got the largest number of illiterate, malnourished persons, polio, leprosy and TB cases.
The SCs in U.P. are predominantly rural as 87.7 % of them live in villages. Their literacy rate is 46.3 % which is much lower than the national average (54.7 %) aggregated for all SCs. Male and female literacy rates (60.3 % and 30.5 % respectively) among the SCs is also lower than those recorded for all SCs at he national level (66.6 % and 41.9% respectively ).
Among the SCs literates, 38 % are either without any educational level or have attained education below primary level. The proportions of literates who have attained education up to primary and middle levels are 27.1 % and 18.5 % respectively. Literates who are educated up to matric/higher secondary constitute 13.3 %. Graduated & above are just 3.5%. The non-technical and technical diploma holders constitute a meager 0.1 % only.
Out of the total 133 lakhs SC children in the age group 5-14 years, 58.3 lakhs only have been attending school constituting 56.4 percent. As many as 45.1 lakh (44.6%) children in the corresponding age group have not been going to the school.
Work participation rate (WPR) of the SC population is 34.7 % which is lower than that of all SCs at the national level (40.4 %). Among the total workers, 65.2 % are main workers, which is lower than that recorded for all SCs at the national level (73 %).
"Agriculture Labourers" constitute the highest proportion (42.5 %) among the total SCs workers. This is lower than the national average 45.6 % recorded by all SCs in this category. 'Cultivators' constitute 30.9 % which is significantly higher than the national average (20.0 %). 'Other Workers' account for 22.2 % against the national average of 30.5 percent. Workers in House Hold Industry (HHI) constitute 4.3 %, which is higher than the national average (3.9 %).
Hinduism is the predominant religion of the state (80.6 %). The SCs profess Hinduism account for 99.3 %. Remaining SCs follow Buddhism (0.6 %) and Sikhism (0.1 %).
From the above statistics of 2001 census, it is clear that U.P. Dalits (SCs) are quite backward as compared with Dalits at the national level. This is not withstanding the fact that a Dalit Chief Minister is ruling this state for the fourth time since1995 with some gaps in between.
So the question arises as to what has happened to the Dalits of U.P. during all these years of so called 'Dalit Rule'. It is a serious question which needs to be discussed in detail and in depth at some later stage.
The main question which needs immediate attention of all concerned with dalits' plight in U.P. is, the ever increasing number of suicides and hunger deaths among dalits as well as other weaker sections of society especially in the BundelKhand region consisting of Jhansi, Chitrakoot, Jalaun, Lalitpr, Mahoba and Banda districts. The main reason for this situation is the rain failure for the last five years resulting in loss of crops and wages for the agriculture labourers who are predominantly Dalits of Kol and Sahriya castes. Not only higher caste farmers but even dalit farmers are committing suicides due to crop failure and indebtedness. The agriculture labourers are dying of hunger, malnutrion and unemployment. This region has been identified with Vidharba region of Maharashtra where as many as 4,453 farmers have committed suicides during 2006. It is reported that as many as 200 farmers had committed suicides and another 250 had died of hunger deaths in Bundelkhand during the last five years. Out of this Dalits' share is about 30 % among suicides and 70 % among hunger deaths. 80 % Dalits are on the verge of hunger deaths. As many as 12 Dalits in Bundelkhand and 11 dalits in other districts of U.P. committed suicide and as many 25 Dalits died of hunger deaths during the year 2007 only.
In the face of this horrifying calamity the so called Dalit Chief Minister Ms. Mayawati had the temerity to claim during a party rally at Jhansi on 29.01.08 that not a single man had died either of hunger death or had committed suicide in U.P. She also declared that she will scrap the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (NREGP) when she adorns the chair of Prime Minister at Delhi. NREGP aims at providing 100 days' assured employment to rural labour families. Her claim of 'zero death' and declaration of scrapping NREGP at this juncture is shocking. The need of the hour is to save Dalits and other poor families and farmers by providing succor and relief but she has totally denied the existence of such emergency. In response to her claim of 'No Death', Social Organization like Dalit Mukti Morcha; P.U.C.L; Asha Parivar; Shudra Mahaabha and Ayodhya Ki Awaz have come out with the lists of the Dalits who had died of hunger deaths and had committed suicides during 2007 i.e. during Mayawati's tenure as Chief Minister. This list has been published in a Hindi news paper titled "Daily News Activist" on 3.2.08 published from Lucknow. The interested persons may like to have a look at it. These social organizations had also arranged a Dharna (Protest) before U.P. Assembly on 2.2.08 against Mayawati's apathy towards U.P. Dalits' misery. They also submitted a memorandum to the Governor of U.P; National Commission for Scheduled Castes; National Commission for Human Rights; Minister for Social Justice and Empowerment (Govt. of India) and Minister for Rural Development (Govt. of India) requesting them to get the whole matter enquired by some Independent Enquiry Commission as the State Govt. has refused to take notice of this catastrophe. They have also demanded the honest implementation of various development and public welfare schemes e.g. National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme; Public Distribution System and Pension Schemes for widows, handicapped and old age persons as these schemes have fallen prey to brutal corruption under Mayawati's corrupt misrule.

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Neo Buddhists are far ahead of Hindu Dalits- Dr. Shura Darapuri

Neo Buddhists are far ahead of Hindu Dalits-  Dr. Shura Darapuri

 Dr. B.R.Ambedkar, on 31st May, 1936, in his address to a public meeting at Dadar (Bombay) on the subject of "why go for conversion?" said, "I should like to impress this thing on your minds very clearly that religion is for man and not man for religion. If you want to organize yourself, change your religion. If you want to gain self respect change your religion. If you want to create a society which ensures cooperation, and brotherhood change your religion. If you want to achieve power, change your religion. If you want equality, change your religion. If you want independence, change your religion. If you want to make this world happy in which you live, change your religion." On 14th October, 1956 after converting to Buddhism at Nagpur Dr. Ambedkar remarked," Today I have got a new birth." Now let us see as to what extent the objectives and gains of Buddhist conversion as outlined by Dr. Ambedkar have been achieved or have accrued to the new converts known as Neo Buddhists. First of all it will be proper to see the strength of the Buddhists gained so far. As per the figures of 2001 census report the total population of Buddhists in India stands at 79.55 lacs which is 0.8 percent of the total population of India. It includes a small number of traditional Buddhists. Maharashtra state has the largest Buddhist population of 58.38 lacs followed by Karnatka (3.93 lacs) and Uttar Pardesh (3.02 lacs). The rate of growth of Buddhist population during 1991-2001 has been 24.56 percent which can be said to be quite encouraging. These statistics also show that Buddhist population has surpassed the Jain population. Now when we look into the qualitative changes in the lives of Neo Buddhists vis-à-vis the Hindu Dalits we find that they are far ahead on many scores. As per 2001 census repot comparison of Neo Buddhists and Hindu Dalits on the following scores indicates a significant improvement in the lives of Neo Buddhist:- 

1. Sex Ratio: The sex ratio of female and male among Neo Buddhists is 953 per thousand as compared with 936 of Hindu Dalits. It indicates that the position of women in Neo Buddhist families is far better than that of Hindu Dalits. It is quite in accordance with the high status of women in Buddhist society. This ratio is higher than Hindus (931), Muslims (936), Sikhs (893) and Jains (940). 

 2. Sex Ratio of Children (0-6 years): According to 2001 census report the sex ratio of girls and boys among Neo Buddhists is 942 as compared with 938 of Hindu Dalits. This sex ratio is much higher than Hindus (925), Sikhs (786), and Jains (870). It shows that girls enjoy better care and protection among Neo Buddhists as compared with Hindu Dalit families. 

3. Literacy Rate: Literacy rate of Neo Buddhists is 72.7 percent which is much higher than that of Hindu Dalits (54.70 percent). This rate is also much higher than that of Hindus (65.1), Muslims (59.1) and Sikhs (69.4).It shows that Neo Buddhists are more literate than Hindu Dalits.

 4. Literacy RateFemale : The literacy rate of Neo Buddhist women is 61.7 percent as compared with 41.9 percent of Hindu Dalit women. This rate is also higher than that of Hindus (53.2) and Muslims (50.1). It is in accordance with the status of women in Buddhist society. It shows that females among Neo Buddhists are getting more educated than Hindu Dalit females. 

5. Work Participation Rate: This rate for Neo Buddhists is 40.6 percent which is higher than 40.4 percent for Hindu Dalits. This rate is also higher than that of Hindus (40.4), Muslims (31.3) Christians (39.3), Sikhs (31.7), and Jains (32.7).It indicates that Neo Buddhists are more employed than Hindu Dalits.

 The above comparative study of the status and conditions of Neo Buddhists indicates that they are far ahead of Hindu Dalits on various parameters e.g. sex ratio, girl and boy (0-6 years) sex ratio, literacy, women literacy and work participation rate. It is definitely the result of change of religion which has liberated them from the bondage of caste and inferiority complex. Apart from the above various studies have also shown that Dalits who have followed Dr. Ambedkar and got converted to Buddhism have progressed in all the fields of life as compared with Hindu Dalits. Neo Buddhists have changed their occupations by leaving low paid and dirty professions. Better education has opened for them new opportunities for advancement. They give more importance to the education of their children resulting in higher rate of literacy. They are more self respecting and assertive in their rights. They have become self makers, self dependent and competitive. They have grown intellectually. Their women and children enjoy better status in family and society. They have become enlightened and are saved from religious exploitation and bigotry. Thus Buddhism has definitely liberated them spiritually and materially. This study shows that Buddhism is really a liberating philosophy for Dalits. The Neo Buddhists have made more progress than Hindu Dalits. They should become good Buddhists and should become role models for Hindu Dalits.

New Buddhism for
New Aspirations
Navayana Buddhism of Ambedkar and
His Followers

Virginia Hancock
Ambedkar wrote The Buddha
and His Dhamma with the
intent of creating a single
text for new Buddhists to read
and follow. His introduction outlines
four ways in which previous
understandings of Buddhist doctrine
are lacking:

The Buddha could not have had
his first great realization simply
because he encountered an old
man, a sick man, and a dying man.
It is unreasonable and therefore
false to assume that the Buddha
did not have previous knowledge
of something so common.

The Four Noble truths “make the
gospel of the Buddha a gospel of
pessimism.” If life is composed
entirely of suffering then there is
no incentive for change.

The doctrines of no-soul, karma,
and rebirth are incongruous. It is
illogical to believe that there can be
karma and rebirth without a soul.

The monk’s purpose has not
been presented clearly. Is he
supposed to be a “perfect man”
or a “social servant”?
As these rather sweeping
critiques of Buddhism suggest,
Ambedkar was comfortable in the
role of consciously restructuring his
chosen religion to meet the needs of
the Dalit community he spoke for.1
Several scholars have remarked
upon and analyzed this aspect of
This article begins with an overview of Navayana Buddhism from two perspectives, that of
Ambedkar himself, based on his “Buddhist gospel” The Buddha and His Dhamma, and that of
practioners in Maharashtra, based available academic scholarship. In the case of Ambedkar’s
understanding of Buddhism, I will focus mostly on the changes he made to more traditional
presentations of Buddhism.
In the case of Maharashtran practitioners, I will attempt to draw some broad conclusions
about their relationship to this relatively new religion. The centrality of the figure of Ambedkar
in Navayana Buddhism, as well as Navayana Buddhist’s lack of conformity with Ambedkar’s
understanding of Buddhist principles as articulated in The Buddha and His Dhamma, will
guide me in my conclusions about the ways outside observers might want to move forward
in the study of this relatively new religion.
No.145 18
N a v a y a n a
Buddhism. For
example, Adele
Fiske and
C h r i s t o p h
E m m r i c h
undertook a
detailed analysis
of Ambedkar’s use of the traditional
Buddhists texts in Pali in writing The
Buddha and His Dhamma.2 Fiske
and Emmrich examined Ambedkar’s
references in the original version of
The Buddha and His Dhamma and
describe patterns of alteration from
the presentation of Buddhism in the
Pali canon that they characterize as
omission, change in emphasis and
changed meaning through
interpolation or interpretation.3
Following are examples of the
type of changes Ambedkar made to
traditional presentations of the
Buddha’s teachings and the way in
which these changes might support
Dalit activism.
Ambedkar’s first major
reinterpretation involves the
Buddha’s reununciation of worldly
life. Whereas traditional biographies
of the Buddha emphasize the
empathy the young prince felt when
he first encountered human
sufferring, Ambedkar highlights the
strength of the Buddha’s social
conscience during a conflict over
water rights. According to
Ambedkar, the Buddha advocated a
rational and peaceful resolution of
an inter-tribe water conflict but was
unable to gain the necessary political
leverage because he lacked majority
vote. He then went into exile and
became a renunciant because it was
the only way to prevent his tribe
from going to war with their
neighbors. Ambedkar omits any
mention of old age, sickness, and
death (the forms of suffering the
Buddha is usually understood to
have encountered). In this way the
Buddha’s renunciation is motivated
more by political exigencies rather
than a desire to find the ultimate truth,
and he becomes a figure not unlike a
minority politician in contemporary
India. The discussion of water rights
was also a familiar topic after the
Mahad Satyagraha. These changes,
though unorthodox, create a
character for the Buddha that might
be easily understood by oppressed
communities, specifically Dalits.
The Four Noble Truths
Ambedkar interprets the Four
Noble truths similarly. His
description of the first sermon at Deer
Park follows:
“The centre of his Dhamma is
man and the relation of man to man
in his life on earth. This [the Buddha]
said was his first postulate. His
second postulate was that men are
living in sorrow, in misery and
poverty. The world is full of suffering
and how to remove this suffering
from the world is the only purpose
of Dhamma. Nothing else is Dhamma.
The recognition of the existence of
suffering and to show the way to
remove suffering is the foundation
and basis of his Dhamma…A
religion which fails to recognise this
is no religion at all…The Buddha
then told them that according to his
Dhamma if every person followed (1)
the Path of Purity; (2) the Path of
Righteousness; and (3) the Path of
virtue, it would bring about the end
of all suffering.”4
Ambedkar makes several
obvious changes to early Buddhist
doctrine. The first Noble Truth that
life is suffering becomes the “second
postulate,” and the most important
characteristic of Buddhism becomes
its concern for human relationships.
The second Noble Truth, that
suffering arises from mental craving,
is also described in social terms as
“sorrow, misery and poverty.” In
turn he refers to the third Noble Truth
regarding the cessation of suffering
as the “removal of suffering.”
Christopher Queen’s detailed
analysis of Ambedkar’s presentation
of the Four Noble Truths reveals still
more ways in which they have been
altered to create a message of social
activism. Queen notes that as the
Buddha’s teachings continue it
becomes clear that the Path of Purity
is the Five Precepts, the Path of
Righteousness is the Eightfold Path,
and the Path of Virture is the Ten
Paramitas, or perfections.5 Yet
Ambedkar does not present any of
these concepts in their traditional
format. The goal of the Eightfold
Path, for example, is “to remove
injustice and inhumanity that man
does to man,” rather than nirvana.6
Nirvana itself is then described as:
(1) a fundamental understanding
(In Ambedkar’s view)
Buddha’s renunciation
is motivated more by
political exigencies rather
than a desire find the
ultimate truth and he
becomes a figure
not unlike a minority
politician in
contemporary India.
(Ambedkar’s) Eightfold
Path, for example, is
to remove injustice and
inhumanity that man
does to man...there
is a distinct element
of anti-Brahmanism
in Ambedkar’s
rendering of the
Four Noble Truths.
No.145 19
“that there was
suffering in the
world, and (2) a
p r o a c t i v e
knowledge of
“how to remove
this suffering
and make
m a n k i n d
happy.”7
Buddhism and the Caste
System
These changes speak specifically
to Dalits in a number of ways. First,
there is a distinct element of anti-
Brahmanism in Ambedkar’s rendering
of the Four Noble Truths. “Nothing
else is Dhamma,” he states, and “a
religion which fails to recognize this
is no religion at all.” Although
Ambedkar does not criticize other
religions in this section—as he does
in other chapters of the book—this
and other statements bear close
resemblance to his earlier attack on
Hinduism. Here, Ambedkar again
legitimizes the use of Buddhism to
oppose traditions that are
unsatisfactory. Second, as Queen
notes, Ambedkar seems to believe
that the traditional presentation of
suffering—which places the “blame”
on the cravings of each individual—
would alienate Buddhism from the
socially and politically oppressed.8
Thus suffering is described in
transitory, but more graphic, terms
as “sorrow”, “misery”, and
“poverty.” These largely social
conditions are remedied quite
differently from the traditional
Buddhist understanding of suffering
as an intricate network of mental
cravings. This change also speaks
of the fact that the traditional focus
on craving might have lent itself to
manipulation by people in power,
who could advocate renunciation
instead of response to the materially
based claims of the dispossessed.
Third, by placing the Four Noble
Truths, the Eightfold Path, and the
Ten Perfections in a social context
he provides religious justification for
peoples’ social movements. Lastly,
and perhaps most importantly, his
definition of nirvana is not only
easily understandable but also
theoretically attainable within a
single lifetime.
Concept of Rebirth and the
Role of the Monk
Ambedkar’s explanation of
karma and rebirth further legitimizes
both the source and the goal of social
action. He defends the concept of
rebirth but changes the concept of
the soul. Each time a person is reborn
his or her soul is divided and
recombined with parts of many other
peoples’ souls. There is thus no
single soul that is reborn over and
over again.9 In this way Ambedkar
establishes that there is no
inheritance of traits from one lifetime
to the next—a direct rebuttal to the
widespread views of caste. This in
turn negates the idea that current
social injustices are a result of past
misdeeds and assures Dalit converts
that their new framework does not
contain the possibility for religiously
sanctioned hierarchy. He also
explains that karma works only
within one lifetime and cannot affect
future lives.10 A this-worldly
emphasis on karma gives added
significance to societal changes, as
each life is now a unique and
unrepeatable opportunity for change
and growth. Whereas traditional
conceptions of karma and rebirth
render material changes insignificant
on a cosmological scale, Ambedkar’s
reinterpretation implies that such
changes actually have ultimate
importance. In this way oppressed
peoples are vindicated in their sense
of social outrage and are informed
once again of the importance of
political or social struggle.
Ambedkar’s reinterpretation of
the role of the monk provides a final
illustration that Buddhism takes a
proactive stance towards radical
change. Monks should not be
content merely to serve society—
they are instead the active
participants and creators of history.
He writes that the bhikkhu’s duties
are to proselytize for Buddhism and
serve the laity. The bhikkhu is
commanded specifically to “fight to
spread Dhamma.”11 “We wage war,
O disciples, therefore we are called
warriors.” Ambedkar’s Buddha tells
his disciples, “Where virtue is in
danger do not avoid fighting, do not
be mealy-mouthed.”12 Monks are not
hermetic ascetics who are focused
on the attainment of otherworldly
states. Rather they constitute the
driving force behind a revolution in
mind and body.
Ambedkar establishes
that there is no
inheritance of traits
from one lifetime to the
next—a direct rebuttal
to the Gandhian view
of caste. This in turn
negates the idea that
current social injustices
are a result
of past misdeeds.
Ambedkar’s Buddha tells
his disciples, “Where
virtue is in danger do not
avoid fighting, do not be
mealy-mouthed.” Monks
are not hermetic ascetics
who are focused on
the attainment of
otherworldly states.
No.145 20
Ambedkar’s Buddhism in
Practice
The Buddhism
one finds in daily
life and practice
can differ
significantly from
the principles
described in The
Buddha and his
Dhamma.13 These
differences vary according to
location andsocioeconomicsituation
and range from minute
reinterpretations to fundamental
contradictions. Polarizing concepts
include karma, rebirth, dharma,
meditation, spirituality, materialism,
politics, individuality and social
action. Varying social categories
include the urban, rural, educated,
uneducated, and in many cases, old
and young. Thus, on the one hand
forms of Navayana Buddhist practice
can differ from each other quite
significantly in terms of both form and
content. This will be illustrated
through a simple comparison
between certain studies of rural
Buddhists and members of the
TBMSG. On the other hand, the
figure of Ambedkar provides a clear
and unifying link between different
Buddhist practitioners.
Buddhism in Two Rural
Villages
Two studies of rural villages in
Maharashtra show that differences
between Navayana Buddhism and
Ambedkar’s understanding of
Buddhism can stem more from the
inevitable overlap of religion and
culture than from the type of
conscious religious reconstruction
that Ambedkar engaged in. One must
not extrapolate their conclusions onto
the rest of the Navayana Buddhist
community; however the picture
presented is useful in gaining a sense
she documents the persistence of
traditional Hindu concepts of karma,
dharma, and the transmigration of the
soul.18
Burra characterizes the religious
practice of rural Mahars as
fundamentally Hindu with a Buddhist
exterior. For example, she describes
how the premarriage activities of the
Mahars are still Hindu (one example
is matching horoscopes), yet the
marriage ceremony itself consists of
placing garlands over the bride and
groom as they stand in front of
pictures of Ambedkar and the
Buddha.19 This dichotomy between
private Hindu practice and public
Buddhist practice marks other rituals
as well.
At the same time, Burra notes that
Navayana Buddhists now participate
with great enthusiasm in Hindu
festivals and ceremonies that were
previously forbidden to them.20 This
and other positive changes leave her
with the conclusion that the Dalit
Buddhist movement is a “symbol of
identity transformation” rather than
a true religious conversion.21 “The
Buddhist identity is important mainly
for the outside world,” she writes,
“There is an attempt to emphasize
one’s distinctiveness and this is
achieved by different methods. The
inner core may remain Hindu but this
in no way reflects a betrayal of the
cause.”22 Thus rural Dalit Buddhist
practice is distinguished from other
forms of Buddhism primarily by its
continued reliance on Hindu themes
and rituals.23
This seems to suggest that the
many radical departures from
Ambedkar’s message are caused by
a blurred distinction between Hindu
culture and Indian culture. Even the
beginning of Ambedkar’s political
career was marked by ambivalence
about what constitutes Hinduism
of the range of Navayana Buddhist
practice.
For example, Timothy Fitzgerald
concludes that although rural
Mahars have begun to refuse to
perform traditional duties such as
scavenging and have given up the
practice of eating beef, their
recognition and practice of sub-caste
hierarchy and untouchability, lack of
intercaste marriage, and worship of
Hindu gods and goddesses is
evidence that they practice “the kind
of Buddhism which has not really
changed anybody or anything very
radically.”14
Neera Burra’s study of village life
provides different detail. She notes
that although 70 out of the 102
respondents to her research
questionnaire classified themselves
as Buddhist, none of them had taken
Ambedkar’s 22 vows.15 She argues
that this reflects both a lack of
knowledge about the vows and a
general hesitancy to take oaths that
characterizes rural society.16
Additionally, there were statues of
Hindu gods and goddesses—
alongside pictures of Ambedkar and
the Buddha—in every household she
visited.17 Over half of the people she
interviewed said that they prayed to
all gods, including Hindu deities, and
Dalit Buddhist movement
is a “symbol of identity
transformation” rather
than a true
religious conversion.
“The Buddhist identity
is important mainly for
the outside world,”...The
inner core may remain
Hindu but this in no
way reflects a betrayal
of the cause.”
No.145 21
and what
c o n s t i t u t e s
I n d i a n
culture.24 For
example he
participated,
a l b e i t
marginally, in a
temple entry
campaign—even as he denounced
Brahmans and traditional Hindu
religiosity in writings such as
Annihilation of Caste. It should
therefore come as no surprise that
some rural Buddhists have used their
newfound self-confidence to engage
in traditionally Hindu forms of
worship, as many societal roles that
are available for reclamation are also
related to Hinduism in some way.
International Linkages
The TBMSG is the Indian branch
of the international Buddhist
organization named the Friends of
the Western Buddhist Order
(FWBO), founded in London by
Sangharakshita in 1967. The FWBO
describes its purpose as “return[ing]
to the basic principles of Buddhism
and find[ing] ways of living them out
in the context of the modern
West.”25 The FWBO became
involved in the Indian Buddhist
movement, particularly in
Maharashtra, when several members
of its order came to India to teach
Buddhism in the late 1970’s. The
TBMSG now has twenty centres
located throughout India and runs a
network of social services
organizations.
Fitzgerald goes so far as to assert
that Buddhists who are associated
with the TBMSG represent the more
“spiritual” side of Navayana
Buddhism.26 Their interpretation of
Buddhism is compatible with
Ambedkar’s because it emphasizes
rationality, moral action, and social
reform. However, the TBMSG strives
for total political nonpartisanship
and many of its members view
nirvana not in materialist terms but
as a transcendent state of awareness.
Johannes Beltz’ study of the
TBMSG in Maharashtra provides
more information on the type of
Buddhism that Fitzgerald seems to
be describing. He interviewed
several members of the TBMSG at a
retreat center outside Pune, many of
who described a Buddhist message
of increased spirituality. For example,
one practitioner explained:
“I was born Buddhist. But in
reality, no one can be Buddhist
without practicing the dhamma. To
be Buddhist from birth is not
possible…I took refuge in the
Buddha, the dhamma, and the
sangha. I think that I am on the path
of the Buddha. I want to become a
dhammamitra (a lay leader in the
TBMSG). A Buddhist is more than a
physical man. He is spiritual…I
would like to become 100%
Buddhist.”27
Another told him:
“I consider myself Buddhist
because I believe not in God but in
humanity. I practice Buddhism. I
want to positively develop my
personality and help
others…Through meditation, we
augment our state of consciousness
to become better men.”28
These statements embody the
spirituality and humanism of
Buddhism as envisioned by
Sangharakshita, the founder of the
FWBO. Meditation lies at the center
of individual practice, and only
through knowing oneself does one
enter a state where he or she truly
begins to help others. In addition,
these practitioners negate a
materialistic understanding of the
world. “A Buddhist is more than a
physical man,” one states, “He is
spiritual.” This explains why “no one
can be Buddhist without practicing
the dhamma”: meditation and action
are two aspects of the same teaching,
and to engage in one without the
other is, according to the TBMSG,
to ignore the meaning of Buddhism.
Several of the individuals Beltz
interviewed also made a distinction
between “Dalit Buddhists” who do
not practice and “real Buddhists”
who do. “The Dalit movement
results in bad social conditions for
untouchables,” one dhammachari
asserts, “It is for politics. The Dalit
movement does not have a positive
approach to Buddhism…My
personal experience is different. I
have developed my personality. I do
not call myself Dalit. I consider
myself Buddhist.”29 An employee at
the University of Pune went so far
as to state, “The leaders of the Dalit
movement are selfish and corrupt.
They are demagogues and want to
suppress other currents of Buddhist
thought. They waste a lot of energy,
time, and money…The TBMSG
serenely runs the Buddhist
movement and continues the
work of Dr. Ambedkar with
respect….There is no love between
the activists.”30
Victory over Caste
The disparate practices of some
Maharashtran Buddhists offer a
cautionary statement for those who
may be eager to equate Ambedkar’s
thinking about Buddhism directly
with that of Dalit communities.
Ambedkar, Ambedkar’s Buddhism,
and Buddhist communities are
merely the loci for numerous personal
and communal interactions that
comprise the forms of Navayana
Buddhism. In theory, The Buddha
and His Dhamma would serve as the
philosophical, ideological, and
religious template for Buddhists, and
my own experiences with Navayana
No.145 22
Buddhists in
New Delhi
would suggest
that this is
i n d e e d
possible. As D.
C. Ahir states,
“The Buddha
and His
Dhamma is a true guide for all the
Buddhists. It is the best basis for
propagating the Dhamma, at least in
India”.31 There are plausible models
that would explain how a narrative
text such as The Buddha and His
Dhamma could become the “just
governance” for society that
Ambedkar holds a good religion
should be.32 However, the above
review of scholarship suggests that
The Buddha and His Dhamma does
not occupy a central place in all
Navayana Buddhists’ lives.
Given the differences in
Navayana Buddhist practice, how
are we to understand the religion as
a whole? The element of Navayana
Buddhism that seeks to separate
itself from Hinduism provides one
link between an uninformed
adoption of Buddhism and an
almost instantaneous increase in
self-esteem and perception of selfworth.
Even if converts do not
remember each of Ambedkar’s
twenty-two vows, for example, they
are bound to remember the central
theme of rejection of Hinduism.
Thus many Dalit Buddhists
understand what Buddhism is not
before they focus on what it is. The
conversion experience can be
powerful because the ideological
victory over caste is expressed in
concrete actions on the part of the
convert.
At the same time, however, the
shift away from the Hindu caste
system is highly nuanced. As
Burra’s study shows, the Mahar
rejection of caste does not always
entail rejection of Hindusim. When
the rural Buddhist she studied align
themselves with Buddhism they
An Exemplary Prophet
Lynch’s interest lies in
investigating why and how
Ambedkar, a Mahar, was so fully
accepted and integrated into Jatav
culture. To this end, he provides
several comparisons between Jatav
myths of origin and a new “myth of
origin” that was presented by
Ambedkar. He views Ambedkar as a
Weberian “exemplary prophet” who
has now become the “chief hero” of
the myth that he himself created.33
Lynch seems to imply that the entire
“Neo-Buddhist myth” is
encapsulated by Ambedkar’s
explanation of the origins of the
caste system and the way in which
Dalits ended up at its bottom. This
would not hold true for other
Buddhist communities such as the
TBMSG, however.
Alternatively, what if the figure
of Ambedkar is the defining element
of Navayana Buddhism? Even such
differing communities as the rural
Buddhists examined and the TBMSG
share their veneration for him. A
public debate between Gopal Guru,
a Buddhist and professor at the
University of Pune, and
Dhammacari Lokamitra, a member of
the TBMSG, supports this
hypothesis. Though these men
articulated very different opinions
about the relative weight of the
“spiritual” versus the “political”
aspects of Buddhism, they both
returned to Ambedkar for
justification of their arguments.
Lokamitra wrote, “I am afraid the
project Gopal Guru is talking about
is not that of Ambedkar but of those
who have attempted to use
Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism
to serve their own political ends”.34
Guru offered the following rejoinder:
“Lokamitra and his TBMSG are free
to sell their package of spiritual
Buddhism and synthesise it with
adopt a new social and
psychological paradigm that can
often be characterized foremost by
the victory of equality over caste;
only secondary is the victory of
Buddhist practice over Hindu
practice.
As another possibility, Owen
Lynch has applied an academic
understanding of myth to the
development of Navayana
Buddhism. He uses it to explain the
way that Ambedkar became a cultural
hero and icon of Buddhism for the
Jatavs in Agra, a group that has
significant linguistic and cultural
differences from the Mahars. He
suggests that there is a “Neo-
Buddhist” myth that provides
motivation and strategy for the
community it serves.
Even if converts did not
remember...many Dalit
Buddhists understand
what Buddhism is not
before they focus on
what it is.
Mahar rejection of
caste does not always
entail rejection of
Hindusim... they adopt
a new social and
psychological paradigm
that is characterized
foremost by the victory of
equality over caste; only
secondary is the victory of
Buddhist practice over
Hindu practice.
No.145 23
anything but
not with
Ambedkar ’s
B u d d h i s m .
Because it does
not allow such
synthesis.”35
Both judged the
o t h e r ’ s
reasoning as flawed specifically on
the grounds that it represents a
misinterpretation of Ambedkar’s
message. As Guru acknowledged, he
was bothered not so much by the
TBMSG’s false Buddhist doctrine as
he is by the fact that it has been
associated with Ambedkar.
Ambedkar’s figure fills in the
gaps that are left by the explanations
of origin and anti-Brahmanism. He is
the inspiration, motivation, and
justification for the Dalit Buddhist
movement. His life illustrates the
possibilities of the future, and since
his death those possibilities have
become the center of much of
contemporary Navayana Buddhism.
Ambedkar is in this view both
founder and standard-bearer of
contemporary Navayana Buddhism.
Evaluation and Conclusions
In 1956 Dr. B. R. Ambedkar led
over 50,000 Dalits in a mass
conversion to Buddhism. This act
was the first of many mass
conversions of low cast Hindus to
Buddhism. Today estimates range
from between three million and ten
million Buddhists in India, most of
whom are Dalit.36
For years there was little
scholarly material on Buddhism and
the Ambedkarite movement, save a
few examples such as the pioneering
work of the American historian
Eleanor Zelliot.37 Contrast this with
a recent conference on Indic
Religions in New Delhi held by the
International Association of the
History of Religions, where there
were two entire panels composed of
academics prepared to speak of their
research on the subject “Dalits and
Buddhism.” “Navayana”, “Dalit”,
or “Ambedkarite” Buddhism
(depending on who is speaking) is
also actively discussed by the
worldwide “engaged Buddhist”
community. The intellectual
discourse surrounding Ambedkar’s
understanding of Buddhism and
those who follow in his footsteps
has now grown to the point where it
is able to have a fruitful dialogue
even within itself.38
In turn, at this point it may be
useful for outside observers of
Navayana Buddhism to begin to
consider not only what Navayana
Buddhism is but also how and why
we should examine it.
First, a discussion of Navayana
Buddhist texts or canon must include
all of Ambedkar’s writing, not just
The Buddha and His Dhamma, as a
starting point. As the above
examples highlight, Ambedkar’s life
is usually viewed as the embodiment,
rather than the vehicle, of the
Buddha’s teachings. In theory,
Ambedkar’s significance leads to the
logical conclusion that, just as most
Buddhists’ veneration of Ambedkar
is not limited to the events
surrounding his conversion, so too
the texts which are understood as
contributing to Navayana Buddhism
should not be limited to The Buddha
and His Dhamma. In practice, many
Buddhists already impart religious
significance to Ambedkar’s other
political and sociological works. This
is readily apparent in D.C. Ahir’s
commentary on the Round Table
Conference, for example, which views
Ambedkar’s comments as the
embodiments of the principle of
Right Speech.39
Clearly this inclusive approach
may have its limits. Are we to view
Ambedkar’s doctoral dissertation at
Columbia as religious texts? Likely
not. Nor do I propose to delineate
here between those texts that should
be included in a Navayana Buddhist
canon and those that should not.
Rather this should be understood as
an idea to generate discussion and a
helpful approach to the study of
Ambedkar’s Navayana Buddhism. I
believe, however, that Buddhist
practitioners will ultimately be the
final arbiters in this matter.
Second, where are the studies of
urban, often professional, Navayana
Buddhists and the corresponding
surge in online Navayana Buddhist
communities? In New Delhi, for
example, I came to know several
Buddhists whose meditation
practice and highly informed
understanding of Ambedkar and
Buddhism bears little resemblance to
the conversions described in some
studies of rural Buddhists. There is
a need for scholarship of these
thriving Navayana Buddhist
communities among those who do
research in Marathi and Hindi. There
are also online forums for Navayana
Buddhists and websites on Dalit
rights that would provide valuable
material for those doing work in
English.40
Third, an attempt to describe
Navayana Buddhism through appeal
to the “essential” elements of
Buddhism that may exist in early texts
must be considered carefully. Surely
there are continuities between
traditional understandings of
Buddhism and Ambedkar’s
reinterpretation, but whether or not
these constitute some “essential”
Buddhism to be passed down from
movement to movement is unclear.
Furthermore, stressing this aspect of
Ambedkar’s writing when analyzing
it in the context of other Buddhist
traditions may be overly limiting. This
No.145 24
is not to deny
the importance
of showing that
Ambedkar ’s
interpretation
is, in many
w a y s ,
legitimate from
the standpoint
of the Buddha’s teachings. Such a
project is a necessary part of
religious dialogue and
reinterpretation. However, one must
not lose sight of the “essential”
Navayana when determining its
relationship to “essential”
Buddhism. In this sense it would be
a shame if we fail to capitalize on its
most salient characteristic: a
confident and rational departure
from inherited patterns of thought.
Finally,the study of Navayana
Buddhism needs to be as
interdisciplinary as possible. Why
limit the study of Navayana
Buddhism to certain disciplines
when Ambedkar himself was
unencumbered by the traditional
boundaries between political,
personal, and spiritual
empowerment? The modern
Buddhist movement in India may be
as fundamentally related to
economics and development as it is
to politics and religion. Take, for
example, Amartya Sen’s well-known
Development as Freedom. Seen in
this light, Ambedkar’s project might
be understood as a project of human
development through religious
conversion.
Focusing for a moment on the
subject of religion and development,
two additional suggestions can be
made. First, those who wish to study
development in India might take the
impact of Navayana Buddhism into
account. Has conversion had a
significant material impact on
practitioners’ lives and if so, how?
Given the fact that Ambedkar’s view
of religious conversion is integrally
tied to his goals of social
identity as Dalit and the past and
present connotations that are
associated with this. Although thus
far the body of writing that examines
Ambedkar and Navayana Buddhism
has been a positive development
with respect to Navayana Buddhism,
perhaps now is a good time to
remind ourselves that we must be
careful not to intellectualize
Navayana Buddhism to the extent
that we lose sight of the fact that it is
fundamentally a religion by and for
the politically and socially
oppressed.
This paper was presented at the First
Conference on Religions in the Indic
Civilisation organised in Delhi by
CSDS and IAHR from December
18-21, 2003
Endnotes
1 See Christopher Queen, “Dr.
Ambedkar and the Hermeneutics of
Buddhist Liberation,” in Engaged
Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation
Movements in Asia, Ed. Christopher
S. Queen and Sallie B. (State
University of New York Press 1996),
45 for a useful analysis of Ambedkar
as a modern or postmodern man.
2 See Adele Fiske and Christoph
Emmrich, “The use of Buddhist
Scriptures in B. R. Ambedkar’s The
Buddha and His Dhamma”, in
Surendra Jondhale and Johannes Beltz,
eds., Reconstructing the World: B. R.
Ambedkar and Buddhism in India
(Oxford University Press 2004). See
also Queen 48, and Richard Taylor,
“The Ambedkarite Buddhists,” in
Ambedkar and the Neo-Buddhist
Movement, Ed. T.S. Wilkinson and M.
M. Thomas (Christian Literature
Society 1972), 148.
3 Fiske and Emmrich, 10.
4 B. R. Ambedkar, “The Buddha and His
Dhamma,” in Dr. Babasaheb
Ambedkar Writings and Speeches, Vol.
XXI, Comp. Vasant Moon (Education
Department of Maharashtra 1992),
at 121-122.
5 Queen, 56.
6 See Queen, at 57.
7 Ibid.
We must be careful not
to intellectualize
Navayana Buddhism to
the extent that we lose
sight of the fact that is
fundamentally a religion
by and for the politically
and socially oppressed.
One must not lose sight
of the “essential”
Navayana when
determining its relationship
to “essential” Buddhism.
Its most salient
characteristic is a
confident and rational
departure from inherited
patterns of thought.
empowerment for Dalits, it seems like
a missed opportunity not to consider
this religious movement within the
greater scheme of Indian
development. This may be true
despite the oft-prevailing view of
religion as an anathema to
progressive societal transformation.
Second, the context in which
Navayana Buddhist practice takes
place must not be forgotten by
outside observers. The picture of
human development for Dalits in
India is stark. Although I would
hesitate before projecting bleak
contours on the lives of all Navayana
Buddhist communities, it does seem
safe to assert that this is at least the
general context in which they live,
and that even if many Navayana
Buddhists who are Dalits have
gained upward social mobility they
are still aware of their distinct
No.145 25
8 Queen, 59.
9 Ambedkar, 333.
10 Ambedkar, 340.
11 Ambedkar, 447.
12 Ibid.
13 Note that the bulk of the research for
this paper was completed between May
2000 and May 2001. Although I think
the main conclusions still hold, there
may be scholarship that is not included
here and which would add additional
nuance to the picture portrayed.
14 Timothy Fitzgerald, “Buddhism in
Maharashtra: a Tri-Partite Analysis—
A Research Report,” in Dr. Ambedkar,
Buddhism, and Social Change, Ed.
A.K. Narain and D. C. Ahir (B. R.
Publishing Corporation 1994), 20.
15 Neera Burra, “Buddhism, Conversion
and Identity: A Case Study of Village
Mahars”, in Caste: Its 20th Century
Avatar, ed. M.N. Srinivas (Penguin
India 1997), 160.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 161.
18 Ibid., 161-62.
19 Ibid., 165.
20 Ibid., 166.
21 Ibid., 168.
22 Ibid.
23 Fitzgerald, 20.
24 See Gauri Viswanathan, Outside the
Fold: Religion, Modernity and
Belief (Princeton University Press
1998), 235.
25 Friends of the Western Buddhist Order,
“The FWBO and the Buddhist
Tradition”, available at http://
www.fwbo.org/tradition.html.
26 Ibid., 23.
27 Johanez Beltz, “Spiritualiser le
Dhamma? L’implantation Contestee
du Trailokya Bauddha Mahasangha en
Inde,” Asiatische Studien Etudes
Asiatiques 4 (1997),1055-1072.
28 Ibid., 1063.
29 Ibid., 1065.
30 Ibid., 1066.
31 D. C. Ahir, Buddhism and Ambedkar,
(Dalit Sahitya Prakashan 1990), 110.
32 Charles Hallisey and Anne Hansen, for
example, provide a useful framework
for understanding the inner moral
transformation that result from
repeated exposure to the Jataka tales.
They hold that narrative has the
unique ability to “prefigure,”
“configure”, and eventually
“transfigure” moral life. See Charles
Hallisey and Anne Hansen,
“Narrative, Sub-Ethics, and the Moral
Life,” Journal of Religious Ethics 24.2
(Fall 1996), 323.
33 Owen Lynch, “Dr. B. R. Ambedkar—
Myth and Charisma,” The
Untouchables in Contemporary India,
Ed. J. Michael Mahar (The University
of Arizona Press 1972), 110.
34 Dhammachari Lokamitra,
“Ambedkar and Buddhism,” Economic
and Political Weekly May 18, 1991,
1304.
35 Gopal Guru, “Appropriating
Ambedkar”, Economic and Political
Weekly, July 6-13, 1991, 1699.
36 See Friends of the Western Buddhist
Order, “Reviving Buddhism in India”,
available at http://www.fwbo.org/
india.html.
37 See Eleanor Zelliot, From
Untouchable to Dalit: Essays on the
Ambedkar Movement, 3rd edition
2001, Manohar, New Delhi. I also
would like to thank Professor Zelliot
for her invaluable contributions to
this article, particularly through her
understanding of the weaknesses and
future strengths of scholarship on
Navayana Buddhism.
38 See, e.g., Surendra Jondhale and
Johannes Beltz, Reconstructing the
World: B.R. Ambedkar and Buddhism
in India, (Oxford University Press
2004) and Gail Omvedt, Buddhism in
India: Challenging Brahmanism and
Caste (Sage Publications 2004).
39 See D. C. Ahir, Buddhism and
Ambedkar (Dalit Sahitya Prakashan
1990).
40 An example of an online forum is The
Buddhist Circle, at Yahoo! Groups.
Websites include www.ambedkar.org,
www.navayana.org, and
www.ambedkar.net. I would also like to
thank Mangesh Dahiwale and the other
members of The Buddhist Circle who
were a tremendous help and inspiration
to me while I was living in New Delhi.